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Summary 
 
The lessor‟s tacit hypothec improves the chances of the lessor to recover rent in 
arrears. This real security right arises by operation of law and attaches to the 
lessee‟s movable property found on the leased premises when rent is due but not 
paid. The extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec to third parties‟ property is the 
remedy‟s most controversial feature. The extension is supposedly based on one of 
two theoretical justifications, namely implied consent and the doctrine of estoppel. 
According to the implied-consent theory, the extension is based on the premise that 
the third party consented (explicitly or by implication) that his property can serve as 
security for the payment of the lessee‟s arrear rent. The basis of the second theory, 
the doctrine of estoppel, operates as a limitation on the rei vindicatio of the third 
party. Over the years discourse has shown that there are uncertainties surrounding 
these justifications. Recent debate has also shown that if constitutionally challenged, 
the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec could amount to arbitrary deprivation of 
third parties‟ property. 
The aim of this thesis is to establish whether and how the existing common law 
principles that provide for the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec over property 
belonging to third parties are affected by section 25(1) of the Constitution. 
Consequently, the thesis describes, analyses and scrutinises the general principles 
regulating the lessor‟s tacit hypothec, and more specifically the extension of the 
lessor‟s tacit hypothec to third parties‟ property, in view of section 25(1) of the 
Constitution. 
Taking into considering the recent statutory protection of third parties‟ property, 
the thesis concludes that the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec does not 
constitute an arbitrary deprivation of third parties‟ property because correct 
application of the common law principles that provide for the extension and the 
statutory protection that has been introduced to exclude a large number of cases 
from the reach of the extension adequately protect third parties‟ property interests. 
Therefore, the requirements of section 25(1) are satisfied. 
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Opsomming 
 
Die verhuurder se stilswyende hipoteek verbeter sy kanse om agterstallige huur van 
sy huurder in te vorder. Wanneer die huur opeisbaar word, maar die huurder versuim 
om tydig te betaal, kom hierdie saaklike sekerheidsreg deur regswerking tot stand en 
dit dek alle roerende sake wat op die verhuurde perseel gevind word. Die uitbreiding 
van die stilwyende hipoteek na eiendom wat aan derde partye behoort is die remedie 
se mees kontroversiële eienskap. Hierdie uitbreiding van die hipoteek se 
toepassingsveld  berus na bewering op een van twee regverdigingsgronde, naamlik 
die derde se geïmpliseerde toestemming en die leerstuk van estoppel. Volgens die 
geïmpliseerde toestemming-teorie kan die hipoteek na derdes se bates uitgebrei 
word op die veronderstelling dat sodanige derde partye toegestem het (uitdruklik of 
by implikasie) dat hulle eiendom as sekuriteit vir betaling van die huurder se 
agterstallige huur mag dien. Die tweede teorie steun op die beperking wat die 
leerstuk van estoppel op die rei vindicatio van die derde party plaas. Oor die jare het 
debatte aangedui dat daar onsekerhede rondom hierdie regverdigingsgronde 
bestaan. Onlangse debatte het ook aangetoon dat, indien dit grondwetlik getoets 
word, die uitbreiding van die hipoteek moontlik mag neerkom op ‟n arbitrêre 
ontneming van die derdes se eiendom. 
Die doel van hierdie tesis is om vas te stel of en hoe die bestaande 
gemeenregtelike beginsels wat die stilswyende hipoteek na bates van derdes uitbrei 
deur artikel 25(1) van die Grondwet beïnvloed word. Die tesis bespreek, analiseer en 
toets gevolglik die algemene beginsels van die verhuurder se stilswyende hipoteek, 
en meer spesifiek die uitbreiding van die hipoteek na bates wat aan derdes behoort, 
in die lig van artikel 25(1) van die Grondwet. 
Met inagneming van die beskerming wat derde party se eiendom in terme van 
onlangse wetgewing geniet, bevind die tesis dat die uitgebreide toepassing van die 
stilswyende hipoteek nie op ŉ arbitrêre ontneming van derde partye se eiendom 
neerkom nie omdat korrekte toepassing van die gemeenregtelike beginsels wat vir 
die uitbreiding voorsiening maak, in kombinasie met die wetgewende uitsluiting van 
‟n groot aantal sake wat aan derdes behoort, voldoende beskerming aan die belange 
van derdes verleen. Die vereistes van artikel 25(1) word dus bevredig. 
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Chapter 1:  
Introduction 
 
1 1 Introduction 
Real security is a limited real right that secures an obligation by entitling the creditor 
to have the encumbered property attached and sold in execution. Real security also 
grants the creditor a “right of first preference” regarding the proceeds of sale in 
execution of the security object against unsecured creditors and holders of 
subsequent real security rights.1 Real security rights are accessory in nature. This 
means that the creation and continued existence of real security rights depend on 
the existence of a valid underlying principal obligation.2 Thus, when the secured 
obligation ceases to exist, the real right of the secured creditor also comes to an 
end.3 Unlike personal security that is enforceable only against a specific person, real 
security rights are enforceable against the world at large. 
Modern South African law recognises only one of the original Roman tacit 
hypothecs, namely the lessor‟s tacit hypothec.4 The lessor‟s tacit hypothec (also 
known as the landlord‟s tacit hypothec) is a real security right created by operation of 
                                            
1
 See CG van der Merwe “Real security” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African law (9
th
 
ed 2007) 630-665 631. See also AJ van der Walt & GJ Pienaar Introduction to the law of property (6
th
 
ed 2009) 258; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of 
property (5
th
 ed 2006) 357; M Kaser Römisches Privatrecht (6
th
 ed 1960 trans by R Dannenbring 
Roman private law 2
nd
 ed 1968)126; B Nicholas An introduction to Roman law (1962) 150. 
2
 See H Mostert & A Pope (eds) The principles of the law of property in South Africa (2010) 300; GF 
Lubbe “Mortgage and pledge” rev TJ Scott in LTC Harms & FA Faris (eds) LAWSA Vol 17 Part 2 (2
nd
 
ed 2008) para 437; CG van der Merwe “Real security” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s Principles of South 
African law (9
th
 ed 2007) 630-665 631; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and 
Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 2006) 358; GJ Pienaar & AJM Steven “Real security” in R 
Zimmerman, D Visser & K Reid (eds) Mixed legal systems in comparative perspective: Property and 
obligations in Scotland and South Africa (2004) 758-786 760; AJM Steven “Accessoriness and 
security over land” (2009) 13 Edin LR 387-426 388. 
3
 SA Timber & Joinery Works (Pty) Ltd v The Sherriff 1955 (4) SA 56 (O). See further H Mostert & A 
Pope (eds) The principles of the law of property in South Africa (2010) 325; GF Lubbe “Mortgage and 
pledge” rev TJ Scott in LTC Harms & FA Faris (eds) LAWSA Vol 17 Part 2 (2
nd
 ed 2008) para 438. 
4
 See s 85(1) of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936; s 2 of the Security by Means of Movable Property Act 
57 of 1993; Holderness NO and Others v Maxwell and Others [2012] ZAKZPHC 49 (31 July 2012) 18; 
Eight Kaya Sands v Valley Irrigation Equipment 2003 (2) SA 495 (T) 514D-E. See further H Mostert & 
A Pope (eds) The principles of the law of property in South Africa (2010) 325; GF Lubbe “Mortgage 
and pledge” rev TJ Scott in LTC Harms & FA Faris (eds) LAWSA Vol 17 Part 2 (2
nd
 ed 2008) para 
440; CG van der Merwe “Real security” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African law (9
th
 ed 
2007) 630-665 655; D Smith “The constitutionality of the lessor‟s hypothec: Attachment of a third 
party‟s goods” (2011) 27 SAJHR 308-330 310. 
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law to secure the lessor‟s claim against the lessee for rent in arrears. The ability of 
the lessor to apply for attachment of the goods belonging to the lessee is the 
remedy‟s most salient feature.5 This tacit hypothec vests over movables (invecta et 
illata),6 including money brought on to the leased premises as well as the fruits of the 
land, to secure the payment of rent in arrears.7 The hypothec comes into existence 
the moment the lessee falls into arrears and terminates upon payment of the due 
amount.8 The lessor‟s hypothec is an accessory to the contract of lease and need 
not be negotiated by the parties.9 However, prior to attachment or the lessee‟s 
insolvency the hypothec holder (lessor) obtains no real right of security, with the 
effect that the invecta et illata forming the subject matter of the hypothec can simply 
be removed from the leased premises, thus depriving the lessor of his security.10 
Once the lessor‟s hypothec has been perfected (by way of court order and 
attachment), the lessor acquires a real security right. This right entails a preference 
to the proceeds following a sale in execution of the movable property. In addition, the 
lessor is entitled to prevent the lessee from removing the invecta et illata from the 
premises or to claim their return if they have been removed. The thesis reviews the 
general principles of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec. The main focus of thesis is on the 
rationale for the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec to third parties‟ property. 
 
1 2 Research problems, hypotheses, research aims and methodology 
The general principle is that the lessor‟s tacit hypothec operates against the lessee‟s 
movables brought on to the premises for permanent use by the lessee, irrespective 
                                            
5
 AJM Steven “Landlord‟s hypothec in comparative perspective” (2008) 12 EJCL 1-18 8. 
6
 Invecta et illata are movable goods brought on to the leased premises by the lessee. 
7
 Woodrow and Co v Rothman 1884 (4) EDC 201; Webster v Ellison 1911 AD 73 79, 86; Ordermann v 
Peinke 1911 EDL 201; Sugarman and SA Breweries Ltd v Burrows 1916 WLD 73. See also TJ Scott 
& S Scott Wille’s Law of mortgage and pledge in South Africa (3
rd
 ed 1987) 99. 
8
 Noble v Heatley 1905 TS 433. 
9
 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 
2006) 405. 
10
 S 32 of Magistrates‟ Courts Act 32 of 1944; Magistrates‟ Court rule 56. See also Timmeman v Le 
Roux 2000 (4) SA 59 (W) 65 I; Halstead v Durant NO 2002 (1) SA 27 (W) 282 C; Eight Kaya Sands v 
Valley Irrigation Equipment 2003 (2) SA 495 (T) 514D-G per Van der Walt J (Van der Westhuizen J 
concurring). The dissenting minority judgment per Preller AJ 514D-G “found the opposite in that 
Webster v Ellison 1911 AD 73 79 was, if correctly read, not authority for the proposition that the 
perfecting (by attachment) was necessary for the establishment of the landlord‟s hypothec.” See also 
H Mostert & A Pope (eds) The principles of the law of property in South Africa (2010) 325; PJ 
Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 2006) 
405; TJ Scott & S Scott Wille’s Law of mortgage and pledge in South Africa (3
rd
 ed 1987) 99. 
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of whether the lessor was aware of their presence.11 However, in certain 
circumstances the hypothec operates contrary to the principle,12 in that it also applies 
against the property of third parties found on the leased premises.13 In these 
situations, the lessor‟s tacit hypothec may only extend to the movable goods 
belonging to third parties if the property of the lessee and sub-lessee proves 
insufficient to satisfy the lessor‟s claim for arrear rent.14 The law with regard to the 
extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec to a third party‟s property was laid down by 
the then Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in Bloemfontein Municipality v 
Jacksons Ltd:15  
“When goods belonging to a third person are brought on to leased premises with 
the knowledge and consent, express or implied, of the owner of the goods, and 
with the intention that they shall remain there indefinitely for the use of the 
tenant, and the owner, being in a position to give notice of his ownership to the 
landlord fails to do so, and the landlord is unaware that the goods do not belong 
to the tenant, the owner will thereby be taken to have consented to the goods 
being subject to the landlord‟s tacit hypothec and liable to attachment.”16 
The requirements for attaching property belonging to third parties in terms of the 
lessor‟s tacit hypothec were set out in Bloemfontein Municipality v Jacksons Ltd:17  
 The property must be on the premises with the knowledge of its owner; 
                                            
11
 Friedlander v Croxford & Rhodes 1867 (5) Searle 395; Mackay Bros Ltd v Eaglestone 1932 TPD 
301 305; Fresh Meat Supply Co v Standard Trading Co (Pty) Ltd 1933 CPD 550 567. 
12
 Goldinger’s Trustee v Whitelaw Son 1916 TPD 230 235; Van den Bergh, Melamed & Nathan v 
Polliack & Co 1940 TPD 237 238. See also CG van der Merwe “Real security” in F du Bois (ed) 
Wille’s Principles of South African law (9
th
 ed 2007) 630-665 657. 
13
 Bushing v Kinnear 1885 (5) HCG 254 (presumption that invecta et illata belong to the person in 
whose ostensible possession they are found must be rebutted for property to be treated as belonging 
to a third party). See also AJ van der Walt & GJ Pienaar Introduction to the law of property (6
th
 ed 
2009) 275; CG van der Merwe “Real security” in F Du Bois (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African law 
(9
th
 ed 2007) 630-665 657. 
14
 Frielander v Croxford and Rhodes 1867 (5) Searle 395 (in case of an invalid sublease, the sub-
lessee is in position of a third party whose movables have been brought onto the premises); Ex parte 
Aegis Assurance & Trust Co Ltd 1909 EDC 363; Ex parte Adler 1911 EDL 106; Yost Typewriter Co v 
Andrew 1915 (3) NPD 213 (the lessee has a hypothec over the invecta et illata of the sub-lessee); 
Reinold & Co v Oudtshoorn 1931 TPD 382; Odendaal v Van Oudshoorn 1968 (3) SA 433; Standard 
Bank Financial Services Ltd v Tylam (Pty) Ltd 1972 (2) SA 383 (C); Eight Kaya Sands v Valley 
Irrigation Equipment 2003 (2) SA 495 (T). See also CG van der Merwe “Real security” in F du Bois 
(ed) Wille’s Principles of South African law (9
th
 ed 2007) 630-665 657; D Smith “The constitutionality 
of the lessor‟s hypothec: Attachment of a third party‟s goods” (2011) 27 SAJHR 308-330 311. 
15
 1929 AD 226 271. 
16
 See also Barclays Western Bank Ltd v Dekker & Another 1984 (3) SA 220 (D) 222-223; TR 
Services (Pty) Ltd v Poynton's Corner Ltd & Others 1961 (1) SA 773 (D) 775. 
17
 1929 AD 226 227. 
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 the property must be present with some degree of permanence and not merely 
temporarily; 
 the property must be there for the lessee‟s own use and benefit; and  
 the landlord must be unaware of the fact that the property belongs to someone 
else and not to the lessee. 
 
These requirements, which serve as the justifications for allowing attachment of third 
parties‟ property to secure the lessee arrear rent, have been confirmed by the courts 
in Fresh Meat Supply Co v Standard Trading Co (Pty) Ltd18 and Eight Kaya Sands v 
Valley Irrigation Equipment.19 However, in recent years discussions have shown that 
there is uncertainty concerning these justifications for the extension of the lessor‟s 
tacit hypothec to third parties‟ property for the payment of the arrear rent of the 
lessee. This uncertainty has recently become more apparent, and in TR Services 
(Pty) Ltd v Poynton’s Corner Ltd & Others20 Warner J expressed the following 
opinion:  
“[I]t is very difficult to discover the true basis for the landlord having a 
hypothec over the goods of third parties in the possession of the tenants … 
this ... appears to be a strange approach because I find the greatest difficulty 
in believing that any owner, if asked the question, would agree to his goods 
being made subject to such hypothec. He would almost inevitably reply: „Of 
course I do not agree to it; why should I?‟” 
In Eight Kaya Sands v Valley Irrigation Equipment21 Van der Walt J in an obiter 
dictum stated that there is no legal relationship between the lessor and a third party 
whose movables are on the leased premises and therefore, there is no justification to 
attach the third party‟s property as security for the debt of the lessee.22 
The main research question in this thesis is whether and how the existing 
common law principles that provide for the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec to 
                                            
18
 1933 CPD 550. 
19
 2003 (2) SA 495 (T) 500–502. 
20
 1961 (1) SA 773 (N) 775D-H. 
21
 2003 (2) SA 495 (T) 500G-H. 
22
 See also AJM Steven “Landlord‟s hypothec in comparative perspective” (2008) 12 EJCL 1-18 14; 
JS McLennan “A lessor‟s hypothec over the goods of third parties – anomaly and anachronism” 
(2004) 16 SA Merc LJ 121-125 125. 
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a third party‟s property provide adequate protection to the third party‟s constitutional 
property rights and if not, whether the common law principles need to develop in a 
different direction under the influence of the Constitution. It is therefore important to 
carefully scrutinise the justifications for the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec to 
third parties‟ property as laid down in Bloemfontein Municipality v Jacksons Ltd.23 
In as far as the lessor‟s tacit hypothec extends to property belonging to third 
parties it may be inconsistent with section 25(1) of the Constitution, which protects 
third parties‟ property rights against arbitrary deprivation. However, if the existing 
common law principles protect the interests of affected third parties adequately, the 
extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec will probably be in line with section 25(1) of 
the Constitution. 
In order to investigate the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec to a third 
party‟s property and to understand how it applies in practice, I will describe and 
analyse the literature regarding the lessor‟s tacit hypothec. The purpose for such 
description and analysis is to enable an understanding of how the lessor‟s hypothec 
developed and how it operates with respect to a third party‟s property. This 
investigation should also indicate the justifications for the application of the lessor‟s 
tacit hypothec to a third party‟s property and the protection that is available to protect 
the property rights of third parties. The methodology expounded by the Constitutional 
Court in First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African 
Revenue Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance24 
is applied to determine whether the justifications of the extension of the lessor‟s tacit 
hypothec and legislative protection of third parties‟ property rights adequately protect 
third parties‟ constitutional property rights. In fact, section 25(1) of the Constitution 
prohibits arbitrary deprivation of property and requires sufficient reasons for a 
deprivation. Accordingly, the justification for the extension of the lessor‟s tacit 
hypothec would have to provide that sufficient reason to ensure that it does not 
cause arbitrary deprivation. 
 
                                            
23
 1929 AD 266 227. 
24
 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 46. 
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1 3 Overview of chapters 
The thesis starts by exploring the general principles that provide for the lessor‟s tacit 
hypothec in Roman-Dutch law. The meaning of real security and the common law 
forms of real security that existed in Roman law prior to the evolution of the lessor‟s 
tacit hypothec are considered briefly to illustrate the need for and importance of the 
lessor‟s tacit hypothec. Followed by an analysis of the acceptance of the lessor‟s 
tacit hypothec in South African law, Chapter 2 explores the nature and ownership of 
the property that is bound by the lessor‟s tacit hypothec, the accrual of the hypothec, 
attachment and its legal effects, and the lessor‟s preference upon the lessee‟s 
insolvency. 
Chapter 3 turns to the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec to third parties‟ 
property. The chapter starts by describing and examining the extension principle and 
its origins. More specifically, the chapter focuses on setting out the justifications for 
the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec to third parties‟ property as well as the 
protective measures developed under the common law and recently enacted 
statutory protection for third parties‟ property rights against the extension of the 
lessor‟s tacit hypothec. Hence, the chapter discusses and analyses the implied 
consent and estoppel theories that are usually offered as justifications for the 
extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec with reference to case law prior to 1929, the 
1929 case of Bloemfontein Municipality v Jacksons Ltd25 and post-1929 case law to 
create a framework within which the protection of third parties‟ constitutional property 
rights is evaluated. 
Chapter 4 draws on the research conducted in the previous chapters as a basis 
for interpreting and understanding justifications for the extension of the lessor‟s tacit 
hypothec to property belonging to third parties. The justifications (theories) for the 
extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec to third parties‟ property as they are 
understood and applied in practice are scrutinised in the light of section 25(1) of the 
Constitution to determine the constitutional validity of the extension of the lessor‟s 
tacit hypothec to third parties‟ property. The methodology set out in First National 
Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance26 is followed to establish 
                                            
25
 1929 AD 266. 
26
 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 46. 
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whether the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec to third parties‟ property 
constitutes arbitrary deprivation of the third parties‟ property. Taking into 
consideration the clarification of the justifications for the extension of the lessor‟s 
tacit hypothec to third parties‟ property established in Chapter 3, the extension of the 
lessor‟s tacit hypothec to property belonging to a third party is compared to the 
legislative provision that was at issue in the FNB case. 
Chapter 5 brings together the conclusions drawn from the analyses in the 
previous chapters and provides certain recommendation that may assist the courts 
when applying the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec to third parties‟ property.
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
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Chapter 2:  
General principles 
 
2 1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe and analyse the common law principles 
that provide for the lessor‟s tacit hypothec, with the aim to enable an understanding 
of how the lessor‟s tacit hypothec developed and how it works. My hypothesis is that 
a clear exposition of the common law principles that provide for the lessor‟s tacit 
hypothec in this chapter will lay a good foundation for scrutiny in the next chapter of 
the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec to third parties‟ property. 
Since the lessor‟s tacit hypothec developed in Roman law and Roman-Dutch 
law and was adopted in South African law, the place to start tracing its origins is in 
Roman law.1 In Roman law fiducia (also known as fiducia cum creditore contracta) 
and pignus were the main forms of real security prior to the evolution of the lessor‟s 
tacit hypothec (hypotheca). Creating real security by means of fiducia meant that 
ownership of property belonging to the debtor had to be conveyed to the creditor 
subject to the condition that it would be re-conveyed as soon as the debtor paid the 
secured debt. In the case of pignus the creditor was placed in possession of the 
security object (property). However, ownership of the property remained with the 
debtor.2 The need for real security without possession and/or transfer of ownership 
of the security object led to the development of hypotheca. Creating real security by 
means of hypotheca meant that the creditor could be protected without being placed 
in possession of or having ownership of the security object transferred to him. This 
meant that the debtor remained in possession of the security object as well as that 
ownership of the security object remained with the debtor. However, the creditor had 
                                            
1
 See in general R Zimmerman “„Double cross‟: Comparing Scots and South African law” in R 
Zimmerman, D Visser & KGC Reid (eds) Mixed legal systems in comparative perspective (2004) 1-33 
4-6; F du Bois “Sources of law: Common law and precedent ” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s Principles of 
South African law (9
th
 ed 2007) 64-99 67. 
2
 WW Buckland A textbook of Roman law from Augustus to Justinian (1975) 475; R van den Bergh 
“The development of the landlord‟s hypothec” (2009) 15 Fundamina 155-167 156. 
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a right to take possession of the security object in cases where the debtor failed to 
pay his debt.3 
Originally, hypotheca developed in the context of rural leases where its security 
object was the lessee‟s fruits and crops, and it was also extended to urban leases 
where the security object was the lessee‟s invecta et illata. Initially hypotheca could 
only be constituted by agreement.4 However, the contractual basis of the hypotheca 
in urban leases was abolished by the emperor Justinian when he spoke of a just or 
legal presumption with regard to the lessee‟s invecta et illata, and from that time the 
hypotheca no longer arose by agreement but by operation of law:5  
“We accept that property brought on to an urban leasehold is hypothecated, as if 
this had been impliedly agreed. The opposite is true of rural tenancies.”6 
Following Roman law, Roman-Dutch law also recognised the lessor‟s tacit hypothec 
(hypotheek) for arrear rent and also applied it to the lessee‟s invecta et illata in the 
case of urban tenements and to the lessee‟s fruits and crops of a rural tenement.7 
The Roman law lessor‟s tacit hypothec, as developed by Roman-Dutch law, is the 
only one of the Roman law tacit hypothecs that has been received into South African 
law8 and its value is recognised by the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936.9 
The second part of this chapter commences with an examination of the 
meaning of real security. It also provides an overview of the common law forms of 
real security (fiducia and pignus), which existed prior to the evolution of the lessor‟s 
tacit hypothec in Roman law as well as real security rights recognised in Roman-
Dutch law and South African law. My hypothesis is that an overview and analysis of 
                                            
3
 WW Buckland A textbook of Roman law from Augustus to Justinian (1975) 475. See further R van 
den Bergh “The development of the landlord‟s hypothec” (2009) 15 Fundamina 155-167 157. 
4
 WW Buckland A textbook of Roman law from Augustus to Justinian (1975) 475. See further R van 
den Bergh “The development of the landlord‟s hypothec” (2009) 15 Fundamina 155-167. 
5
 See also R van den Bergh “The development of the landlord‟s hypothec” (2009) 15 Fundamina 155-
167 166. 
6
 D 20.2.4 (English translation of the Digest referred to in this quote is from T Mommsen, P Kruger & 
A Watson The Digest of Justinian Vol II (1985)). See also R van den Bergh “The development of the 
landlord‟s hypothec” (2009) 15 Fundamina 155-167 166. 
7
 T Berwick A contribution to an English translation of Voet’s commentary on the Pandects (1902) 
311. 
8
 See Friedlander v Croxford & Rhodes (1867) 5 Searle 395; Baker v Hirst & Co (1880) 2 NLR 55 57; 
Longlands v Francken (1881) Kotzé 256; Mackay Bros v Cohen (1884) 1 Off R 342; Webster v Ellison 
1911 AD 73 79; Bloemfontein Municipality v Jacksons 1929 AD 266 271; Columbia Furnishing Co v 
Goldblatt 1929 AD 27 30. See further WE Cooper Landlord and tenant (2
nd
 ed 1994) 180. 
9
 See ss 47 and 85 of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936. 
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these forms of real security will lay the basis for an understanding of the need for 
and importance of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec. The third part of this chapter analyses 
the development of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec in Roman law, Roman-Dutch law and 
its acceptance and operation in South African law. The discussion of the operation of 
the lessor‟s tacit hypothec in South African law continues in the fourth part of the 
chapter, where the nature and ownership of the goods bound by lessor‟s tacit 
hypothec are analysed. The fifth part explores the accrual of the hypothec, 
attachment and its legal effects, and the lessor‟s preference on the lessee‟s 
insolvency. Termination of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec is discussed in the sixth part of 
this chapter. 
 
2 2 Real security 
2 2 1 Meaning of real security 
Van den Bergh10 states that in ancient Rome the most common form of security was 
personal security.11 This state of affairs may have resulted from the fact that a large 
number of relationships were based on fidelity.12 Nevertheless, despite the 
propensity to mostly make use of personal security, Roman property law also 
recognised real security.13 
                                            
10
 R van den Bergh “The development of the landlord‟s hypothec” (2009) 15 Fundamina 155-167 155. 
11
 M Kaser Römisches Privatrecht (6
th
 ed 1960 trans by R Dannenbring Roman private law 2
nd
 ed 
1968) 126 states that “the Romans at all times preferred „personal credit‟, with giving sureties, over 
„real credit‟”. F Schulz Classical Roman law (1951) 402 states that “in the law of the Republic and as 
well as of the classical period, we have to realise the important fact that the principal form of credit 
was pure personal credit (with or without sureties) and not real credit”. HF Jolowicz Historical 
introduction to the study of Roman law (1932) 309 declares that “personal security appears to have 
developed at an earlier stage in Roman history than did real security” and the author further states 
that “even in the law of classical times and later, when security is needed for procedural purposes, it 
is almost exclusively in the form of suretyship that it is required that was required”. WW Buckland The 
main institutions of Roman private law (1931) 320 states that “it is a well evidenced fact that the 
Romans preferred surety to what is called real security”. See further R van den Bergh “The 
development of the landlord‟s hypothec” (2009) 15 Fundamina 155-167 155. 
12
 R van den Bergh “The development of the landlord‟s hypothec” (2009) 15 Fundamina 155-167 155. 
F Schulz Classical Roman law (1951) 402 emphasises that “in the law of the Republic as well as the 
classical period, the principal form of credit was personal and not real security: Roman fides, Roman 
pedantic accuracy, honesty, and reliability in business matters were the strong pillars of that credit”. F 
Schulz Principles of Roman law (1936) 237 states that “personal security too played a greater part 
than security by pledge or hypotheca and that, in particular, the law relating to mortgages on real 
property was so poorly developed, is explained by the large number of relationships based on fidelity”. 
13
 JAC Thomas Textbook of Roman law (1976) 328 states that “in the course of Roman legal 
development, there were three forms of real security, all – even when created by contract – giving the 
creditor a right in rem in the thing which constituted the security, the res obligata”. F Schulz Classical 
Roman law (1951) 403 states that “real credit developed but slowly and imperfectly in Roman 
economic life and the history of the Roman law concerning real security shows the same features”. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
11 
Schulz defines real security as a right over a thing, movable or immovable, 
granted to a creditor in order to secure his claim against the debtor.14 Buckland 
states that the essence of transactions creating real security is to give the creditor 
some right, essentially a right in rem, over property by way of security for the debt.15 
Lee also states that a real security right is a real right created to secure the 
performance of an obligation.16 Furthermore, Thomas describes real security as the 
situation where the debtor or a third party offers an object over which a real right in 
favour of the creditor is vested.17 Therefore, a real security right can be defined as a 
limited real right that secures an obligation by entitling the creditor with the right to 
have the encumbered property attached and sold in execution and to use the 
proceeds to settle the outstanding debt. Real security also entitles the creditor with a 
“right of first preference” with regard to the proceeds of a sale in execution of the 
security object against unsecured creditors.18 Unlike other limited real rights, real 
security rights secure the obligation and cease to exist as soon as the secured 
obligation is fulfilled.19 In other words, real security rights are accessory in nature.20 
 
2 2 2 Real security in Roman and Roman-Dutch law 
Having examined the meaning of real security in the preceding section, this section 
commences by exploring kinds of real security that existed prior to the development 
of hypotheca in Roman law and led to the evolution of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec in 
Roman law. This section further examines the acceptance and development of 
                                                                                                                                       
See further R van den Bergh “The development of the landlord‟s hypothec” (2009) 15 Fundamina 
155-167 155. 
14
 F Schulz Classical Roman law (1951) 400. See also R van den Bergh “The development of the 
landlord‟s hypothec” (2009) 15 Fundamina 155-167 155. 
15
 WW Buckland A textbook of Roman law from Augustus to Justinian (1975) 473. See also R van 
den Bergh “The development of the landlord‟s hypothec” (2009) 15 Fundamina 155-167 155. 
16
 RW Lee The elements of Roman law with a translation of the Institutes of Justinian (4
th
 ed 1956) 
175. 
17
 PHJ Thomas Introduction to Roman law (1986) 67. 
18
 See CG van der Merwe “Real security” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African law (9
th
 
ed 2007) 630-665 631. See also AJ van der Walt & GJ Pienaar Introduction to the law of property (6
th
 
ed 2009) 258; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of 
property (5
th
 ed 2006) 357; M Kaser Römisches Privatrecht (6
th
 ed 1960 trans by R Dannenbring 
Roman private law 2
nd
 ed 1968)126; B Nicholas An introduction to Roman law (1962) 150. 
19
 H Mostert & A Pope (eds) The principles of the law of property in South Africa (2010) 325; GF 
Lubbe “Mortgage and pledge” rev TJ Scott in LTC Harms & FA Faris (eds) LAWSA Vol 17 Part 2 (2
nd
 
ed 2008) para 437; TJ Scott & S Scott Wille’s Law of mortgage and pledge in South Africa (3
rd
 ed 
1987) 1. 
20
 For an explanation of the development of the accessoriness principle in Roman law see M Kaser 
Römisches Privatrecht (6
th
 ed 1960 trans by R Dannenbring Roman private law 2
nd
 ed 1968) 130. 
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pignus and hypotheca in Roman-Dutch law. In fact, in the course of Roman legal 
development there were three forms of real security, namely fiducia, pignus and 
hypotheca.21 
Fiducia is the oldest form of real security.22 Fiducia consisted of the transfer of 
ownership of the security object to the creditor.23 The transfer was done by means of 
mancipatio or in iure cessio and it was subject to an agreement of trust (pacta 
fiduciae) that the security object would be re-conveyed to the former owner once the 
debt was paid.24 Initially a pacta fiduciae was not enforceable as such and the debtor 
relied on the trustworthiness of the creditor.25 Pacta fiduciae became enforceable 
when the praetor granted the parties an actio fiduciae (personal action) that was only 
enforceable between the creditor and the debtor.26 Pacta fiduciae usually included a 
clause (pactum distrahendi) that provided that the creditor should be entitled to sell 
the security object if the debt was not paid the on agreed date.27 However, the 
creditor did not acquire an ius in re aliena (limited real right) in the property, since a 
pacta fiduciae was not a real security right.28 Originally, only res mancipi could be 
used to constitute fiducia.29 Yet, later all corporeal objects could be used to 
constitute fiducia.30 
Van den Bergh31 points out that the inherent dangers of fiducia was that if the 
creditor turned out to be untrustworthy the debtor would only have a personal action 
against the creditor, that the debtor took all the risk, and that successive mortgage 
                                            
21
 In this regard see PHJ Thomas Introduction to Roman law (1986) 67. See also R van den Bergh 
“The development of the landlord‟s hypothec” (2009) 15 Fundamina 155-167 156. 
22
 WA Hunter A systematic and historical exposition of Roman law in order of a code (4
th
 ed 1885) 
434. See also PHJ Thomas Introduction to Roman law (1986) 67. 
23
 WA Hunter A systematic and historical exposition of Roman law in order of a code (4
th
 ed 1885) 
434. See also PHJ Thomas Introduction to Roman law (1986) 67. 
24
 WA Hunter A systematic and historical exposition of Roman law in order of a code (4
th
 ed 1885) 
434. 
25
 See PHJ Thomas Introduction to Roman law (1986) 67; R van den Bergh “The development of the 
landlord‟s hypothec” (2009) 15 Fundamina 155-167 156. 
26
 PHJ Thomas Introduction to Roman law (1986) 67. 
27
 A pactum distrahendi entailed that the creditor could use the proceeds of the sale in execution to 
satisfy his claim. The pactum distrahendi developed during the classical period into the ius distrahendi 
(an implied right to sell the security object if the debt was not discharged): See PHJ Thomas 
Introduction to Roman law (1986) 67. 
28
 PHJ Thomas Introduction to Roman law (1986) 67. 
29
 Res mancipi is the category of property that Romans, in early Rome, viewed to be of particular 
importance to them. 
30
 PHJ Thomas Introduction to Roman law (1986) 67. 
31
 R van den Bergh “The development of the landlord‟s hypothec” (2009) 15 Fundamina 155-167 156. 
See also M Kaser Römisches Privatrecht (6
th
 ed 1960 trans by R Dannenbring Roman private law 2
nd
 
ed 1968) 128. 
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against the same property was not possible.32 Van den Bergh argues that other 
types of real security evolved as a result of the abovementioned disadvantages of 
fiducia.33 Notwithstanding these disadvantages, fiducia remained in use throughout 
the classical period.34 According to Hunter, fiducia co-existed with pignus and 
hypotheca for a long time and successfully developed up to the time of 
Constantine.35 Hunter states that fiducia began to be ignored in practice after the 
abolishment of the lex commissoria.36 According to Hunter, fiducia lost the other 
pillar on which it rested when the ancient forms of conveyance, mancipatio and 
cession in jure, fell into disuse. Fiducia fell into complete oblivion during the time of 
the emperor Justinian (approximately 530 – 533 AD).37 
The next form of real security to be introduced in Roman law was pignus,38 in 
which case possession of the security object passed to the creditor but ownership 
remained with the debtor. Pignus was a creation of praetorian law and was only 
                                            
32
 In this context the term mortgage means mortgage in a wide or comprehensive sense. See PJ 
Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 2006) 
357; TJ Scott & S Scott Wille’s Law of mortgage and pledge in South Africa (3
rd
 ed 1987) 1 for the 
difference between the narrow and wide meaning of mortgage. 
33
 R van den Bergh “The development of the landlord‟s hypothec” (2009) 15 Fundamina 155-167 156. 
34
 See P van Warmelo An introduction to the principles of Roman civil law (1976) 113-114. See further 
JAC Thomas Textbook of Roman law (1976) 329-330; WW Buckland A textbook of Roman law from 
Augustus to Justinian (1975) 473-474; B Nicholas An introduction to Roman law (1962) 150-151; RW 
Lee The elements of Roman law with a translation of the Institutes of Justinian (4
th
 ed 1956) 171; HF 
Jolowicz Historical introduction to the study of Roman law (1954) 318; F Schulz Classical Roman law 
(1951) 406-407; R van den Bergh “The development of the landlord‟s hypothec” (2009) 15 Fundamina 
155-167 156. 
35
 WA Hunter A systematic and historical exposition of Roman law in order of a code (4
th
 ed 1885) 
434. 
36
 The lex commissoria was the essential element of the fiducia and entailed that if the money 
borrowed was not repaid on the agreed date, the security object would be forfeited to the creditor: 
See WA Hunter A systematic and historical exposition of Roman law in order of a code (4
th
 ed 1885) 
434. 
37
 WA Hunter A systematic and historical exposition of Roman law in order of a code (4
th
 ed 1885) 
434. See also M Kaser Römisches Privatrecht (6
th
 ed 1960 trans by R Dannenbring Roman private 
law 2
nd
 ed 1968) 128. See further PHJ Thomas Introduction to Roman law (1986) 67 who states that 
fiducia became obsolete in post-classical law. 
38
 WW Buckland A textbook of Roman law from Augustus to Justinian (1975) 474-475 states that 
pignus is a term usually used for a pledge delivered to the creditor and that was made possible by the 
praetor granting protection for the possession. See also P van Warmelo An introduction to the 
principles of Roman civil law (1976) 115-116; JAC Thomas Textbook of Roman law (1976) 330-332; 
RW Lee The elements of Roman law with a translation of the Institutes of Justinian (4
th
 ed 1956) 171-
172; HF Jolowicz Historical introduction to the study of Roman law (1954) 317; F Schulz Classical 
Roman law (1951) 407; R van den Bergh “The development of the landlord‟s hypothec” (2009) 15 
Fundamina 155-167 156. 
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regarded as a real right because it could eventually be enforced with an actio in rem. 
Under the word pignus the Romans understood the right as well as the thing itself.39 
The last form of real security to be introduced in Roman law was hypotheca, 
where the creditor only had a right to take possession of the security object, but 
without any actual handing over.40 It was possible for the parties to agree not to 
transfer possession of the security object until the debt became due.41 Since the 
development of hypotheca is discussed in the next section,42 it is unnecessary to 
discuss it here. However, it suffices at this stage to draw the distinction between 
hypotheca and pignus. Hunter states that in Roman law there was not much 
difference between pignus and hypotheca.43 Pignus was usually used in those cases 
where possession of the security object was transferred to the creditor and 
hypotheca was used in cases where the debtor retained possession of the security 
object and the creditor had a right to take possession of the security object when the 
debt was not paid in time.44 
Roman-Dutch law, as influenced by Roman law, also recognised pignus 
(pandgeving) and hypotheca (hypotheek). In early Dutch law an object given as 
security for the due performance of a contract of exchange was known as vadium 
(wedde) and the whole transaction was called the vadium contract.45 If the promised 
                                            
39
 See in general R van den Bergh “The development of the landlord‟s hypothec” (2009) 15 
Fundamina 155-167 156. 
40
 Hypotheca is a term used for a pledge that was not delivered: See F Schulz Classical Roman law 
(1951) 407-408. See also WW Buckland A textbook of Roman law from Augustus to Justinian (1975) 
475- 476; R van den Bergh “The development of the landlord‟s hypothec” (2009) 15 Fundamina 156. 
41
 See WA Hunter A systematic and historical exposition of Roman law in order of a code (4
th
 ed 
1885) 434; WW Buckland A textbook of Roman law from Augustus to Justinian (1975) 475. 
42
 See section 2 3 below. 
43
 WA Hunter A systematic and historical exposition of Roman law in order of a code (4
th
 ed 1885) 
436. 
44
 D 13.7.9.2: “Strictly speaking, we use pignus for the pledge which is handed over to the creditor 
and hypotheca for the case in which he does not even get possession.” D 20.1.5: “The difference 
between pignus and hypotheca is purely verbal.” (English translation of the Digest referred to in this 
footnote is from T Mommsen, P Kruger & A Watson The Digest of Justinian Vol II (1985)). See also D 
20.2.4. M Nathan Common law of South Africa Vol II (1904) 934-5 states that “tacit hypothecation, 
according to the Roman law, it forms one of the branches of piguns neccessarium (necessary 
hypothec), which is divided into pignus praetorium, and pignus legale. Pignus praetorium or judiciale 
is the hypothecation which takes place in favour of the judgment creditor upon the goods of the 
judgment debtor, for the satisfaction of the judgment. Pignus legale, or legal hypothec, is implied 
necessarily by law, so that there is no necessity for bargaining for it expressly. Nor will agreement to 
the contrary, that is, that there shall be no legal hypothec arising out of the transaction, be of any 
avail, wherefore the hypothec is said to be tacit or implied”. See further M Kaser Römisches 
Privatrecht (6
th
 ed 1960 trans by R Dannenbring Roman private law 2
nd
 ed 1968) 129; WA Hunter A 
systematic and historical exposition of Roman law in order of a code (4
th
 ed 1885) 436. 
45
 TJ Scott & S Scott Wille’s Law of mortgage and pledge in South Africa (3
rd
 ed 1987) 2. 
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article was forthcoming, the object handed over provisionally could be redeemed. In 
this sense it was a pledge. However, unlike the South African pledge, it was not an 
accessory agreement but rather had the nature of an alternative payment.46 
According to Grotius,47 pignus is a contract whereby a person places his 
property in the hands of another as security for his debt. Van Leeuwen in his Rooms-
Hollands recht48 wrote that pandgeving is either the giving in pledge of a movable 
property, or hypotheca or onderzetting by which immovable property is bonded 
without actual delivery. Huber49 stated that hypotheek takes place when property 
remains with the debtor and pandt when the property is delivered to the creditor as a 
security for a debt.50 The abovementioned authorities therefore made a distinction 
between pignus and hypotheca. The distinction depends either on the method of 
implementing the security or on the nature of the property secured.51 In other words, 
the distinction between pandt and hypotheek is that for the creation of pandt the 
creditor must be placed in possession of the security object whereas to create 
hypotheek the creditor need not to be in possession of the security object. 
Furthermore, hypotheek is created by operation of law and pandt is created by 
agreement between the debtor and creditor. 
 
2 2 3 Real security in modern South African law 
Roman-Dutch law has been an integral part of South African law since the 17th 
century, and the principles of Roman-Dutch law are still applied in South African 
courts.52 The Roman-Dutch principles of property law, including real security, form a 
major part of South African property law.53 With their origins in Roman law and as 
                                            
46
 TJ Scott & S Scott Wille’s Law of mortgage and pledge in South Africa (3
rd
 ed 1987) 2. 
47
 H Grotius Inleidinge tot de Hollandsche rechtsgeleertheid (1631 trans by RW Lee The 
jurisprudence of Holland Vol 1 1953, hereafter referred to as Grotius) 3.8.1. 
48
 4.12.2. 
49
 U Huber Heedendaagse rechtsgeleertheyt (1686 trans by P Gane The jurisprudence of my time 
1993) 3 19 1. 
50
 See also TJ Scott & S Scott Wille’s Law of mortgage and pledge in South Africa (3
rd
 ed 1987) 4. 
51
 See also TJ Scott & S Scott Wille’s Law of mortgage and pledge in South Africa (3
rd
 ed 1987) 3. 
52
 See Lazarus v Dose (1884) 3 SC 42; Webster v Ellison 1911 AD 73; Holderness NO and Others v 
Maxwell and Others [2012] ZAKZPHC 49 (31 July 2012). See also in general F du Bois “Sources of 
law: Common law and precedent ” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African law (9
th
 ed 
2007) 64-99 67; R Zimmerman “„Double cross‟: Comparing Scots and South African law” in R 
Zimmerman, D Visser & KGC Reid (eds) Mixed legal systems in comparative perspective (2004) 1-33 
4-6; AJ Kerr “The reception and codification of systems of law in Southern Africa” (1958) 2 JAL 82-
100 82. 
53
 See in general M Nathan Common law of South Africa Vol II (1904) 934-5. 
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developed in Roman-Dutch law, pignus (pledge) and hypotheca (hypothec) also form 
part of South African property law. Pledge and hypothec are both real security rights 
that are recognised in modern South African property law.54 
Similar to Roman-Dutch real security, South African real security rights afford a 
secured creditor a right to have the security object attached and sold in execution 
and a right of first preference over the proceeds of the security object.55 This means 
that when a debtor is unwilling or unable to repay the principal debt, the creditor may 
apply to court for the attachment of the security object and have it sold in execution. 
If the security object is subject to more than one real security right, the right that was 
created first takes precedent.56 The principal debt relationship between the creditor 
and debtor is essential and without it there can be no real security.57 When the 
secured obligation ceases to exist, the real right of the secured creditor also comes 
to an end.58 This means that the emergence and continued existence of real security 
rights depend on the existence of a valid underlying principal obligation.59 The 
accessoriness principle is well developed in South African law and it has been 
influenced by early Roman-Dutch law.60 This principle is recognised both in case 
law61 and in the works of modern writers regarding personal and real security.62 
                                            
54
 See in general CG van der Merwe “Real security” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s Principles of South 
African law (9
th
 ed 2007) 630-665. 
55
 H Mostert & A Pope (eds) The principles of the law of property in South Africa (2010) 298. See 
further GF Lubbe “Mortgage and pledge” rev TJ Scott in LTC Harms & FA Faris (eds) LAWSA Vol 17 
Part 2 (2
nd
 ed 2008) para 437. 
56
 See s 2(2) of the Security by Means of Movable Property Act 57 of 1993. For a discussion of the 
ranking of claims in general see R Sharrock, K van der Linde & A Smith Hockly’s Insolvency law (9
th
 
ed 2012) 186-192; CG van der Merwe “Real security” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s Principles of South 
African law (9
th
 ed 2007) 630-665 638-639. See in general H Mostert & A Pope (eds) The principles of 
the law of property in South Africa (2010) 298; L Steyn “Treatment of secured creditors of an insolvent 
estate: Changing perspectives in South African law” (2002) 11 Int Insolv Rev 35-48. 
57
 H Mostert & A Pope (eds) The principles of the law of property in South Africa (2010) 325. 
58
 SA Timber & Joinery Works (Pty) Ltd v The Sherriff 1955 (4) SA 56 (O). See further H Mostert & A 
Pope (eds) The principles of the law of property in South Africa (2010) 325; GF Lubbe “Mortgage and 
pledge” rev TJ Scott in LTC Harms & FA Faris (eds) LAWSA Vol 17 Part 2 (2
nd
 ed 2008) para 437. 
59
 See H Mostert & A Pope (eds) The principles of the law of property in South Africa (2010) 300; GF 
Lubbe “Mortgage and pledge” rev TJ Scott in LTC Harms & FA Faris (eds) LAWSA Vol 17 Part 2 (2
nd
 
ed 2008) para 437; CG van der Merwe “Real security” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s Principles of South 
African law (9
th
 ed 2007) 630-665 631; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and 
Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 2006) 358; GJ Pienaar & AJM Steven “Real security” in R 
Zimmerman, D Visser & K Reid (eds) Mixed legal systems in comparative perspective: Property and 
obligations in Scotland and South Africa (2004) 637-670 760; AJM Steven “Accessoriness and 
security over land” (2009) 13 Edin LR 387-426 388. 
60
 See AJM Steven “Accessoriness and security over land” (2009) 13 Edin LR 387-426 392. 
61
In African Life Property Holdings v Score Food Holdings 1995 (2) SA 230 (A) 238F the court held 
per Nienaber JA that “guaranteeing a non-existent debt is as pointless as multiplying by nought”. See 
also Kilburn v Estate Kilburn 1931 AD 501 506; Lief NO v Dettmann 1964 (2) SA 252 (A) 259; 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
17 
Unlike personal security that is enforceable only against a specific person, real 
security rights are enforceable against the world at large and may arise either by 
agreement (express real security), by operation of law (tacit real security) or by court 
order (judicial real security).63 The mortgage, pledge and notarial bond are forms of 
express real security rights.64 The lessor‟s tacit hypothec, the instalment agreement 
hypothec, statutory security rights and liens are forms of tacit real security.65 Judicial 
mortgages and judicial pledges are forms of judicial real security.66 
 
2 3 General principles of the lessor’s tacit hypothec 
2 3 1 Historical background 
2 3 1 1 Roman law 
In Roman law the need for a change in the field of security without possession 
and/or transfer of ownership of the security object arose fairly early.67 The history of 
the existence of hypotheca is attested to in Cato‟s time (234-149 BC).68 The need for 
the protection of the creditor without possession of the security object started with 
cases in which a lessor of an agricultural tenement was willing to lease his land.69 
Van den Bergh states that the lessor wished to collect the rent but in most cases it 
could not be paid before the harvest and therefore there was a need for credit until 
                                                                                                                                       
Thienhaus v Metje & Ziegler Ltd 1965 (3) SA 25 (A) 44; AJM Steven “Accessoriness and security over 
land” (2009) 13 Edin LR 387-426 392. 
62
 See PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 
ed 2006) 358-359; CF Forsyth & JT Pretorius Caney’s The law of suretyship (4
th
 ed 2002) 37; E Kahn 
(ed) KM Kritzinger Principles of the law of mortgage, pledge and lien (1999) 8-9; TJ Scott & S Scott 
Wille’s Law of mortgage and pledge in South Africa (3
rd
 ed 1987) 4. 
63
 See in general H Mostert & A Pope (eds) The principles of the law of property in South Africa 
(2010) 296-300. 
64
 See in general PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of 
property (5
th
 ed 2006) 357-402. 
65
 See in general, PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of 
property (5
th
 ed 2006) 403-425. 
66
 See in general, PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of 
property (5
th
 ed 2006) 403-425. 
67
 R van den Bergh “The development of the landlord‟s hypothec” (2009) 15 Fundamina 155-167 157. 
68
 See HF Jolowicz Historical introduction to the study of Roman law (1954) 319. B Nicholas An 
introduction to Roman law (1962) 151-152 states that “the existence of pledge without possession is 
attested to in Cato‟s time (234-149 BC) by a clause in his form of contract for the sale of olives on a 
tree, which provides that „everything that the purchaser brings into the olive grove is to serve as 
security for payment‟ (Cato De Agri Cultura 146 5) and a similar clause with respect to slaves and 
cattle in the form of a sale of pasture, there being in the latter case a further clause which provides 
that any litigation concerning the matter is to take place in Rome (Cato De Agri Cultura 149 7-8)”. 
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 F Schulz Classical Roman law (1951) 408. See also WW Buckland A textbook of Roman law from 
Augustus to Justinian (1975) 475; R van den Bergh “The development of the landlord‟s hypothec” 
(2009) 15 Fundamina 155-167 157. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
18 
such time as the crop was gathered.70 Lessors required some form of security and in 
most cases the only property an agricultural lessee could pledge was his cattle, 
slaves and farming equipment – in other words, everything he would require to 
farm.71 
In the case of both fiducia and pignus this state of affairs meant that the lessee 
would lose control of the property pledged and as a result would not be able to 
farm.72 This impossible situation led to the development of a new form of security, 
namely hypotheca.73 The rural lessor‟s hypotheca originally arose by a special 
agreement between the parties that the lessor would be entitled to take the 
hypothecated property as well as the harvest if the lessee failed to pay the rent when 
it became due.74 The lessee agreed that whatever was brought on the leased land or 
produced there should be subject to the hypotheca.75 The agreement was that the 
creditor obtained neither ownership nor possession of the pledged property but a 
bare ius in re aliena.76 The advantage of hypotheca was that the lessee could 
continue using whatever he needed to farm while it was hypothecated as security for 
the rent.77 The content of the real security at the time of the agreement was that the 
pledge would come into existence at some time in future if the rent was not duly 
paid.78 In terms of this agreement the lessor had no action in rem and had to depend 
on self-help if the lessee failed to deliver the security object to him. Van den Bergh 
states that the agreement therefore was not enforceable as such, and 
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 R van den Bergh “The development of the landlord‟s hypothec” (2009) 15 Fundamina 155-167 158. 
71
 R van den Bergh “The development of the landlord‟s hypothec” (2009) 15 Fundamina 155-167 157. 
72
 F Schulz Classical Roman law (1951) 408. 
73
 A Borkowski & P du Plessis Textbook on Roman law (2005) 304 refers to the hypotheca as a 
“modified form of pignus”. B Nicholas An introduction to Roman law (1962) 151-152 refers to it as a 
“variant of pignus”. JC van Oven Leerboek van Romeinsch Privaatrecht (1948) 173-174 calls it a 
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was no publicity. However, it may be said that by the time it had become a tacit agreement and even 
earlier, when the agreement between the lessor and the lessee had become usual, everybody would 
have been aware that the invecta et illata and the crops had been pledged for the rent. In such a case 
no further publicity seems to have been necessary: See R van den Bergh “The development of the 
landlord‟s hypothec” (2009) 15 Fundamina 155-167 157. 
74
 R van den Bergh “The development of the landlord‟s hypothec” (2009) 15 Fundamina 155-167 158. 
75
 See D 20.1.32. See also A Borkowski & P du Plessis Textbook on Roman law (2005) 304; P van 
Warmelo An introduction to the principles of Roman civil law (1976) 116; WW Buckland A textbook of 
Roman law from Augustus to Justinian (1975) 475; RW Lee The elements of Roman law with a 
translation of the Institutes of Justinian (4
th
 ed 1956) 172; HF Jolowicz Historical introduction to the 
study of Roman law (1954) 319; F Schulz Classical Roman law (1951) 407-408. 
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 R van den Bergh “The development of the landlord‟s hypothec” (2009) 15 Fundamina 155-167 158. 
77
 R van den Bergh “The development of the landlord‟s hypothec” (2009) 15 Fundamina 155-167 158. 
78
 R van den Bergh “The development of the landlord‟s hypothec” (2009) 15 Fundamina 155-167 158. 
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notwithstanding this disadvantage it was a practical and convenient custom. At first 
the hypotheca only applied in the case of agricultural tenants.79 
According to Van den Bergh,80 as soon as the hypotheca was accepted in rural 
leases it was extended to the lease of urban premises, in which event the rent was 
secured by the lessee‟s invecta et illata.81 The urban hypotheca attached to all the 
movable property brought on to the leased premises for the lessee‟s use. The 
lessor‟s knowledge of the presence of the movables was irrelevant.82 For example, 
furniture was tacitly deemed to have been pledged as security for the rent and for 
any damage caused by the tenant.83 The hypotheca was further extended to inns 
and warehouses, in which case the rent was likewise secured by the invecta et 
illata.84 As far as urban premises were concerned the move away from agreement to 
tacit consent – as a requirement to constitute hypotheca – initially appeared in the 
Digest of Emperor Justinian:  
“We accept that property brought on to an urban leasehold is hypothecated, as if 
this had been impliedly agreed. The opposite is true of rural tenancies.”85 
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 R van den Bergh “The development of the landlord‟s hypothec” (2009) 15 Fundamina 155-167 158. 
80
 R van den Bergh “The development of the landlord‟s hypothec” (2009) 15 Fundamina 155-167 158. 
81
 This was the technical term used for animals and slaves (that were chased in) and farm implements 
(that were carried in). In D 20.2.4 inducta is used instead of invecta. The distinction between these 
two words is that inducta refer to animals led on to the property and invecta refer to things carried on. 
With regard to authority for the extension of the tacit hypothec to the lessees of urban premises, 
Neratius wrote in D 20.2.4: “We accept that property brought on to urban leasehold is hypothecated, 
as if this had been impliedly agreed.” In D 20.2.4.1 Neratius states that this also holds true for stables, 
although they are not directly adjacent to urban property. In D 20.2.6 Ulpian states that “[a]lthough it is 
understood that in urban tenancies properties brought on the premises is impliedly hypothecated as if 
this had been specifically agreed …”. Paul in D 20.14.4 states that “[l]ikewise on the ground that even 
agreements by implication are valid, it is settled that in the letting of urban dwellings, the movables (of 
the tenant) constitute a pledge for the landlord even though nothing is expressly agreed”. (English 
translation of the Digest referred to in this footnote is from T Mommsen, P Kruger & A Watson The 
Digest of Justinian Vol II (1985)). See further D 13.7.11.5: “[H]ence, if you rent a house and sublet 
part of it to me and I pay my rent to your lessor, I will have the action on pignus against you.” (English 
translation of the Digest referred is from T Mommsen, P Kruger & A Watson The Digest of Justinian 
Vol III (1985)). See also Baker v Hirst & Co (1880) 2 NLR 55 57. 
82
 R van den Bergh “The development of the landlord‟s hypothec” (2009) 15 Fundamina 155-167 158. 
83
 In D 13.7.11.5 Ulpian states that “furniture and movables” will be charged and that the “agreement 
was impliedly taken to have been made”. (English translation of the Digest referred to in this footnote 
is from T Mommsen, P Kruger & A Watson The Digest of Justinian Vol III (1985))  
84
 In D 20.2.3 Ulpian states: “If a warehouse, hotel or site is leased, Neratius thinks that there is here 
also an implied agreement for the hypothecation of goods brought in. This is the better view.” (English 
translation of the Digest referred to in this footnote is from T Mommsen, P Kruger & A Watson The 
Digest of Justinian Vol II (1985)) 
85
 D 20.2.4 (English translation of the Digest referred to in this footnote is from T Mommsen, P Kruger 
& A Watson The Digest of Justinian Vol II (1985)). 
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Justinian‟s Digest further states that the tacit hypotheca will apply not only in Rome 
but also in the provinces, so that all the inhabitants can benefit from this “equitable 
presumption”. Therefore, the lessor‟s right to take possession of the property in 
urban leases no longer arose by agreement but by operation of law.86 However, 
agreement remained a requirement with regard to the rural lessee‟s invecta et 
illata.87 Van den Bergh suggests that the invecta et illata of a rural lessee were too 
important to be tacitly hypothecated because they were necessary to make a living 
and without them he could not work or survive.88 
During the Republic the lessor did not acquire any right (personal or real) in 
terms of the agreement and therefore it was of little use to him.89 Towards the end of 
the Republic, the praetor Salvius gave the lessor the interdictum Salvianum to 
enforce this agreement. Subsequently, the lessor was granted an actio in rem, the 
actio Serviana.90 This action constituted a valid pledge. At first, this action in rem 
applied only between the lessor and the lessee but not against third parties in 
possession of the lessee‟s property. Subsequent to the introduction of the actio 
Serviana, Hadrian in his Edict91 extended the actio Serviana to the actio quasi 
Serviana, which then allowed the lessor to claim the property from anyone. The 
lessor therefore obtained an ius possidendi.92 This development gave the lessor a 
real right and enabled him to obtain possession of the hypothecated property upon 
non-payment of the debt and a right to realise the value of the property for the 
purpose of satisfying his claim.93 
The preceding section shows that the lessor‟s hypothec developed in Rome in 
approximately 160 BC.94 It developed in agricultural leases and could be constituted 
by agreement between the lessor and the lessee. Conversely, with regard to urban 
premises the hypothec could also be constituted without agreement between the 
lessor and lessee. At first the lessor had no action in rem but a personal right. The 
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 RW Lee The elements of Roman law with a translation of the Institutes of Justinian (4
th
 ed 1956) 
178. See also further R van den Bergh “The development of the landlord‟s hypothec” (2009) 15 
Fundamina 155-167 160. 
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 D 20.2.4. See also R van den Bergh “The development of the landlord‟s hypothec” (2009) 15 
Fundamina 155-167 161. 
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 R van den Bergh “The development of the landlord‟s hypothec” (2009) 15 Fundamina 155-167 161. 
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 AJM Steven “Landlord‟s hypothec in comparative perspective” (2008) 12 EJCL 1-18 2. 
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 §§ Edict 266, 267. 
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significant development of the Roman lessor‟s hypothec was when Emperor 
Hadrian95 gave the lessor the actio quasi Serviana, which allowed the lessor to claim 
the hypothecated property from everyone.96 
 
2 3 1 2 Roman-Dutch law 
The Roman-Dutch law lessor‟s tacit hypothec has a double origin. It is derived from 
the pandingsrecht of old Dutch law, on to which has been grafted the tacit hypothec 
of Roman law.97 Old Dutch law did not recognise the tacit hypothec but the 
pandingsrecht, which was not a security right but merely the right to obtain security 
by attaching the goods of the debtor.98 By virtue of this right the lessor could attach 
the lessee‟s invecta et illata for the arrear rent (which process was called 
pandneming) and, after due notice to the lessee, have them sold in execution without 
previously having obtained a judgment against the lessee.99 Similar to Roman law, 
Roman-Dutch law recognised two categories of hypotheca, namely the express and 
the tacit hypothec,100 each containing several individual hypothecs.101 Unlike express 
hypothecs (pledges), tacit hypothecs arose by operation of law apart from and 
without any agreement between the parties.102 Roman-Dutch law recognised various 
forms of tacit hypothecs.103 To secure the rent due to him, the lessor in Roman law 
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Fundamina 155-167. 
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 ed 1948) 189. 
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hypothecs arise by operation of law. 
101
 T Berwick A contribution to an English translation of Voet’s commentary on the Pandects (1902) 
308. See also TJ Roos & H Reitz Principles of Roman-Dutch law (1909) 89, 93; M Nathan Common 
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Grotius (3
rd
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 RW Lee Introduction to Roman-Dutch law (3
rd
 ed 1931) 189. 
103
 The following is a list of tacit hypothecs as stated by GT Morice English and Roman-Dutch law (2
nd
 
ed 1905) 54, that were recognised in Roman-Dutch law and that were also imported to South African 
law: (a) the tacit hypothec on land subject to a census as security for such a census; (b) as security 
for the costs of maintaining dikes; (c) that of masons, carpenters or other workmen as security for 
materials supplied or labour bestowed in the repair of any building (but not in its ornamentation or 
improvement); (d) that of the state over the property receivers or controllers of public revenues; (e) 
that of minors over the property of their guardians as security for deficiencies through 
maladministration; (f) that of the lessors of houses and lands over all goods brought on the leased 
premises (omnia illata et invecta) as well as growing crops; (g) that of bleachers of linen and clothes 
as security for payment of their charges; (h) that of towns, villages and churches over the receivers or 
controllers of their revenues; (i) that of a captain over the ship and merchandise as security for his 
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had a tacit hypothec over invecta et illata brought on to the urban leased 
premises,104 and in the case of an agricultural tenancy over the fruits and crops of 
the land.105 Roman-Dutch law incorporated the Roman law lessor‟s tacit hypothec 
and extended it to apply to invecta et illata of the lessee of the agricultural 
tenancy.106 As a result, no distinction was drawn between urban and rural leases and 
therefore every lessor had a tacit hypothec over the invecta et illata of his lessee 
found on the leased property when the lessee failed to pay the rent.107 
 
2 3 2 South African law 
The Roman law lessor‟s tacit hypothec, as developed in Roman-Dutch law, has been 
accepted by the courts as part of South African law.108 In South African law the 
lessor has a tacit hypothec over the invecta et illata on the leased premises for 
arrear rent.109 The lessor‟s tacit hypothec operates against movables brought on to 
the leased premises for permanent use by the lessee, whether or not the lessor was 
aware of their presence.110 The lessor‟s tacit hypothec constitutes an exception to 
                                                                                                                                       
freight; (j) that of a merchant on a ship belonging to the captain, as security for compensation for 
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nd
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Merwe “Real security” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African law (9
th
 ed 2007) 630-665 
656; P Havenga, M Havenga, R Kelbrick, M McGregor, H Schulze, K van der Linde General principles 
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th
 ed 2007) 178; JTR Gibson, C Visser, JT Pretorious, R Sharrock & M van 
Jaarsveld (eds) South African mercantile and company law (8
th
 ed 2003) 182; WE Cooper Landlord 
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nd
 ed 1994) 180; TJ Scott & S Scott Wille’s Law of mortgage and pledge in South Africa 
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rd
 ed 1987) 99; MA Diemont, RM Marais, PJ Aronstam The law of hire-purchase in South Africa (4
th
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th
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the principle that provides that to satisfy his debt a creditor is only entitled to execute 
against his debtor‟s property, since in certain circumstances it may extend to third 
parties‟ property.111 
The lessor‟s tacit hypothec is the only one of the old tacit hypothecs that has 
any value for purposes of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936.112 While it abolished the 
preference formerly conferred by other tacit hypothecs over the estate of insolvent 
persons, the Insolvency Act expressly preserves the preference conferred by the 
lessor‟s tacit hypothec.113 The Insolvency Act also limits the amount for which the 
preference is claimable.114 
In Woodrow & Co v Rothman115 the court had to decide whether the lessor‟s 
tacit hypothec covers the lessee‟s arrear rent as well as the damage or deterioration 
caused by him. The court held that the lessor‟s tacit hypothec covered rent only and 
not a debt due by the lessee for repairs that he had failed to make.116 More recently, 
in New Life Communal Property Association v Draigri Boerdery Bpk117 Froneman J 
found in favour of the respondents and held that the hypothec only secures 
outstanding rent. Further, section 85(2) of the Insolvency Act confers a preference 
on the lessor (for purposes of the lessee‟s insolvency) in respect of rent only. 
South African writers are divided in their views. On one hand, there are those 
who argue that the lessor‟s tacit hypothec only secures payment of arrear rent,118 
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while on the other hand, there are those who argue that the lessor‟s tacit hypothec is 
not limited to the arrear rent but that it also covers damage caused by the lessee.119 
 
2 4 Nature and ownership of the property bound 
2 4 1 Nature of the goods 
When it is invoked, the lessor‟s tacit hypothec only attaches to movable property 
present on the leased premises or movables attached while in transit to a new 
destination subsequent to removal from the premises.120 Movable property that is 
subject to the lessor‟s tacit hypothec is divided into two classes, namely the invecta 
et illata and the fruits and crops of the leased property.121 
The first class of applicable movables, invecta et illata, consists of corporeal 
movable goods driven or carried on to the leased property,122 and they are subject to 
the lessor‟s tacit hypothec.123 For instance, animals, furniture and ornaments, jewels, 
arms, implements, tools, gold and silver of the lessee found on the leased premises 
are subject to the lessor‟s tacit hypothec. In Roman-Dutch law merchandise in a 
shop was said to be free from the hypothec on the ground that it is not brought on 
the premises by the lessee for his own service and use.124 This view has not been 
adopted in South African law.125 The position in modern South African law is that all 
stock belonging to the lessee that is found in the shop at the time of attachment is 
subject to the hypothec.126 In Harris v Tomlison127 it was held that the lessor who 
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ejected his lessee and exercised his hypothec over the property of the lessee was 
entitled to remain in possession of such property until the arrear rent was paid. In 
Goldinger’s Trustee v Whitelaw & Sons the court expressed the view that the only 
possibility of excluding movable property found on the leased premises is when it 
belongs to a third party.128 
The second class of movables, fruits and crops of the leased property, are also 
subject to the lessor‟s tacit hypothec.129 In Orderman v Peincke it was held that fruits 
and crops are subject to the hypothec whether still growing or after they have been 
separated from the soil.130 In MacDonald v Radin & the Potchefstroom Dairies & 
Industries Co131 it was held that the lessor is the owner of fructus naturales.132 The 
court expressed the view that when the lessee collects the fructus naturales of the 
property, he does so with the lessor‟s implied consent, which must be taken to be 
given without prejudice to his hypothec for rent.133 Incorporeal property is not subject 
to the lessor‟s tacit hypothec.134 In Insolvent Estate Dunn135 the court had to decide 
whether money in the lessee‟s hands was subject to the lessor‟s tacit hypothec. The 
court held that the hypothec could not extend to a “totally incorporeal thing” such as 
the lessee‟s right, title and interest in a liquor licence. In Sugarman & SA Breweries 
Ltd v Burrows136 it was held that the lessor‟s tacit hypothec does not attach to the 
proceeds of a sale of property that was subject to the hypothec. Wille is of the view 
that these cases are sufficient authority for the proposition that money in the lessee‟s 
hands is not subject to the hypothec.137 Cooper argues that money found on the 
leased premises is subject to the lessor‟s tacit hypothec but not the proceeds of the 
sale of invecta et illata that has been deposited in the lessee‟s banking account or 
that had not been paid to him yet.138 
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2 4 2 Ownership of the property 
Ownership of property can never be absolute and it may be limited in the interest of 
the community, neighbours and other holders of rights.139 A lessor‟s tacit hypothec is 
an example of the way in which the rights of an owner of property may be limited by 
operation of law.140 Classes of persons whose property may be subject to the 
hypothec are the lessee, the sub-lessee and third parties.141 In what follows I discuss 
the situations in which the lessee‟ and sub-lessee‟s property may be subject to the 
lessor‟s tacit hypothec. The situation in which a third party‟s property found on the 
leased property may be subject to the lessor‟s tacit hypothec forms an essential part 
of this thesis and therefore it is discussed in the next chapter. 
Generally the lessor‟s tacit hypothec attaches to all goods that belong to the 
lessee that are brought on to the leased premises with the intention that it remains 
there indefinitely.142 In Bushing v Kinnear143 it was held that there is a presumption 
that movable property belongs to the person in whose ostensible possession it is 
found.144 Further, a person who claims ownership of property found on the leased 
premises has the onus to prove his ownership.145 In Cholwich v Penny it was held 
that the lessor‟s tacit hypothec cannot be defeated by a simulated transaction 
between the lessee and a third party purporting to give the latter real rights in the 
goods, whereas the former remains owner of such goods.146 
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If the lessee‟s invecta et illata prove insufficient to satisfy the lessor‟s claim for 
arrear rent, the invecta et illata found on the premises belonging to a bona fide sub-
lessee may be subjected to the lessor‟s tacit hypothec, but only for such an amount 
as the sub-lessee owes the lessee for rent.147 In Friedlander v Croxford & Rhodes it 
was held that if a sub-lessee had not obtained consent from the lessor, his sub-lease 
is not bona fide and therefore the invecta et illata are subject to the lessor‟s tacit 
hypothec as if they belonged to the lessee.148 In Du Preez v Mkwambi149 the lessee 
had subleased a rural tenement without his lessor‟s consent. The court held that the 
sub-lessee‟s property was subject to the lessor‟s tacit hypothec. However, the court 
in Ex parte Aegis Assurance & Trust Co Ltd expressed the view that in the case of a 
lease with a clause against sub-leasing, and if there is nothing to show that the sub-
lessee is aware of the clause, it should be assumed that the sub-lessee is bona 
fide.150 Cooper‟s view is that a sub-lessee derives all his rights to a sub-leased 
property from the lessee and the latter therefore cannot give the sub-lessee greater 
rights than he has.151 Conversely, as there is no link between the lessor and the sub-
lessee, the lessor‟s rights in his property cannot be weaker than in the case of the 
lessee.152 Cooper contends that rent is fructus civiles to which the owner of the land 
is entitled.153 Therefore, a sub-lessee‟s invecta et illata are subject to the lessor‟s 
tacit hypothec to the extent that the sub-lessee owes the lessee rent. If a sub-lease 
is invalid, the sub-lessee is in the same position as any other third party whose 
property is on the premises let to the lessee and therefore it is not subject to the 
lessor‟s tacit hypothec unless it is intended for the lessee‟s use.154 Accordingly, 
Cooper argues that Friedlander v Croxford & Rhodes155 and Du Preez v Mkwambi156 
were wrongly decided, since the sub-lessees did not bring their properties on to the 
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leased premises for the use by the lessees but for their own use.157 Cooper‟s 
argument seems plausible, since the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec to the 
unlawful sub-lessee‟s property in almost all situations will not meet all the 
requirements of the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec to the third party‟s 
property, especially the requirement that the third party‟s property should have been 
brought on to the leased premises for the lessee‟s use.158 
 
2 5 Accrual of the lessor’s tacit hypothec, attachment and the lessor’s 
preference on the lessee’s insolvency 
2 5 1 Accrual of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec and attachment (and its legal effect) 
The lessor‟s tacit hypothec originates directly and immediately from the contract of 
lease.159 However, it is operative only when and as long as the rent is in arrears and 
not paid.160 As a result, if rent is payable on the first day of the month but it is not 
paid on that day, the lessor‟s tacit hypothec accrues on the second day.161 Since the 
lessor‟s tacit hypothec is accessory to an obligation to pay rent, the lessor has no 
hypothec if no rent is due.162 The lessor‟s tacit hypothec relates only to movables 
that are present on the leased premises on the day that rent becomes due.163 
Apart from the preference enjoyed by the lessor on the lessee‟s insolvency,164 
the accrual of the hypothec does not afford the lessor a real security right.165 As a 
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result, there is nothing to prevent third parties from acquiring rights in the same 
property, which may nullify the lessor‟s tacit hypothec.166 It follows that without 
attachment the hypothec does not prevent a concurrent creditor from attaching 
property subject to the lessor‟s tacit hypothec to satisfy his claim.167 To acquire a real 
security right, the lessor must seek the assistance of the court,168 and thus have the 
sheriff of the court attach property on the premises or apply for an interim interdict to 
prevent removal of property from the leased premises.169 In Webster v Ellison,170 
Innes J remarked that the fact that the hypothec attaches and operates only as long 
as the goods are on the leased premises renders the lessor‟s tacit hypothec of little 
practical value.171 Consequently, in the absence of an interdict or attachment, the 
lessor‟s tacit hypothec is lost as soon as the goods are removed from the 
premises.172 The judge emphasised that the lessor is not entitled to prevent the 
lessee from removing the property from the leased premises; rather, his remedy is to 
seek the assistance of the court and obtain an interdict or an attachment order.173 It 
does not matter who removes the property from the leased premises or whether 
such a person knew or was ignorant of the existence of the hypothec over the 
property.174 As a result, the hypothec is lost if the lessee, a bona fide purchaser of 
the property, a creditor, or the messenger acting on behalf of a third party removes 
property subject to the lessor‟s tacit hypothec from the premises before 
attachment.175 Removal of the property from the leased premises before perfection 
(attachment) defeats the lessor‟s tacit hypothec, since the lessor has no real security 
right over the property but only a personal right to acquire a real security right over 
the invecta et illacta belonging to the lessee.176 However, the lessor‟s tacit hypothec 
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is not lost if the property is removed from the leased premises by the sheriff or 
messenger under a writ of execution taken out by the lessor for the very purpose of 
giving effect to the hypothec.177 
Roman-Dutch law recognised the lessor‟s right to seize property removed from 
the leased premises but only while it is in transit to its new destination,178 since the 
lessor‟s tacit hypothec operates against property found on the leased premises and 
is lost as soon as it is removed from the leased premises.179 South African courts 
have accepted this principle180 but have rejected to grant an attachment order 
relating to the invecta et illata once it has reached its destination.181 South African 
courts have expressed the view that although the lessor may make an application 
expeditiously, it will not order the attachment and return of the property to the leased 
premises once it has reached its destination.182 
In South African law the machinery to assist the lessor to protect and enforce 
his hypothec takes various forms. The Magistrates‟ Courts Act 32 of 1944 and the 
High Court Rules contain special procedures that enable the lessor to have the 
movable property found on the leased premises attached as security for his claim for 
arrear rent. The Magistrates‟ Courts Act provides two remedies for the protection of 
the lessor‟s tacit hypothec. The first remedy is in terms of section 31 of the Act, 
which provides that an automatic rent interdict may be obtained when summons 
claiming rent is issued. This entails attaching to the summons a notice that prohibits 
any person from removing any of the furniture or other effects that are subject to the 
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lessor‟s tacit hypothec from the leased property, until the court has made an order.183 
Such a notice serves as an interdict against any person who knows about the notice 
not to remove any of the specified property.184 Confirmation by the court of such an 
interdict operates as an extension of the interdict until execution of a further order of 
the court.185 The second remedy is in terms of section 32 of the Magistrates‟ Courts 
Act, as amended by section 25 of the Magistrates‟ Courts Amendment Act 120 of 
1993. In essence, section 32(1) of the Act provides for the issue of an attachment 
order on application by the lessor or his agent on affidavit alleging as follows: the 
premises is situated within the jurisdiction of the court; an amount of rent not 
exceeding the court‟s jurisdiction is due and in arrears; rent has been demanded in 
writing for the space of seven days and more; and that the lessee is about to remove 
the movable property from the premises in order to avoid payment of the rent.186 
These allegations are regarded as grounds for attachment of the lessee‟s 
property.187 
In Timmerman v Le Roux188 it was held that the application must expressly 
make an allegation that the lessee intends removing the movables in the immediate 
future, and that the reason for the removal is specifically to avoid payment of rent.189 
The court expressed the view that a magistrate is not permitted to authorise the 
removal of the goods when granting an attachment order and that removal may only 
take place pursuant to the execution procedure laid down in the Magistrates‟ Courts 
Act.190 Upon security being given to the satisfaction of the clerk of the court to pay all 
damages, costs and charges that the lessee or any other person may sustain or 
incur by reason of the attachment if it is set aside, the court may issue an attachment 
order. The order is carried out by the sheriff of the court. The sheriff can attach so 
much of the movable property on the premises subject to the lessor‟s tacit hypothec 
for the rent as may be sufficient to satisfy the amount of such rent, together with the 
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costs of the application and any action for the rent.191 Generally, any person affected 
by an interim interdict may apply to the court to have the notice set aside.192 
However, in Halstead v Durrant193 it was held that there can be no appeal against 
interlocutory orders such as an interim interdict confirming the lessor‟s tacit 
hypothec.194 This principle also applies to actions brought in terms of section 32(2) of 
the Magistrates‟ Courts Act, which provides that any affected person (namely, the 
lessee or other persons affected by the order) can apply to have the attachment set 
aside, provided that he offer security pending the final decision of the court.195 An 
application to vary or rescind the attachment order can also be made under section 
36(d) of the Magistrates‟ Courts Act.196 
In cases where the high court has jurisdiction, an interdict pendente lite (interim 
interdict) would seem to afford adequate protection.197 The general principle with 
regard to obtaining an interdict pendente lite is that the lessor must establish the 
following: a clear right; an injury actually committed or reasonably apprehended; and 
the absence of similar or adequate protection by any other ordinary remedy.198 An 
application for an interim interdict will succeed if the applicant is able to satisfy the 
abovementioned requirements. However, the court has discretion to grant an interim 
interdict even when a clear right has not been proven. The court may only grant an 
interim interdict in the following circumstances: the right the applicant seeks to 
protect is prima facie established, even though open to some doubt; there is a well-
grounded apprehension of irreparable harm to the applicant if the interim relief is not 
granted, and he ultimately succeeds in establishing the right; the balance of 
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convenience favours the granting of interim relief; and the applicant has no other 
satisfactory remedy.199 
The effect of the abovementioned remedies is either to prohibit anyone with 
knowledge of the order in question to remove movable property from the premises or 
to enable the sheriff of the court to attach sufficient movable property, even before 
final judgment has been obtained. In all these cases a final attachment order can be 
obtained after the lessor has successfully applied in court for arrear rent. The accrual 
and nature of attachment to perfect the lessor‟s tacit hypothec are discussed above 
and the legal effect of attachment is discussed below. 
In Leech v Gardner200 Hertzog J expressed the opinion that what the lessor had 
before attachment was only a right to have the goods hypothecated to him. He 
pointed out that it was called a potential right in the invecta at illata and that the 
hypothec was only completely constituted after arrest.201 In Webster v Ellison202 
Innes J pointed out that the lessor‟s tacit hypothec would be of little practical value 
without some special machinery to enforce it and that the machinery provided by the 
Roman-Dutch law for this purpose is attachment.203 In Reddy v Johnson204 it was 
held that attachment is necessary to create a limited real right and consequently that 
a lessor cannot prevent removal of the goods from the premises without first seeking 
an attachment order.205 In Eight Kaya Sands v Valley Irrigation Equipment206 the 
central issue was whether attachment of the movable property on the leased 
premises was necessary to perfect the lessor‟s tacit hypothec. Van der Walt J 
answered this question in the affirmative, while Preller AJ disagreed. Van der Walt J, 
relying on Webster v Ellison,207 stated that as a general rule the lessor‟s tacit 
hypothec takes effect once the movables are attached and therefore lapses if the 
movables are removed and not attached. According to Van der Walt J, the lessor‟s 
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tacit hypothec grants the lessor a right to attachment in order to vest a real security 
right over the movable property of the lessee as security for the payment of the 
rental arrears.208 Without attachment, no complete real right comes into existence.209 
The minority judgment of Preller AJ, on the other hand, approached the legal 
principles differently. His view was that a limited real right comes into existence as 
soon as rent is in arrears.210 According to Preller AJ, attachment is not necessary for 
the hypothec to operate as a real security right. However, the lessee could frustrate 
the right by removing the property from the leased premises, even in the presence of 
the lessor. The lessor can only prevent this from happening by obtaining an interdict 
or an attachment order.211 More recently, the court in Holderness NO and Others v 
Maxwell and Others212 confirmed the majority judgment in Eight Kaya Sands v Valley 
Irrigation Equipment,213 and held that the lessor‟s tacit hypothec without attachment 
by means of a court order does not vest the lessor with a real security right.214 
Knobel215 questions Van der Walt J‟s construction as to whether attachment is 
necessary.216 Her question concerns the nature of the right that comes into existence 
once a lessee falls into rental arrears, but before attachment has taken place.217 
Knobel points out that some authors218 and judges219 argue that the hypothec 
becomes a real right only upon attachment or the acquisition of effective control in 
another way, such as the automatic rent interdict.220 By contrast, other authors221 
and one judge222 contend that the lessor‟s tacit hypothec comes into existence as 
soon as rent is in arrears. In order to vest, perfect or secure the hypothec, the lessor 
has certain rights that he may exercise in respect of the movable things on the 
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leased premises, such as the entitlement to attach the movables.223 Knobel argues 
that none of the authors and judges referred to above explains the nature of the 
lessor‟s tacit hypothec or the right (or entitlement, as she prefers) that the lessor has 
before perfection. According to Knobel there is authority for the view that these 
entitlements arise ex lege.224 She is of the opinion that the hypothec is best 
construed as one of the naturalia of the contract of lease, a term that is implied ex 
lege into a contract complying with the requirements of a contract of lease.225 It is not 
clear whether or not Knobel agrees with the sources she refers to. Knobel concludes 
that Van der Walt J‟s decision is more equitable in terms of its practical effect on the 
position of a third person. She prefers the majority decision of Van der Walt J 
because attachment provides unambiguous compliance with the publicity principle 
and promotes legal certainty.226 
I conclude that the court in Webster v Ellison227 interpreted Voet228 to the effect 
that the hypothec, before attachment, has no force against third parties. In other 
words, the lessor‟s tacit hypothec is only effective between the parties.229 I suggest 
that the right that the lessor has before attachment is a personal right to acquire a 
real security right.230 Therefore, attachment is necessary to establish a real security 
right. This construction is supported by case law,231 academic views,232 and 
legislation.233 The effect of attachment is that the lessor‟s right against the property is 
rendered effective against the whole world.234 This result follows from the fact that as 
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soon as attachment is made, the subsequent removal of goods from the premises is 
prohibited. This means that a personal right conferred on the lessor by the hypothec 
is converted by attachment into a real security right.235 The lessor becomes a 
secured creditor,236 both prior to and upon the insolvency of the lessee.237 
 
2 5 2 Lessor‟s preference on the lessee‟s insolvency 
Upon the lessee‟s insolvency attachment is not necessary in order to obtain a 
preference in favour of the lessor.238 The lessor automatically obtains a right of first 
preference over the proceeds of the goods that are subject to his hypothec. 
Regarding the lessor‟s preference for rent upon the lessee‟s insolvency, the following 
points should be considered: the amount of the preference claimable; property 
subject to the preference; and the order of preference. 
The amount claimable by the lessor upon the lessee‟s insolvency is set out in 
section 85(2) of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936, which provides that:  
“A landlord‟s legal hypothec shall confer a preference with regard to any article 
subject to that hypothec for any rent calculated in respect of any period 
immediately prior to and up to the date of sequestration but not exceeding (a) 
three months, if the rent is payable monthly or at shorter intervals than one 
month; (b) six months, if the rent is payable at intervals exceeding one month but 
not exceeding three months; (c) nine months, if the rent is payable at intervals 
exceeding three months but not exceeding six months; (d) fifteen months in any 
other case”. 
The lessor enjoys a preference only over invecta et illata that were on the premises 
at the date of sequestration239 but he does not lose his preference when the invecta 
et illata are removed from the leased premises for the very purpose of being sold in 
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execution.240 This additional preference for the lessor is provided for in section 47 of 
the Insolvency Act:  
“If a creditor of an insolvent estate who is in possession of any property 
belonging to that estate, to which he has a right of retention, or over which he 
has the landlord‟s legal hypothec, delivers that property to the trustee of that 
estate, at the latter‟s request, he shall not thereby lose the security afforded by 
his right of retention or lose his legal hypothec, if when delivering the property, 
he notifies the trustee in writing of his rights and in due course proves his claim 
against the estate”.241 
A lessor whose claim exceeds the amount for which he has a preferent claim 
becomes a concurrent creditor in the free residue of the insolvent lessee‟s estate for 
the balance of his claim.242 For example, if the rent is payable monthly and five 
months‟ rent is in arrears when the lessee is sequestrated and sufficient movables 
belonging to the lessee are found on the leased premises to pay the arrear rent for 
five months, the lessor will have a secured claim for only three months‟ rent. His 
claim for rent in arrears for the other two months is unsecured and he will merely 
have a concurrent claim for it.243 For the purpose of calculating the amount of rent for 
which the lessor has a secured claim it was held in Sercombe v Colonial Motors 
(Natal) Ltd244 that the date of sequestration is the date of the provisional order of 
sequestration. 
A perfected lessor‟s tacit hypothec and an instalment agreement hypothec245 
may compete in a claim against a lessee‟s (debtor‟s) insolvent estate.246 The 
question whether the lessor‟s tacit hypothec that has been perfected or an instalment 
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agreement hypothec247 should prevail in a claim on an insolvent estate has not yet 
been decided in South African courts. The following paragraphs discuss the order of 
preference between the perfected lessor‟s tacit hypothec and the instalment 
agreement hypothec. The question whether the property belonging to the third party 
is subject to the lessor‟s hypothec is dealt with in the next chapter. 
Scott and Scott248 are of the view that where the property forming the subject 
matter of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec is also subject to other real security rights, the 
prior in tempore potior in iure rule applies. Therefore, the lessor‟s tacit hypothec over 
certain invecta et illata ranks prior to that of the credit grantor (instalment agreement 
seller) over the same movables, as the latter only comes into existence upon the 
debtor‟s insolvency.249 Scott and Scott further argue that the lessor‟s claim is 
preferent because his hypothec vested earlier than that of the credit grantor, and the 
lessor can successfully oppose delivery of the property to the credit grantor because 
of the credit grantor‟s express or implied consent to the lessor‟s tacit hypothec.250 
Cooper251 is of the view that where there is a competition upon insolvency 
between the lessor‟s tacit hypothec and an instalment agreement hypothec, the 
lessor‟s tacit hypothec is stronger than the rights of the instalment agreement 
seller.252 According to Cooper, this position follows from the circumstance that prior 
to the lessee‟s insolvency the instalment agreement seller was the owner and that 
upon the lessee‟s insolvency the instalment agreement seller loses his ownership 
and acquires a hypothec as a surrogate of the ownership.253 Cooper argues that this 
surrogate cannot be stronger than the ownership for which it was substituted.254 
Cooper further argues that the lessor‟s tacit hypothec is preferent to the claim of the 
holder of a special notarial bond over the movables, since such a bond operates 
over the free residue only.255 However, Cooper‟s view predated the Security by 
Means of Movable Property Act, which had the effect of excluding the property over 
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which a special notarial bond is registered before the perfection of the lessor‟s tacit 
hypothec.256 
Kerr257 suggests that on the lessee‟s insolvency, when there is competition 
between the lessor‟s tacit hypothec and an instalment agreement hypothec, the 
better view appears to be the that the creditor of the hypothec that originated prior in 
time (in normal cases the lessor‟s tacit hypothec) has preference. 
Van der Walt and Pienaar258 are of the view that where there is a clash 
between the lessor‟s tacit hypothec and the hypothec of the credit grantor over the 
same movable property upon the lessee‟s (debtor‟s) insolvency, which hypothec 
should prevail is dependent on whether the credit grantor was informed that his 
property is on the leased premises. They argue that if the credit grantor was not 
informed that the property was on the leased premises, the lessor‟s tacit hypothec 
should not include the property belonging to the credit grantor. However, if the credit 
grantor was informed, and if all requirements of the Bloemfontein Municipality v 
Jackson’s259 case have been met,260 the lessor‟s tacit hypothec may include that 
property. In such a case the lessor‟s tacit hypothec can be stronger than that of the 
credit grantor but only if the lessor‟s tacit hypothec accrued and was perfected 
before insolvency.261 
Notwithstanding the above analysis of academic views, in light of section 2(1) 
of the Security by Means of Movable Property Act 57 of 1993, I conclude that on the 
lessee‟s insolvency the instalment agreement hypothec trumps the lessor‟s tacit 
hypothec, since section 2(1)(b) of the Act expressly excludes the movable property 
sold in terms of the instalment agreement from being subject to the lessor‟s tacit 
hypothec. One may also conclude that the exclusion in section 2(1) of the Act only 
applies before the lessee‟s insolvency, since the Security by Means of Movable 
Property Act does not actually refer to the instalment agreement hypothec but only to 
the instalment agreement itself. 
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2 6 Termination of the lessor’s tacit hypothec 
The lessor‟s tacit hypothec is discharged as soon as the lessee pays the arrear 
rent,262 but if the payment is invalid, for example if it is made by means of a cheque 
that is subsequently dishonoured, the hypothec is not discharged.263 In Koenigsberg, 
Hopkins & Co v Robinson Gold Mining Co Ltd264 it was held that if the amount of the 
arrear rent is paid to the lessor by a third party, the hypothec is discharged, even 
though such person receives a cession from the lessor of his rights and action 
against the lessee, for since the hypothec is discharged by the fact of payment, there 
is nothing left to be ceded.265 
According to Lubbe,266 termination of the lease contract does not terminate the 
lessor‟s tacit hypothec.267 The author argues that there is also authority for the 
proposition that the termination of the lease contract terminates the lessor‟s tacit 
hypothec.268 In Oliver & Havenga v Moyer269 the contention was raised that on the 
expiration of a lease the lessor‟s tacit hypothec was ipso facto discharged, since 
there no longer is any leased premises. However, the court held that the expiration 
of the contract of lease does not discharge the lessee of the duty to pay the rent in 
arrears. In Rajah v Pillay270 the court interdicted the lessee from removing the 
invecta et illata if the lease was cancelled but arrear rent was not paid. Further, in 
Spayile v Bower271 a new lessee took possession on termination of the lease and the 
property belonging to the previous lessee subject to the hypothec remained on the 
leased premises. The court held that the hypothec remained in force. In Laingsburg 
                                            
262
 See Koenigsberg, Hopkins & Co v Robinson Gold Mining Co Ltd 1905 TH 90 95-96; Hamp-Adams 
v Loubser 1911 CPD 564 568. See further AJ van der Walt & GJ Pienaar Introduction to the law of 
property (6
th
 ed 2009) 275; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The 
law of property (5
th
 ed 2006) 407; GF Lubbe “Mortgage and pledge” rev TJ Scott in LTC Harms & FA 
Faris (eds) LAWSA Vol 17 Part 2 (2
nd
 ed 2008) para 443; WE Cooper Landlord and tenant (2
nd
 ed 
1994) 199; G Wille Landlord and tenant in South Africa (4
th
 ed 1948) 211. 
263
 See Table Bay Habour Board v Carrol (1908) 25 SC 45. See also Spayile v Bower 1911 CPD 65; 
Windermere v Mitre 1970 (1) SA 152 (R); WE Cooper Landlord and tenant (2
nd
 ed 1994) 199; G Wille 
Landlord and tenant in South Africa (4
th
 ed 1948) 211. 
264
 1905 TH 90. 
265
 See E Kahn, M Havenga, P Havenga & J Lotz Principles of the law of sale and lease (2
nd
 ed 2010) 
94; G Wille Landlord and tenant in South Africa (4
th
 ed 1948) 211. 
266
 See GF Lubbe “Mortgage and pledge” rev TJ Scott in LTC Harms & FA Faris (eds) LAWSA Vol 17 
Part 2 (2
nd
 ed 2008) para 443. 
267
 Spayile v Bower 1911 CPD 65; Oliver & Havenga v Moyes 1916 OPD 40; E Kahn, M Havenga, P 
Havenga & J Lotz Principles of the law of sale and lease (2
nd
 ed 2010) 94. 
268
 See GF Lubbe “Mortgage and pledge” rev TJ Scott in LTC Harms & FA Faris (eds) LAWSA Vol 17 
Part 2 (2
nd
 ed 2008) para 443. 
269
 1916 OPD 40. 
270
 1966 (2) SA 222 (N). 
271
 1911 CPD 65. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
41 
School Board v Logan272 it was held that a lessor cannot charge rent for storage of 
property that he retains against the will of the lessee in the exercise of his rights after 
the lease has come to an end. Removal of property before attachment terminates 
the lessor‟s tacit hypothec against such property.273 
 
2 7 Conclusion 
Considering the significance and usefulness of real security rights in the modern 
economy, as a point of departure this chapter examines the meaning of real security 
rights and also discusses the forms of real security that existed in Roman law prior to 
the evolution of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec. The chapter concludes that the lessor‟s 
tacit hypothec developed in cases of rural leases as an alternative form of real 
security to the two oldest forms of real security rights (fiducia and pignus), which had 
the effect of transferring ownership or possession of the security object to the 
creditor. The discussion of the historical background of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec in 
this chapter indicates that in the early stages of development, the lessor‟s hypothec 
could only be constituted by agreement between the parties and that the agreement 
between the parties, specifically with regard to urban leases, disappeared during the 
reign of Emperor Justinian. The analysis of the evolution of the lessor‟s tacit 
hypothec indicates that major developments of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec took place 
in sixteenth and seventeenth-century Roman-Dutch law. The lessor‟s tacit hypothec 
is the only remaining common law tacit hypothec that exists in South African law and 
its significance is recognised by South African statutes.274 
The South African legal position regarding the lessor‟s tacit hypothec can be 
summarised as follows: the lessor‟s tacit hypothec accrues as soon as the rent is 
due but not paid. It vests over movable property brought on to the leased premises 
as well as the fruits of the leased land to secure the payment of rent stipulated in the 
lease agreement.275 The lessor‟s tacit hypothec entails that the lessor may have the 
encumbered thing attached by the sheriff of the court, and that he may keep the 
attached property until the rent in arrear is paid in full. However, in case of the 
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lessee‟s insolvency the lessor acquires “a right of first preference” with regard to the 
proceeds of the sale in execution of the security property. 
The chapter also illustrates that there is an on-going debate between judges 
and academics with regard to whether attachment is necessary for the lessor‟s 
hypothec to constitute a real right.276 On the one hand are authors who argue that 
attachment constitutes a real security right. On the other hand are authors who 
argue that attachment only strengthens the real security right. Taking into 
consideration case law and academic views, one may conclude that attachment 
constitutes a real security right. 
Considering the controversy amongst academics277 with respect to the scope of 
obligation secured by the lessor‟s tacit hypothec, relying on legislation,278 and case 
law,279 I conclude that the lessor‟s tacit hypothec only secures the rent in arrears.280 I 
furthermore conclude that unlike other real security rights that attach only to the 
property belonging to the debtor, the lessor‟s tacit hypothec also affects the property 
rights of sub-lessees and third parties. Consequently, in cases where the lessee‟s 
property proves insufficient to settle the debt, the sub-lessee‟s movable property 
found on the leased premises may be attached but only to the extent that the sub-
lessee owes rent.281 In cases where both the lessee‟s and sub-lessee‟s movable 
property is insufficient to secure the lessor‟s claim, a third party‟s property that has 
been brought on to the premises may be subject to the lessor‟s hypothec, but only if 
the requirements set in Bloemfontein Municipality v Jacksons Ltd282 – as confirmed 
in Paradise Lost Properties v Standard Bank of Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd283 – have 
been met. 
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 Ss 31 and 32 Magistrates‟ Courts Act 32 of 1944; S 85(2) of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936. 
279
 Woodrow & Co v Rothman (1884) 4 EDC 9; New Life Communal Property Association v Draigri 
Boerdery Bpk [2007] ZAECHC 101 15. 
280
 See also Wavely Trust & Trading Co v Depaux 1902 TH 73; Webster v Ellison 1911 AD 73 86; GF 
Lubbe “Mortgage and pledge” rev TJ Scott in LTC Harms & FA Faris (eds) LAWSA Vol 17 Part 2 (2
nd
 
ed 2008) para 438. 
281
 TJ Scott & S Scott Wille’s Law of mortgage and pledge in South Africa (3
rd
 ed 1987) 99. 
282
 1929 AD 226 271. 
283
 1997 (2) SA 815 (D). 
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Although the question whether the perfected lessor‟s tacit hypothec or the 
instalment agreement hypothec should prevail on the lessee‟s insolvency has not yet 
been dealt with by South African courts, I conclude that the instalment agreement 
hypothec should prevail, since section 2(1)(b) of the Security by Means of Movable 
Property Act excludes the movable property sold in terms of the instalment 
agreement from being subject to the lessor‟s tacit hypothec. 
The general aim of this chapter is to describe and analyse the common law 
principles that provide for the lessor‟s tacit hypothec. The chapter gives an overview 
of the historical background of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec in Roman law and Roman-
Dutch law, and describes the general principles regulating the lessor‟s tacit hypothec 
in South African law. The description and analysis of the principles that provides for 
the lessor‟s tacit hypothec has laid the foundation for the scrutiny of the extension of 
the lessor‟s tacit hypothec to the third party‟s property, which issue is examined in 
the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3:  
Extension of the lessor’s tacit hypothec to third 
parties’ property 
 
3 1 Introduction 
The lessor‟s tacit hypothec developed in Roman law1 and Roman-Dutch law,2 and 
was adopted in South African law.3 The principle that provides for the extension of 
the lessor‟s tacit hypothec to property belonging to third parties developed in 
seventeenth century Roman-Dutch law4 and was accepted in South African law.5 
In Hollandsche consultatien Grotius explained the extension principle as 
follows:  
“If things have been carried into leased premises with the knowledge and also the 
consent of the owner in order to remain there for the duration of the lease, and to 
be used by the tenants they are subject to the landlord‟s hypothec, but it is 
otherwise if the owner was ignorant.”6 
The justifications for the principle that provides for the extension of the lessor‟s tacit 
hypothec to third parties‟ property were set out in Bloemfontein Municipality v 
Jacksons Ltd7 as follows:  
“When goods belonging to a third person are brought on to leased premises with 
the knowledge and consent, express or implied, of the owner of the goods, and 
                                            
1
 See chapter two, section 2 3 1 1 above. 
2
 See chapter two, section 2 3 1 2 above. 
3
 See chapter two, section 2 3 2 above. 
4
 See DP de Bruyn The opinions of Grotius as contained in the Hollandsche consultatien en advijsen 
(1894) 186; J Voet Commentarius ad Pandectas (1829 trans by P Gane Commentary on the Pandect 
1958, hereafter referred as Voet) 20.2.5. 
5
 See Lazarus v Dose (1884) 3 SC 42 44; Mackay Brothers v Cohen (1894) 1 Off Rep 342 344; 
Heugh’s Trustee v Heydenrych (1895) 12 SC 318 320; Collins v Whittock (1899) 9 HCG 182; Noble v 
Heatley 1905 TS 433; Turpin v Wagstaff & Sons 1906 TS 597 ; Russell v Savory (1906) 20 EDC 100 
103; Ncora v Untiedt 1916 EDL 328; Goldinger’s Trustee v Whitelaw & Sons 1916 TPD 235; Mangold 
Bros Ltd v Hirschman Bros 1917 TPD 187 189; Bradlow & Co v Lucas 1917 TPD 310; Colonial 
Cabinet Manufacturing Co v Wahl 1924 CPD 282 284; Sercombe v Colonial Motors (Natal) Ltd 1929 
NPD 58 65; Bradlow v Ward 1929 TPD 313. 
6
 DP de Bruyn The opinions of Grotius as contained in the Hollandsche consultatien en advijsen 
(1894) 186. See also G Wille Landlord and tenant in South Africa (4
th
 ed 1948) 195. 
7
 1929 AD 266. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
45 
with the intention that they shall remain there indefinitely for the use of the 
tenant, and the owner, being in a position to give notice of his ownership to the 
landlord fails to do so, and the landlord is unaware that the goods do not belong 
to the tenant, the owner will thereby be taken to have consented to the goods 
being subject to the landlord‟s tacit hypothec and liable to attachment.” 8 
The common law position regarding the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec to 
third parties‟ property has been amended by the Security by Means of Movable 
Property Act9 to provide more protection to third parties. However, despite a degree 
of legislative protection, recent discussions have cast doubt on the justifications for 
the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec to third parties‟ property that is not 
covered by the Act.10 
The aim of the chapter is to describe the common law principle that provides for 
the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec to third parties‟ property. More 
specifically, the chapter focuses on setting out the justifications for the extension 
principle as well as the protective measures developed under the common law and 
recently enacted statutory protection for third parties‟ property. The second part of 
the chapter explores the origins of the principle that provides for the extension of the 
lessor‟s tacit hypothec to third parties‟ property. The third part explains the rationale 
for the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec to third parties‟ property. The fourth 
part sets out and analyses recently enacted statutory protection for certain third 
parties against the lessor‟s tacit hypothec. 
 
3 2 The extension principle and its origins 
The general principle is that the lessor has a tacit hypothec over invecta et illata on 
the leased premises to secure the rent due to him by the lessee.11 Accordingly, the 
                                            
8
 Bloemfontein Municipality v Jacksons Ltd 1929 AD 266 271. 
9
 57 of 1993, s 2. 
10
 See AJM Steven “Landlord‟s hypothec in comparative perspective” (2008) 12 EJCL 1-18 14; JS 
McLennan “A lessor‟s hypothec over the goods of third parties – anomaly and anachronism” (2004) 
16 SA Merc LJ 121-125 125; I Knobel “The tacit hypothec of the lessor” (2004) 67 THRHR 687-697 
694. 
11
 For the application of the principle see Lazarus v Dose (1884) 3 SC 43; Isaacs v Hart & 
Henochsberg (1887) 8 NLR 18; Webster v Ellison 1911 AD 73. See also H Mostert & A Pope (eds) 
The principles of the law of property in South Africa (2010) 325; E Kahn, M Havenga, P Havenga & J 
Lotz Principles of the law of sale and lease (2
nd
 ed 2010) 90; CG van der Merwe “Real security” in F 
du Bois (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African law (9
th
 ed 2007) 630-665 656; P Havenga, M 
Havenga, R Kelbrick, M McGregor, H Schulze & K van der Linde General principles of commercial 
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lessee‟s movable property brought on to the leased premises with the intention to 
remain there indefinitely is subject to the lessor‟s tacit hypothec.12 Whether or not the 
lessor was aware of the presence of the lessee‟s property on the leased premises is 
irrelevant.13 A sub-lessee‟s property is also subject to the lessor‟s tacit hypothec, but 
only to the extent that the sub-lessee owes rent.14 Property of a third party found on 
the leased premises may only be subject to the lessor‟s tacit hypothec if the lessee‟s 
and/or the sub-lessee‟s property found on the leased premises proves insufficient to 
secure the lessor‟s claim for arrear rent.15 The extension of the lessor‟s tacit 
hypothec to third parties‟ property is the most salient feature of the lessor‟s remedy 
and constitutes an exception to the principle that the creditor can only execute 
against his debtor‟s property in order to satisfy his claim.16 
The origins of the principle that provides for the extension of the lessor‟s tacit 
hypothec to third parties‟ property can be traced back to the customary laws of 
France and Holland.17 The extension principle as applied in South African law 
originated from customary laws of mid-seventeenth century Holland.18 The extension 
principle is founded on various Roman-Dutch authorities and it combines the most 
                                                                                                                                       
law (6
th
 ed 2007) 178; AJ Kerr The law of sale and lease (3
rd
 ed 2004) 389; JTR Gibson, C Visser, JT 
Pretorious, R Sharrock & M van Jaarsveld (eds) South African mercantile and company law (8
th
 ed 
2003) 182; WE Cooper Landlord and tenant (2
nd
 ed 1994) 180; TJ Scott & S Scott Wille’s Law of 
mortgage and pledge in South Africa (3
rd
 ed 1987) 99; MA Diemont, RM Marais & PJ Aronstam The 
law of hire-purchase in South Africa (4
th
 ed 1978) 208; AFS Maasdorp Maasdorp’s Institutes of South 
African law Vol II (8
th
 ed 1960) 193; RW Lee Introduction to Roman-Dutch law (5
th
 ed 1953) 189; G 
Wille Landlord and tenant in South Africa (4
th
 ed 1948) 189; THR Roos & H Reitz Principles of 
Roman-Dutch law (1909) 94; M Nathan Common law of South Africa Vol II (1904) 936; AFS 
Maasdorp The institutes of Cape law Book II (1903) 255. 
12
 Voet 20.2.5; Leech v Gardner (1898) 15 CLJ 206; Bourne & Co v Lindsay 1912 TPD 144; 
Goldinger’s Trustee v Whitelaw & Sons 1916 TPD 230. 
13
 See Friedlander v Croxford & Rhodes (1867) 5 Searle 395 396; Mackay Bros Ltd v Eaglestone 
1932 TPD 301 305-306. See also WE Cooper Landlord and tenant (2
nd
 ed 1994) 181; CG van der 
Merwe “Real security” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African law (9
th
 ed 2007) 630-665 
657. 
14
 See Friedlander v Croxford & Rhodes (1867) 5 Searle 395; Smith v Dierks (1884) 3 SC 142; Ex 
parte Aegis Ass and Trust Co 1909 EDC 363. 
15
 Longlands v Francken 1881 Kotzé 256; Lazarus v Dose (1884) 3 SC 43; Border and Allen v 
Gowlett 1911 OPD 29. See also AJ Kerr The law of sale and lease (3
rd
 ed 2004) 394. 
16
 See Lazarus v Dose (1884) 3 SC 43; Isaacs v Hart & Henochsberg (1887) 8 NLR 18; Webster v 
Ellison 1911 AD 73; Goldinger’s Trustee v Whitelaw & Sons 1916 TPD 230 236; Van den Bergh, 
Melamed & Nathan v Polliack & Co 1940 TPD 237 238. See also GF Lubbe “Mortgage and pledge” 
rev TJ Scott in LTC Harms & FA Faris (eds) LAWSA Vol 17 Part 2 (2
nd
 ed 2008) para 440. 
17
 Bourne & Co v Lindsay 1912 TPD 142 144. 
18
 See DP de Bruyn The opinions of Grotius as contained in the Hollandsche consultatien en advijsen 
(1894) 186; Voet 20.2.5; Bourne & Co v Lindsay 1912 TPD 142 144. See also WE Cooper Landlord 
and tenant (2
nd
 ed 1994) 183; AJM Steven “Landlord‟s hypothec in comparative perspective” (2008) 
12 EJCL 1-18 14-15. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
47 
practical elements appearing in the principles expressed by various Roman-Dutch 
jurists.19 
Roman law does not directly deal with the extension of the lessor‟s tacit 
hypothec. However, there are two texts in the Digest that are generally quoted as 
bearing on the matter. The first text is that of Scaevola,20 who states that a special 
agreement by the debtor and the creditor (owner of the land) that anything brought 
on to the land shall be included in the mortgage of the land and should cover slaves 
brought on to the land by the debtor to remain there permanently but not slaves 
brought there for temporary purposes.21 However, in Leech v Gardner22 Hertzog J 
held that the example referred to by Scaevola is neither a case of the lessor‟s tacit 
hypothec nor of one person‟s property being bound for another person‟s debt. 
Regarding the second Roman law text, in Lazarus v Dose23 De Villiers CJ stated that 
the earliest reference to the subject in the civil law is that of Pomponius. Pomponius 
stated that “we must see whether everything brought on to premises is hypothecated 
or only what is brought on so as to remain there”.24 Pomponius‟s view is that only 
property brought on to the leased premises with the intention to remain there should 
be subject to the hypothec.25 Wille26 argues that the authority cited in Lazarus v 
Dose27 refers to the lessor‟s tacit hypothec but there is no reference to the 
application of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec to the third party‟s property. In Goldinger’s 
Trustee v Whitelaw & Sons28 Mason J stated that the Digest provides in general 
terms that invecta et illata brought on to the leased premises are liable to the lessor‟s 
tacit hypothec.29 Yet, there is no passage that explicitly or implicitly imposes this 
                                            
19
 G Wille Landlord and tenant in South Africa (4
th
 ed 1948) 194-195. 
20
 D 20.1.32 (English translation of the Digest referred to in this thesis is from T Mommsen, P Kruger 
& A Watson The Digest of Justinian Vol II (1985)). See also G Wille Landlord and tenant in South 
Africa (4
th
 ed 1948) 195. 
21
 The original Digest text in D 20.2.32 states that “[a] debtor agreed that whatever was brought on the 
mortgaged land or there arose or was produced should be subject to mortgage. Part of the land was 
untenanted, and the debtor handed it to his managing slave to farm, assigning him slaves needed for 
that purpose. The question was whether the managing slave, the other slave sent to farm, and the 
manager‟s vicarii were subject to the mortgage. Scaevola replied that only those who were brought on 
their owners as permanent, not those lent temporarily, were mortgaged”. 
22
 (1898) 15 CLJ 208. 
23
 (1884) 3 SC 44. 
24
 D 20.2.7. 
25
 D 20.2.7 reads as follows: “We must see whether everything brought on to premises is 
hypothecated or only what is brought on so as to remain there. The latter is the better view.” 
26
 See G Wille Landlord and tenant in South Africa (4
th
 ed 1948) 194. 
27
 (1884) 3 SC 44. 
28
 1916 TPD 230 235. 
29
 D 20.1.22. 
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liability on the property of a third person.30 One can therefore conclude that the 
Roman law lessor‟s tacit hypothec probably did not extend to third parties‟ property.31 
Roman-Dutch law regarding the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec to third 
parties‟ property is more explicit.32 In an opinion that was collected in the 
Hollandsche consultatien Grotius argues as follows:  
“If things have been carried into leased premises with the knowledge and also the 
consent of the owner in order to remain there for the duration of the lease and to 
be used by the tenants they are subject to the landlord‟s hypothec, but it is 
otherwise if the owner was ignorant”.33 
Grotius‟s view is that a third party‟s property brought on to the leased premises to 
remain there for the service and use by the lessee is only bound by the lessor‟s tacit 
hypothec if it was brought on to the leased premises with the knowledge and consent 
of the third party (owner). Grotius further states that a third party‟s property may be 
subject to the lessor‟s tacit hypothec if, with the knowledge that his property is used 
on the leased premises, the third party fails to inform the lessor of his ownership of 
the property.34 Groenewegen35 and Van Leeuwen36 support this view. 
Voet collected the chief authorities on this subject and states the law in the 
following manner:  
“Only such invecta et illata, however are bound by tacit mortgage as are the 
tenant‟s own property; unless they have been taken into the hired premises with 
the consent of their owner with a view to be kept there permanently, or for the 
use of the tenant, such for example as beds, chairs and instruments of the art 
which the tenant exercises in the house, for their owner has thereby tacitly 
consented to this tacit mortgage of his property, at least in subsidium of any 
deficiency in the illata of the tenant himself, nor can he be considered clear of 
                                            
30
 See Goldinger’s Trustee v Whitelaw & Sons 1916 TPD 230 235. 
31
 See D 20.1.22; Leech v Gardner (1898) 15 CLJ 208; Goldinger’s Trustee v Whitelaw & Sons 1916 
TPD 230 235. See also G Wille Landlord and tenant in South Africa (4
th
 ed 1948) 194. 
32
 G Wille Landlord and tenant in South Africa (4
th
 ed 1948) 195. 
33
 DP de Bruyn The opinions of Grotius as contained in the Hollandsche consultatien en advijsen 
(1894) 186. See also G Wille Landlord and tenant in South Africa (4
th
 ed 1948) 195. 
34
 DP de Bruyn The opinions of Grotius as contained in the Hollandsche consultatien en advijsen 
collated (1894) 186. 
35
 2.48.17. 
36
 1.4.9.3. 
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fraud when with the full knowledge of the facts, he dissembled and did not inform 
the lessor [of his ownership]”.37 
Voet‟s view is that, if the lessee‟s property found on the leased premises proves 
insufficient, the lessor may attach property found on the premises belonging to a 
third party to satisfy his claim for arrear rent.38 However, a third party‟s property is 
subject to the lessor‟s tacit hypothec only if such a third party had knowledge of and 
consented to it being there and if the property was brought on to the leased premises 
with the intention to remain there for permanent use by the lessee. A third party‟s 
property may also be subject to the lessor‟s tacit hypothec if the third party knows 
that his property is stored on the leased premises and fails to inform the lessor of his 
ownership.39 
The Roman-Dutch law principle that provides for the extension of the lessor‟s 
tacit hypothec to third parties‟ property was accepted in South African law40 and was 
at issue in several South African cases decided before 1929. 1929 is an important 
year for this thesis because it is the year in which the Appellate Division settled the 
law regarding the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec to third parties‟ property in 
the case of Bloemfontein Municipality v Jacksons Ltd.41 
Grotius‟s view as stated in the Hollandsche consultatien42 was accepted in 
South African law in Longlands v Francken,43 where it was held that a third party‟s 
property brought on to the leased premises with the third party‟s consent and for 
permanent use by the lessee was subject to the lessor‟s tacit hypothec.44 The 
earliest reference in South African case law to Voet‟s45 view to the same effect is 
Ulrich v Ulrich’s Trustee,46 where it was held that the lessee‟s daughter‟s property 
                                            
37
 Voet Commentarius ad Pandectas (1829 trans by P Gane Commentary on the Pandect 1958, 
hereafter referred as Voet) 20.2.5. 
38
 Voet 20.2.5. 
39
 Voet 20.2.5. See also M Nathan Common law of South Africa Vol II (1904) 936. 
40
 See Longlands v Francken 1881 Kotzé 256; Ulrich v Ulrich’s Trustee (1883) 2 SC 319; Lazarus v 
Dose (1884) 3 SC 42 44; Mackay Brothers v Cohen (1894) 1 Off Rep 342 344; Heugh’s Trustee v 
Heydenrych (1895) 12 SC 318 320; Leech v Gardner (1898) 15 CLJ 208; Collins v Whittock (1899) 9 
HCG 182. 
41
 1929 AD 266. 
42
 DP de Bruyn The opinions of Grotius as contained in the Hollandsche consultatien en advijsen 
(1894) 186. 
43
 1881 Kotzé 256. 
44
 1881 Kotzé 256. 
45
 Voet 20.2.5. 
46
 (1883) 2 SC 319. 
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brought on to the leased premises to remain there permanently for the daughter‟s 
and the lessee‟s use was subject to the lessor‟s tacit hypothec to satisfy the lessor‟s 
claim for rent in arrears.47 
Accordingly, the South African legal position is that the lessor‟s tacit hypothec 
may extend to third parties‟ property only if it was brought on to the leased premises 
with the knowledge and consent of its owner, and to remain on the leased premises 
indefinitely for the use by the lessee. Otherwise, it is subject to the lessor‟s tacit 
hypothec if the third party knows that his property is on the leased premises and fails 
to inform the lessor of his ownership over the property before the hypothec is 
perfected.48 
 
3 3 Rationale for the extension 
3 3 1 Introduction 
Even though the extension principle has been accepted and applied in South African 
law,49 the rationale for the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec to third parties‟ 
property remains unclear.50 In recent years discourse has shown that there is 
                                            
47
 See also Russell v Savory (1906) 20 EDC 100, where the lessee of a house and garden had the 
right to keep four horses and two cows on the adjoining farm. Only one cow was kept on the leased 
land. The cow was the property of the lessee‟s son, who lived with him and paid no rent. No notice 
was given to the lessor that the cow was not the property of the lessee. The lessee fell in arrears and 
the cow was attached. In an interpleader action the lessee‟s son claimed ownership of the cow. The 
court held that the cow was kept on the farm under the lease and was there permanently (in the 
sense of indefinitely) and presumably for the benefit of the lessee. Consequently, the cow was subject 
to the lessor‟s tacit hypothec. 
48
 See Longlands v Francken 1881 Kotzé 256; Ulrich v Ulrich’s Trustee (1883) 2 SC 319; Russell v 
Savory (1906) 20 EDC 100; Bloemfontein Municipality v Jacksons Ltd 1929 AD 266 271. 
49
 For acceptance of the extension principle see Longlands v Francken 1881 Kotzé 256; Ulrich v 
Ulrich’s Trustee (1883) 2 SC 319. For the application of the extension principle, see Lazarus v Dose 
(1884) 3 SC 42 44; Mackay Brothers v Cohen (1894) 1 Off Rep 342 344; Heugh’s Trustee v 
Heydenrych (1895) 12 SC 318 320; Collins v Whittock (1899) 9 HCG 182; Noble v Heatley 1905 TS 
433; Turpin v Wagstaff & Sons 1906 TS 597; Russell v Savory (1906) 20 EDC 100 103; Ncora v 
Untiedt 1916 EDL 328; Goldinger’s Trustee v Whitelaw & Sons 1916 TPD 235; Mangold Bros Ltd v 
Hirschman Bros 1917 TPD 187 189; Bradlow & Co v Lucas 1917 TPD 310; Colonial Cabinet 
Manufacturing Co v Wahl 1924 CPD 282 284; Sercombe v Colonial Motors (Natal) Ltd 1929 NPD 58 
65; Bradlow v Ward 1929 TPD 313; Bloemfontein Municipality v Jacksons Ltd 1929 AD 266 271; 
Rand Furnishing Co v Hydenrych 1929 TPD 583; Mackay Bros Ltd v Eaglestone 1932 TPD 301 303; 
Hilson & Taylor Ltd v Teukolskin 1933 TPD 83 88; Fresh Meat Supply Co v Standard Trading Co (Pty) 
1933 CPD 550 555; Van den Bergh, Melamed & Nathan v Polliack & Co 1940 TPD 237 238; TR 
Services (Pty) Ltd v Poynton’s Corner Ltd & Others 1961 (1) SA 773 (N); Eight Kaya Sands v Valley 
Irrigation Equipment 2003 (2) SA 495 (T); Holderness NO and Others v Maxwell and Others [2012] 
ZAKZPHC 49 (31 July 2012) 34. 
50
 See JS McLennan “A lessor‟s hypothec over the goods of third parties – anomaly and 
anachronism” (2004) 16 SA Merc LJ 121-125 125; I Knobel “The tacit hypothec of the lessor” (2004) 
67 THRHR 687-697 694; AJM Steven “Landlord‟s hypothec in comparative perspective” (2008) 12 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
51 
uncertainty regarding the justifications of the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec 
to third parties‟ property to satisfy the lessor‟s claim for arrear rent by the lessee. 
This uncertainty has recently become more apparent, and in TR Services (Pty) Ltd v 
Poynton’s Corner Ltd & Others51 Warner J expressed the following opinion:  
“[I]t is very difficult to discover the true basis for the landlord having a 
hypothec over the goods of third parties in the possession of the tenants … 
this ... appears to be a strange approach because I find the greatest difficulty 
in believing that any owner, if asked the question, would agree to his goods 
being made subject to such hypothec. He would almost inevitably reply: „Of 
course I do not agree to it; why should I?‟”52 
In Eight Kaya Sands v Valley Irrigation Equipment53 Van der Walt J in an obiter 
dictum stated that there is no legal relationship between the lessor and a third party 
whose movables are on the leased premises. Therefore, there is no justification to 
attach the third party‟s property as security for the debt of the lessee. Cooper argues 
that the justifications advanced for the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec to third 
parties‟ property are unsound.54 McLennan argues that implied consent, fault and 
appearance are all hopeless explanations for the extension of the lessor‟s tacit 
hypothec to third parties‟ property to satisfy the lessor‟s claim for arrear rent against 
the lessee.55 Steven argues that implied consent is a fiction whereby the owner is 
taken to have accepted to the lessor‟s tacit hypothec.56 He further argues that as a 
result of implied consent being a fiction, an alternative theory that the consent is 
inferred from the owner being negligent in asserting his ownership should be 
dismissed.57 Smith argues that there is no legal nexus or contract between the lessor 
                                                                                                                                       
EJCL 1-18 14; D Smith “The constitutionality of the lessor‟s hypothec: Attachment of a third party‟s 
goods” (2011) 27 SAJHR 308-330 330. 
51
 1961 (1) SA 773 (N) 775D-H. 
52
 AJM Steven “Landlord‟s hypothec in comparative perspective” (2008) 12 EJCL 1-18 14 concurs 
with this view. 
53
 2003 (2) SA 495 (T) 500G-H. 
54
 WE Cooper Landlord and tenant (2
nd
 ed 1994) 183. 
55
 JS McLennan “A lessor‟s hypothec over the goods of third parties – anomaly and anachronism” 
(2004) 16 SA Merc LJ 121-125 123. 
56
 AJM Steven “Landlord‟s hypothec in comparative perspective” (2008) 12 EJCL 1-18 14-15. 
57
 AJM Steven “Landlord‟s hypothec in comparative perspective” (2008) 12 EJCL 1-18 14-15. 
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and the third party, and therefore the lessor‟s tacit hypothec should not extend to the 
third party‟s property.58 
There are two theories (views) regarding the basis for the extension of the 
lessor‟s tacit hypothec to third parties‟ property.59 In terms of the first theory the 
extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec to third parties‟ property is based on the 
premise that the third party consented (explicitly or by implication) that his property 
can serve as security for the payment of the lessee‟s arrear rent.60 The second 
theory relies on the doctrine of estoppel that operates as a limitation on the rei 
vindicatio of the third party.61 According to both theories it is necessary that the 
attached property should have been brought on to the leased premises not merely 
for temporary but for perpetual (indefinite) use by the lessee. To qualify as perpetual, 
the use must be for an indefinite period or for the entire period of the lease.62 
In what follows I analyse the two theories (implied consent and estoppel) with 
reference to case law prior to 1929, the 1929 case of Bloemfontein Municipality v 
Jacksons Ltd63 and post-1929 case law in order to identify the essential 
requirements of each theory. The main aim of this analysis is to examine how each 
of the two doctrines has developed and is applied in South African law. 
 
                                            
58
 D Smith “The constitutionality of the lessor‟s hypothec: Attachment of a third party‟s goods” (2011) 
27 SAJHR 308-330 330. See also I Knobel “The tacit hypothec of the lessor” (2004) 67 THRHR 687-
697 694, who argues that the third party‟s property should not serve as security for the debts of a 
lessee. 
59
 TR Services (Pty) Ltd v Poynton's Corner Ltd & Others 1961 (1) SA 773 (D) 775-776; Holderness 
NO and Others v Maxwell and Others [2012] ZAKZPHC 49 (31 July 2012) 28. See also GF Lubbe 
“Mortgage and pledge” rev TJ Scott in LTC Harms & FA Faris (eds) LAWSA Vol 17 Part 2 (2
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3 3 2 Implied consent 
3 3 2 1 Introduction 
According to the first theory the extension principle is based on the third party‟s 
consent that his property can be utilised as security for payment of arrear rent by the 
lessee. It is argued that the third party‟s consent may be express or implied from his 
conduct.64 It appears that no problem arises in cases where the third party gave 
express consent for his property to be subject to the lessor‟s tacit hypothec.65 
However, implied consent seems to be more problematic.66 Hence, this section 
focuses on the third party‟s implied consent and not his express consent. The 
circumstances under which the third party‟s consent to the lessor‟s tacit hypothec 
may be implied have been carefully analysed by South African courts.67 In Lazarus v 
Dose68 De Villiers CJ expressed the view that a third party‟s consent to the lessor‟s 
tacit hypothec could be presumed from the third party‟s conduct in leaving his 
property in the lessee‟s possession under such a circumstance as would necessarily 
lead the lessor to believe that the property belongs to the lessee. 
In Bloemfontein Municipality v Jacksons Ltd69 Curlewis JA explained the 
implied consent principle as follows:  
“When goods belonging to a third person are brought on to leased premises with 
the knowledge and consent, express or implied, of the owner of the goods, and 
with the intention that they shall remain there indefinitely for the use of the 
tenant, and the owner, being in a position to give notice of his ownership to the 
landlord fails to do so, and the landlord is unaware that the goods do not belong 
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 See Lazarus v Dose (1884) 3 SC 44; Collins v Whittock (1899) 9 HCG 182; Mangold Bros Ltd v 
Hirschman Bros 1917 TPD 187; Bradlow & Co v Lucas 1917 TPD 310; Bradlow v Ward 1929 TPD 
313. See also G Wille Landlord and tenant in South Africa (4
th
 ed 1948) 194; TJ Scott & S Scott 
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rd
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 See TJ Scott & S Scott Wille’s Law of mortgage and pledge in South Africa (3
rd
 ed 1987) 99. See 
also AJ Kerr The law of sale and lease (3
rd
 ed 2004) 394; I Knobel “The tacit hypothec of the lessor” 
(2004) 67 THRHR 687-697 94. 
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to the tenant, the owner will thereby be taken to have consented to the goods 
being subject to the landlord's tacit hypothec and liable to attachment.” 70 
In Barclays Western Bank Ltd v Dekker & Another71 Kumbleben J expressed the 
view that “implied consent” is inferred when an owner has failed to inform the lessor 
of his ownership of property on the leased premises when he could reasonably be 
expected to have done so. Disputes regarding third parties‟ property usually occur 
when the owner seeks to reclaim his property and the lessor relies on his alleged 
hypothec.72 In such circumstances the onus is on the lessor to prove that the 
hypothec exists and also attaches to the third party‟s property on the leased 
premises.73 The lessor can discharge this onus only by proving the four requirements 
that follow from Bloemfontein Municipality v Jacksons Ltd,74 namely: 
 The property must be on the premises with the knowledge and consent of its 
owner; 
 the lessor must be unaware of the fact that the property belongs to someone 
other than the lessee; 
 the property must be present with some degree of permanence and not merely 
temporarily; and 
 the property must be there for the lessee‟s own use and benefit. 
These requirements are discussed below with reference to their application in case 
law prior to 1929, in Bloemfontein Municipality v Jacksons Ltd75 and in post-1929 
case law. Although these requirements already developed in seventeenth century 
Roman-Dutch law, the decision in Bloemfontein Municipality v Jacksons Ltd was a 
pivotal moment in the development of the principle of the extension of the lessor‟s 
tacit hypothec in modern South African law. This case is significant because, as I 
explain below, the court in Bloemfontein Municipality v Jacksons Ltd developed or 
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extended the third party‟s knowledge and consent requirement further than it was 
applied before. 
 
3 3 2 2 Third parties’ knowledge and consent 
Roman-Dutch law provided for the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec to third 
parties‟ property only if the third party had knowledge of and consented to his 
property being on the leased premises.76 This was also the position in South African 
law prior the decision in Bloemfontein Municipality v Jacksons Ltd.77 
For instance, in Heugh’s Trustee v Heydenrych78 the owner had let the furniture 
to the lessee (the insolvent) of certain leased premises who later moved the furniture 
to new premises without the respondent‟s knowledge and consent. The court held 
that it was impossible to hold the owner responsible for the new lessor‟s belief that 
the furniture belonged to the insolvent. De Villiers CJ reasoned that the owner of the 
furniture, being unaware of the removal, could not have given notice of his ownership 
to the new lessor and therefore the lessor‟s tacit hypothec did not apply to such 
furniture.79 
In Collins v Whittock80 the facts corresponded to those in Heugh’s Trustee v 
Hydenrych.81 However, in Collins v Whittock the owner of the property gave consent 
to the first removal of the property to the premises owned by his debtor‟s relatives. 
Yet, without the owner‟s knowledge and consent, the debtor moved once again to 
the leased premises owned by the defendant. The court held that the plaintiff knew 
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 See DP de Bruyn The opinions of Grotius as contained in the Hollandsche consultatien en advijsen 
(1894) 186; Voet 20.2.5. 
77
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nothing of the removal of his property to the lessor‟s (defendant‟s) premises until the 
liability for rent had been incurred and therefore the lessor‟s tacit hypothec could not 
extend to the plaintiff‟s property.82 
In Bradlow & Co v Lucas83 B sold furniture to W in terms of a hire-purchase 
agreement subject to a reservation of ownership clause, and informed W‟s lessor of 
the hire-purchase agreement. Thereafter the lessor transferred ownership of the 
premises to his son and no notification of change of ownership was given to B. When 
W fell in arrears with the rent, the new lessor attached the movable assets found on 
the leased premises including B‟s furniture.84 The court held that inasmuch as B had 
done everything in its power to show that it did not consent to the furniture being 
subject to the lessor‟s tacit hypothec, its furniture could not be subject to the lessor‟s 
tacit hypothec.85 
In Bradlow v Ward86 B sold furniture to F in terms of a hire-purchase agreement 
and informed F‟s lessor of the hire-purchase agreement. F agreed not to remove the 
furniture from the leased premises without B‟s written consent and that, in case F 
decided to remove the furniture to other premises, he should inform and provide B 
with the name and address of his new lessor. F moved the furniture to premises 
belonging to Ward and did not inform B of the move. As soon as B became aware of 
F‟s move, he obtained the name and address of F‟s new lessor and informed him of 
the hire-purchase agreement. However, by the time the new lessor was informed of 
the hire-purchase agreement, he had already issued summons for rental arrears and 
had obtained a rent interdict. On appeal the court held that the lessor‟s tacit 
hypothec could not extend to the furniture belonging to B because B had taken all 
reasonable steps to protect his property against the hypothec.87 
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In three of the four cases discussed above,88 third parties lacked knowledge 
that their properties were on the leased premises. Consequently, consent to their 
property being subject to the lessor‟s tacit hypothec could not be inferred. However, 
in Bradlow & Co v Lucas89 the court was influenced by the fact that the third party 
had taken reasonable steps to notify the lessor that it did not wish its property to be 
subject to the lessor‟s tacit hypothec. 
In light of the preceding overview of case law I conclude that prior to 1929 
South African courts accepted that the lessor‟s tacit hypothec could only extend to 
third parties‟ property if the third party had knowledge that his property was on the 
leased premises.90 Consequently, the third party‟s property was not subject to the 
lessor‟s tacit hypothec if he was unaware that his property was on the leased 
premises.91 The operation of the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec to third 
parties‟ property in this context corresponds to the principle that provides that the 
property of a legal subject may not be alienated or burdened without his consent 
(express or implied).92 
                                                                                                                                       
also Rand Furnishing Co v Hydenrych 1929 TPD 588, where De Waal JP elaborated on this dictum 
as follows:  
“[I]t is clear from those authorities that the owner of movables must not be guilty of any 
dilatory or negligent conduct in the matter of notice. He must take such steps as are 
reasonable in the circumstances to protect his property, steps that would negative any 
intention on his part to subject his goods to the operation of the landlord's lien. It is not 
enough, for the owner merely to say: „I do not consent to my goods being subject to the 
landlord's lien‟. He must give some reasonable expression of his intention not to consent, 
either to the landlord or his agent; he must do something that appeals to reasonable men 
as being entirely inconsistent with his having so consented.” 
In this case the court emphasised how essential it is for a third party who knows that his property is on 
the leased premises to notify the lessor of his ownership. The above dictum also focused on the 
conduct of a third party who does not know his property is on the hired premises but fails to ascertain 
the whereabouts of his property. 
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However, in 1929 a major development took place with the Appellate Division‟s 
decision in Bloemfontein Municipality v Jacksons Ltd.93 In May 1925 the respondents 
(Jacksons Ltd) sold furniture in terms of a hire-purchase agreement to Smit, who 
was then living on the leased premises situated in Shannon Valley. The respondent 
informed Smit‟s lessor of the hire-purchase agreement. In May 1926 Smit moved 
from Shannon Valley to 205 Monument Road in Bloemfontein where he rented a 
house from Bloemfontein Municipality (the appellant). No notice was given to the 
respondents of Smit‟s change of address. When Smit fell in arrears with his 
instalments, the respondents issued summons against him but the messenger was 
unable to serve Smit with summons at Shannon Valley. However, with the 
assistance of the respondent‟s attorneys the messenger successfully served Smit 
with summons at 205 Monument Road. Subsequent to Smit‟s failure to pay the due 
instalments the respondents repossessed the furniture. Smit then paid the due 
instalments and the furniture was returned to him at 205 Monument Road. 
The appellant attached the furniture under a judgment for arrear rent and in the 
interpleader action the respondents (Jacksons Ltd) claimed that the furniture was not 
subject to the lessor‟s tacit hypothec because it belonged to them. By the time the 
furniture was attached, it had been stored at 205 Monument Road for eighteen 
months. The court had to decide whether the respondents‟ property was subject to 
the lessor‟s tacit hypothec.94 The court rejected the respondents‟ argument that the 
knowledge of its attorneys could not be imputed to it because the attorneys were 
only its agents for the purpose of issuing summons for recovery of the due 
instalments. 
The court held that ordinary prudence demands that an owner of goods 
supplied under a hire-purchase agreement should protect itself in some way.95 The 
court emphasised that although the hire-purchase agreement contained the name 
and address of the lessor in Shannon Valley, it contained no prohibition against Smit 
removing the furniture without first obtaining the consent of the respondents or a 
clause binding Smit to give notice to the respondents in case he moves to a new 
premises. The court per Curlewis JA held that the respondents were in a position to 
find out where Smit was living but failed to do so and/or to take reasonable 
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measures to protect itself.96 As a result, the court was compelled to infer from the 
respondents‟ conduct that the respondents impliedly consented to its furniture being 
subject to the lessor‟s tacit hypothec.97 
Prior to Bloemfontein Municipality v Jacksons Ltd98 South African courts 
interpreted the third party‟s knowledge and consent requirement to mean that a third 
party‟s property could not be subject to the lessor‟s tacit hypothec if the third party 
was not aware that his property was on the leased premises. Bloemfontein 
Municipality v Jacksons Ltd99 developed the third party‟s knowledge and consent 
requirement and it now entails that a third party‟s property can be subject to the 
lessor‟s tacit hypothec even if the third party has no knowledge that his goods is on 
the leased premises. However, the third party should have been in position to 
ascertain the whereabouts of his property but failed to protect himself.100 
Cooper accepts the premise of the court in Bloemfontein Municipality v 
Jacksons Ltd101 that Jacksons Ltd was not entitled to assume that Smit would 
continue to live in Shannon Valley and that Jacksons Ltd had the means of knowing 
that Smit was no longer residing there.102 The author also agrees with the court‟s 
view that it did not follow that Jacksons Ltd knew that Smit was either no longer 
residing in Shannon Valley or was residing in 205 Monument Road.103 Cooper 
further agrees with the court that by its failure to take steps to protect itself Jacksons 
Ltd led the appellant to believe that the furniture was the lessee‟s property and 
hence subject to the hypothec.104 However, Cooper criticises the court‟s failure to 
apply the third party‟s knowledge and consent requirement.105 Cooper argues that 
unless the third party‟s knowledge of its property being stored at 205 Monument 
Road was established, the court was not entitled to infer that Jacksons Ltd had 
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impliedly consented to its furniture being subject to the lessor‟s tacit hypothec.106 
Yet, Cooper suggests that the decision in Bloemfontein Municipality v Jacksons 
Ltd107 can be supported on the basis that Smit was not prohibited under the hire-
purchase agreement from removing the furniture from the hired premises in Shannon 
Valley and therefore Smit was under no obligation to notify Jacksons Ltd of his 
move.108 Cooper‟s view can be interpreted to mean that Bloemfontein Municipality v 
Jacksons Ltd109 should have been decided on estoppel rather than implied consent. 
In Fresh Meat Supply Co v Standard Trading Co110 Standard Trading Co (the 
respondents) sold electric appliances to Birke (the lessee) in terms of a hire-
purchase agreement, with a clause that states that the articles shall be kept in 
Birke‟s possession. The agreement further obliged Birke to notify the respondents of 
his new lessor‟s name and address in case he moves to another leased premises.111 
The hire-purchase agreement was not completely filled in and Birke did not indicate 
whether or not he was living on the leased premises. The Standard Trading Co 
accepted the incomplete agreement and had no knowledge that Birke kept its 
furniture on the leased premises owned by Fresh Meat Supply Co. 
Subsequent to Birke‟s failure to pay rent the furniture was attached by the 
appellant in terms of a judgment for arrear rent. The respondent claimed that the 
furniture was not subject to the lessor‟s tacit hypothec. The court relied on 
Bloemfontein Municipality v Jacksons Ltd112 as authority for the view that consent to 
the lessor‟s tacit hypothec may be implied even when the owner does not know that 
his property had been kept on the leased premises.113 The court held that the clause 
that imposed an obligation on the purchaser to notify the respondent (seller) of his 
move and the new address was not sufficient to protect the respondent against the 
lessor‟s tacit hypothec.114 The court concluded that the respondent had not taken 
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reasonable steps to protect itself and therefore the respondent had impliedly 
consented that its property could be subject to the lessor‟s tacit hypothec.115 
Cooper also criticises the decision in Fresh Meat Supply Co v Standard Trading 
Co116 and states that the court was not entitled to assume the respondent‟s 
knowledge and consent as to whether Birke resided on the leased premises.117 
Cooper argues that, unless the third party‟s knowledge was established, the court 
was not entitled to infer that Standard Trading Co had impliedly consented to its 
furniture being subject to the lessor‟s tacit hypothec.118 However, Cooper contends 
that Fresh Meat Supply Co v Standard Trading Co119 can be justified on the basis 
that the hire-purchase agreement did not prohibit Birke from removing the property to 
another leased premises without the consent of Standard Trading Co.120 
In light of the above discussion, the Appellate Division in Bloemfontein 
Municipality v Jacksons Ltd121 developed or extended the third party knowledge and 
consent requirement to also apply in cases where a third party has no knowledge 
that his property is on the leased premises but failed to take reasonable steps to 
protect himself.122 According to the court in Bloemfontein Municipality v Jacksons Ltd 
such steps would include a clause in the hire-purchase agreement that prohibits the 
lessee from removing the property without the owner‟s consent or a clause binding 
the debtor to inform the creditor of his change of address.123 
I agree with Cooper that the courts in Bloemfontein Municipality v Jacksons 
Ltd124 and Fresh Meat Supply Co v Standard Trading Co125 were not entitled to infer 
the third party‟s consent because the owner‟s knowledge that his property was on 
the leased premises was not established. In my view, if the court in Bloemfontein 
Municipality v Jacksons Ltd126 strictly applied the third party‟s knowledge and 
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consent requirement as it was applied in earlier cases127 the result would have been 
different, since it appears that there was no evidence to prove that Jacksons Ltd 
knew that Smit had moved to 205 Monument Road. Therefore, the court was in 
actual fact not entitled to assume the knowledge and consent of Jacksons Ltd. 
 
3 3 2 3 The lessor’s knowledge of ownership 
The second requirement that the lessor must prove to be successful with his 
hypothec against a third party‟s property is that he was not aware that the property 
belonged to a third party.128 Hence, the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec 
cannot operate if the lessor is aware of the true position.129 The third party has a duty 
to notify the lessor of his ownership of the movable property.130 For example, in 
Mackay Brothers v Cohen131 M sold a piano to C‟s lessee in terms of a hire-purchase 
agreement and informed C of the hire-purchase agreement, after which C attached 
the piano to satisfy his claim for arrear rent against his lessee. The court held that 
the hypothec is founded on a presumption of the tacit consent of the owner of the 
goods, which can be rebutted by a clear expression of its will. Therefore, the piano 
was not subject to the lessor‟s tacit hypothec because M notified the lessor that the 
piano was its property.132 
In Goldinger’s Trustee v Whitelaw & Sons133 it was held that to be effective 
such a notice should reach the lessor before the lessee is in arrears with rent. Also, 
in Bloemfontein Municipality v Jacksons Ltd it was stated that the lessor‟s tacit 
hypothec is inoperative if the lessor is aware of the fact that movables on the leased 
premises are not the lessee‟s property.134 In TR Services (Pty) Ltd v Poynton’s 
Corner Ltd & Others135 it was held that knowledge of ownership may be inferred if 
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the property bears a notice that it is the property of a third party. Knowledge can also 
be inferred from the nature of the lessee‟s business or occupation.136 
In Paradise Lost Properties (Pty) Ltd v Standard Bank of SA (Pty) Ltd137 the 
court elaborated on the lessor‟s knowledge requirement. Standard Bank sold but 
reserved ownership of a business and its assets until the full purchase price was 
paid. The applicant obtained default judgment against the lessee (debtor) for arrear 
rent. Consequently, they attached the movable property found in the debtor‟s 
possession. The trial court held that, if the lessor knew that the property belonged to 
a third party, the property could not be subject to the lessor‟s tacit hypothec.138 On 
appeal the appellant argued that it did not have knowledge of the fact that the 
property belonged to a third party. The court held that, since the lessor received a 
copy of the hire-purchase agreement (instalment agreement), it could not heedlessly 
ignore the facts that were before it and accordingly the court dismissed the 
appeal.139 
In Eight Kaya Sands v Valley Irrigation Equipment140 the respondent leased 
property to the lessee who stored it on the leased premises belonging to the 
appellant (lessor). Neither the lessee nor the owner of the property (Valley Irrigation 
Equipment) had informed the lessor that the property belonged to the respondents. 
The appellant claimed that the property found on the leased premises, including 
those of the respondent, was subject to the lessor‟s tacit hypothec for arrear rent. 
The court held that the third person‟s property found on the leased premises may be 
subject to the lessor‟s tacit hypothec. However, if the lessor has knowledge that the 
property belongs to the third party, such property is not subject to the lessor‟s tacit 
hypothec. Therefore, because the lessor was informed that the property belonged to 
the respondent before it perfected its hypothec, the respondents‟ property could not 
be attached.141 The decisions in Paradise Lost Properties (Pty) Ltd v Standard Bank 
of SA (Pty) Ltd142 and Eight Kaya Sands v Valley Irrigation Equipment143 were 
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recently confirmed in Holderness NO and Others v Maxwell and Others.144 In this 
case it was held that, if the lessor becomes aware that the property belongs to a third 
party before perfection, his hypothec cannot extend to such property.145 
Sher146 argues that as a result of the judgment in Paradise Lost Properties (Pty) 
Ltd v Standard Bank of SA (Pty) Ltd,147 the lessor‟s position has been weakened, 
since actual knowledge of the fact that the property in the leased premises belongs 
to a third party is no longer a deciding requirement. Sher argues that the subjective 
standard of the lessor‟s actual knowledge has been replaced by the objective 
standard of whether the lessor, by exercising reasonable care, could have 
established that the property did not belong to the lessee.148 Sher further argues that 
the move from a subjective to an objective standard may result in the exclusion of 
more movables from the lessor‟s tacit hypothec, which undermines the lessor‟s 
security.149 
It is arguable that the courts are moving away from the actual-knowledge 
requirement of the lessor regarding the true ownership of the property to an imputed 
knowledge. This is apparent from Paradise Lost Properties (Pty) Ltd v Standard 
Bank of SA (Pty) Ltd,150 where the court held that the lessor could not argue that he 
was not aware of the true position if, by taking certain steps, he could have known 
the true state of affairs. One can accordingly conclude that Paradise Lost Properties 
(Pty) Ltd v Standard Bank of SA (Pty) Ltd151 has strengthened third parties‟ 
protection against the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec because, as a result of 
this judgment, the lessor cannot ignore the facts regarding the true ownership of the 
movables and proceed to attach such property. 
 
3 3 2 4 Degree of permanence 
The third requirement for the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec to third parties‟ 
property is that the property should have been brought on to the leased premises 
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with the intention to remain there indefinitely.152 For example, in Lazarus v Dose153 it 
was held that this requirement is not met if the goods are leased to the lessee on a 
monthly basis and only a few months have passed. In Mangold Bros Ltd v 
Hirschman Bros154 the court held that a vehicle supplied by an employer to an 
employee to be used solely in the course of his employment was not subject to the 
lessor‟s tacit hypothec because in such cases the element of permanence is absent, 
since the employer can at any time take his vehicle back. In Goldinger’s Trustee v 
Whitelaw & Sons155 it was held that the merchandise that forms part of the lessee-
shopkeeper‟s stock-in-trade was not subject to the lessor‟s hypothec either.156 
In The Standard and Diggers’ News Company v Esterhuizen157 A sold a piano 
to B in terms of a hire-purchase agreement. The terms of the agreement was that the 
lessor of any premises on which the piano might be used or stored would not have a 
tacit hypothec over it. The lessor of B was not informed about the hire-purchase 
agreement and in execution of a judgment for rental arrears he attached the piano 
along with other furniture. The court held that the piano was on the leased premises 
for permanent use by the lessee and therefore subject to the lessee‟s tacit 
hypothec.158 In Bloemfontein Municipality v Jacksons Ltd159 it was held that property 
sold on the hire-purchase system is subject to the lessor‟s tacit hypothec because it 
is brought on to the leased premises with the intention to remain there for some time 
and for the use by the lessee.160 In TR Services (Pty) Ltd v Poynton’s Corner Ltd and 
Others161 Warner AJ expressed the view that it is difficult to know what is required 
under the time factor but, according to the judge, if leased property is on the 
premises for a period of fifteen years, the requirement of permanence is met.162 
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In summary, third parties‟ property is only subject to the lessor‟s tacit hypothec 
if it was brought on to the leased premises with the intention to remain there 
indefinitely for the lessee‟s use. Furthermore, the traditional South African common 
law position is that movable property sold in terms of the hire-purchase agreement is 
presumed to be brought on to the leased premises for the permanent use by the 
lessee, since the agreement entails that the lessee becomes the owner upon 
payment of the full purchase price.163 Hence, property sold in terms of a hire-
purchase agreement can be subject to the lessor‟s tacit hypothec. However, the 
owner of movable property may rebut such a presumption by giving notice to the 
lessor of his intention.164 Conversely, a third party‟s property leased to the lessee in 
terms of a general lease agreement is not subject to the lessor‟s tacit hypothec, 
since it is there for temporary use only.165 
 
3 3 2 5 For use by the lessee 
The last requirement that the lessor must prove in order to be successful with his 
hypothec against third parties‟ property is that the movable property was on the 
leased premises for use by the lessee,166 which fact can be inferred from the nature 
of the goods or from the circumstances.167 For example, in Crowley v Domony168 the 
lessee‟s wife brought some furniture into the house rented by her husband. The 
lessee‟s wife claimed that the furniture was not subject to the lessor‟s tacit hypothec. 
However, the court held that the property was there for permanent use by the lessee 
and his wife and therefore subject to the lessor‟s tacit hypothec. Scott and Scott 
argue that this case was wrongly decided because the requirement is that the 
property should be destined for the use by the lessee and that the marriage 
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relationship in this case did not imply that the property was for the use of the lessee 
as well.169 
In Longlands v Francken170 a piano that was used exclusively by the lessee‟s 
daughter was held not to be subject to the lessor‟s tacit hypothec. In Bloemfontein 
Municipality v Jacksons Ltd171 the court found that if a third party‟s property was 
brought on to the leased premises for the lessee‟s use, it is subject to the hypothec. 
In Reinhold & Co v Van Oudtshoorn172 the bona fide sub-lessee‟s property was 
attached for arrear rent owed by the lessee. The court held that the sub-lessee‟s 
property was not subject to the lessor‟s tacit hypothec because it was not brought on 
to the premises for the use of the lessee. Further, in Van den Bergh, Melamed & 
Nathan v Polliack & Co173 it was held that a radiogram that was bought in terms of a 
hire-purchase agreement by the lessee‟s son for his use was not subject to the 
lessor‟s tacit hypothec. Therefore, the third parties‟ property may only be subject to 
the lessor‟s tacit hypothec if it was taken on to the leased premises for the use of the 
lessee. 
 
3 3 2 6 Conclusion 
Against the backdrop of the application of the implied-consent theory, it is apparent 
that what is meant by the third party‟s consent is not implied consent as meant in 
contract law because there is no contract between the third party and the lessor. My 
view is that consent in cases of the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec means 
that the law may ascribe (impute) consent to the third party, provided that certain 
requirements are met. Furthermore, the requirements that the lessor must prove to 
be succeed with a hypothec over third parties‟ property serve as protection for such 
third parties. Accordingly, failure to prove one of the requirements implies that the 
lessor‟s tacit hypothec cannot operate against third parties‟ property. 
As argued above, the court in Bloemfontein Municipality v Jacksons Ltd174 
developed the knowledge and consent requirement to mean that a third party‟s 
consent may be “implied” even if the third party has no knowledge that his property is 
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stored on the leased premises but, by exercising reasonable care, he should have 
known where his property was stored. Taking into consideration my explanation of 
what should be understood by the third party‟s consent in the extension of the 
lessor‟s tacit hypothec, it has become necessary to clarify the effect of the 
development of the consent requirement in Bloemfontein Municipality v Jacksons 
Ltd.175 
Does the development in Bloemfontein Municipality v Jacksons Ltd mean that 
the law may ascribe knowledge and consent to a third party even if the third party is 
not aware that his property is stored in the leased premises or has done everything 
to protect himself against the lessor‟s tacit hypothec, as happened in Heugh’s 
Trustee v Heydenrych,176 Collins v Whittock,177 Bradlow v Ward178 and Bradlow & Co 
v Lucas?179 Or, does it mean that consent should be imputed to a third party only in 
circumstances where the third party is in a position to find out the whereabouts of his 
property but fails to do so, as was the case in Bloemfontein Municipality v Jacksons 
Ltd and Fresh Meat Supply Co v Standard Trading Co?180 To my mind, the later view 
is more plausible because it would be unreasonable to expect a third party who is 
not aware or not in a position to find out that his property is stored on the leased 
premises to give notice of his ownership to the lessor. Hence, my argument is that 
the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec should not apply in cases where the third 
parties had no knowledge of their property being on the leased premises or cases 
where the third parties have done everything to protect themselves against the 
extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec. 
Analysis of the imputed consent (implied consent) theory indicates that the 
lessor must prove certain requirements in order to be successful with the attachment 
of third parties‟ property. Accordingly, he must prove that the movable property was 
brought on to the leased premises for indefinite use by the lessee and not for 
temporary use. Furthermore, the extension of lessor‟s tacit hypothec to third parties‟ 
property does not apply to cases where the lessor became aware of the true 
ownership of the property before perfection of the hypothec. The analysis of the 
                                            
175
 1929 AD 266 278. 
176
 (1895) 12 SC 318. 
177
 (1899) 9 HCG 182. 
178
 1929 TPD 313. 
179
 1917 TPD 314. 
180
 1933 CPD 550. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
69 
requirements illustrates that movable property leased in terms of a contract of lease 
cannot be subject to the lessor‟s tacit hypothec, since it is brought on to the leased 
premises for temporary use only. 
In what follows I describe the doctrine of estoppel, which is also presented as a 
justification for the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec to third parties‟ property. 
 
3 3 3 Estoppel 
There is judicial support for the view that the doctrine of estoppel,181 which operates 
as a limitation on the rei vindicatio of the owner of property, also serves as a basis 
for the extension of the operation of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec to third parties‟ 
property.182 Estoppel entails that a party (the representor) who has by means of a 
representation wilfully or negligently misled another (the representee) to reasonably 
believe in the existence of a state of affairs and thereby induced that person to act to 
his detriment, will in litigation between the parties be precluded from denying that the 
facts were as represented, provided that to uphold the representation would not be 
contrary to public policy.183 
The requirements for estoppel are as follows: a misrepresentation; reliance by 
the estoppel asserter on the misrepresentation; prejudice; causation; and fault.184 
Although there is some indication that fault is not required in all cases of estoppel,185 
there is authority for the proposition that it is indeed still a requirement in all cases.186 
The majority of authority supports the view that fault (dolus or culpa) is required in 
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cases where estoppel is used as a limitation against the rei vindicatio.187 Requiring 
fault in these instances strengthens the protection of the owner, and in cases of the 
lessor‟s tacit hypothec it strengthens the protection of third parties whose property 
may be subject to the extension of the hypothec. 
The doctrine of estoppel was formally adopted in South African law in In re 
Reynolds Vehicle & Harness Factory Ltd.188 However, its recognition as a limitation 
of the rei vindicatio of the third party received attention from cases regarding the 
lessor‟s tacit hypothec as early as 1884.189 In Lazarus v Dose190 De Villiers CJ 
expressed the view that the owner of the goods would be estopped from denying 
that he intended them to become bound as security to the lessor if he had failed to 
inform the lessor that the property belonged to him.191 In Bloemfontein Municipality v 
Jacksons Ltd192 it was held that if the owner is in a position to inform the lessor of his 
ownership but fails do so, the owner should thereby be taken to have consented to 
the goods being subject to the lessor's tacit hypothec.193 
In Eight Kaya Sands v Valley Irrigation Equipment194 Van der Walt J expressed 
the view that there could be no justification for the property of a third person serving 
as security for the debt of the lessee unless a misrepresentation (skyn) that the 
property belonged to the lessee existed at the time of attachment.195 One can 
deduce from this emphasis that Van der Walt J preferred the doctrine of estoppel as 
the justification for the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec to a third party‟s 
property.196 In the same case Preller AJ stated that the estoppel approach justifies 
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the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec to a third party‟s property on the basis of 
the appearance that the owner generates.197 Lubbe argues that the court in Eight 
Kaya Sands v Valley Irrigation Equipment198 favoured the estoppel approach by its 
emphasis on the element of a culpable misrepresentation by the third party.199 
De Wet and Van Wyk argue that the owner has a duty to ensure that others are 
not misled by the impression that the property belongs to the lessee. According to 
them, if the third party fails to inform the lessor of his ownership, he must be held to 
have consented to the lessor‟s tacit hypothec.200 Cooper also states that estoppel 
justifies the subjection of a third party‟s to the lessor‟s tacit hypothec.201 
Knobel argues that the property of a third party can only be attached if a third 
party who is in a position to give notice to the lessor fails to do so.202 The author also 
contends that estoppel provides a ground for a third party‟s property being subject to 
the lessor‟s tacit hypothec that is more equitable and has a greater foundation in 
reality. Knobel argues that attachment can be justified if at least negligence is 
required on the part of the third person.203 She further suggests that legal certainty 
will be served and equitable results obtained more consistently if there is express 
recognition of the value judgment performed in respect of the third person‟s conduct. 
Therefore, Knobel is of the view that legal certainty and equitable results will be 
facilitated by an unambiguous adoption of the estoppel approach, inclusive of a fault 
requirement in the form of at least negligence.204 
McLennan argues that it is difficult to find how a third party‟s carelessness or 
negligence can constitute consent with respect to the lessor‟s tacit hypothec.205 The 
author argues that in terms of estoppel, the estoppel assertor (lessor) should be 
aware of the presence of the property on his premises and that this is not a 
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requirement for the lessor‟s tacit hypothec, since the lessor does not need to know 
about the presence of such goods on the premises before the rent is in arrears.206 
The author argues that there is no rational legal basis for the extension of the 
lessor‟s tacit hypothec to a third party‟s property. Accordingly, McLennan‟s view is 
that implied consent, fault and appearance are hopeless explanations for the 
extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec to third parties‟ property.207 Hence, the author 
argues that neither implied consent nor the doctrine of estoppel provides justification 
for the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec to third parties‟ property, since there is 
neither contractual privity between the lessor and the third party nor a delict.208 
McLennan argues that the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec is an arbitrary and 
anomalous rule of ancient law that existed in a certain socio-economic environment. 
McLennan‟s view is that without actual consent, a third party‟s property should not be 
used as security for the debt of the lessee. 
Steven states that implied consent is a fiction whereby the owner is taken to 
have accepted his property‟s being subject to the lessor‟s tacit hypothec. The author 
is also of the view that because implied consent is a fiction, the estoppel approach 
should also be dismissed as an alternative to the implied-consent approach.209 
Therefore, Steven is also of the view that neither implied consent nor estoppel 
provides justification for the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec to third parties‟ 
property.210 
With the exception of two authors,211 the discussion of literature above shows 
that the estoppel approach, inclusive of the fault requirement, is accepted as a 
justification for the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec. However, our courts have 
not yet decided any case concerning the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec on 
the doctrine of estoppel. 
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3 3 4 Concluding remarks 
In light of the analysis of the justifications of the extension of the lessor‟s tacit 
hypothec, it is apparent that the majority of case law favours the implied consent 
approach as a justification for the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec to third 
parties‟ property.212 However, in some cases the courts seemed to have accepted 
the doctrine of estoppel as a justification, albeit without explicitly applying it.213 The 
implied consent approach requires that, for a third party‟s property to be subject to 
the lessor‟s tacit hypothec, the property must have been brought on to the leased 
premises to remain there for indefinite use by the lessee. The estoppel approach 
provides that, for a third party‟s property to be subject to the lessor‟s tacit hypothec, 
his action or inaction must have misled the lessor to believe that the property 
belonged to the lessee.214 As a result, it is possible to subject a third party‟s property 
to the lessor‟s tacit hypothec if he is in a position to notify the lessor of his ownership 
but fails to do so.215 In cases where the implied consent approach is applied, the 
onus is on the lessor to prove that the hypothec applies against a third party‟s 
property. On the other hand, in cases where the estoppel approach is applicable, the 
onus is on the estoppel asserter (the lessor) to prove that a third party‟s action or 
inaction constitutes a misrepresentation that caused him to act to his detriment.216 
In view of the discussion of both approaches, it is arguable that the Appellate 
Division in Bloemfontein Municipality v Jacksons Ltd failed to develop the doctrine of 
estoppel, which at that point in time had already received judicial recognition as a 
                                            
212
 See Longlands v Francken 1881 Kotzé 256; Ulrich v Ulrich’s Trustee (1883) 2 SC 319; Lazarus v 
Dose (1884) 3 SC 42; Mackay Brothers v Cohen (1894) 1 Off Rep 342; Heugh’s Trustee v 
Heydenrych (1895) 12 SC 318; Collins v Whittock (1899) 9 HCG 182; Noble v Heatley 1905 TS 433; 
Turpin v Wagstaff & Sons 1906 TS 597; Russell v Savory (1906) 20 EDC 100; Ncora v Untiedt 1916 
EDL 32; Goldinger’s Trustee v Whitelaw & Sons 1916 TPD 235; Mangold Bros Ltd v Hirschman Bros 
1917 TPD 187; Colonial Cabinet Manufacturing Co v Wahl 1924 CPD 282; Sercombe v Colonial 
Motors (Natal) Ltd 1929 NPD 58; Bloemfontein Municipality v Jacksons Ltd 1929 AD 266 271; 
Bradlow v Ward 1929 TPD 313; Rand Furnishing Co v Hydenrych 1929 TPD 583; Mackay Bros Ltd v 
Eaglestone 1932 TPD 301; Hilson & Taylor Ltd v Teukolskin 1933 TPD 83; Fresh Meat Supply Co v 
Standard Trading Co (Pty) 1933 CPD 550; Philips v Hearne & Co 1937 CPD 61; Van den Bergh, 
Melamed & Nathan v Polliack & Co 1940 TPD 237 238; Eight Kaya Sands v Valley Irrigation 
Equipment 2003 (2) SA 495 (T). 
213
 See Lazarus v Dose (1884) 3 SC 44; Mackay Brothers v Cohen (1894) 1 Off Rep 342; Heugh’s 
Trustee v Hydenrych (1895) 12 SC 320; Turpin v Wagstaff & Sons 1906 TS 599; Ncora v Untiedt 
1916 EDL 329; Colonial Cabinet Manufacturing Co v Wahl 1924 CPD 282; Bloemfontein Municipality 
v Jacksons Ltd 1929 AD 266; Eight Kaya Sands v Valley Irrigation Equipment 2003 (2) SA 495 (T) 
501I-502A. 
214
 In general, see JC Sonnekus The law of estoppel in South Africa (2000) 2. 
215
 Bloemfontein Municipality v Jacksons Ltd 1929 AD 266 271. 
216
 I Knobel “The tacit hypothec of the lessor” (2004) 67 THRHR 687-697 694. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
74 
basis for the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec to a third party‟s property.217 
Furthermore, the conclusion reached in Bloemfontein Municipality v Jacksons could 
have been reached by application of the doctrine of estoppel. 
The confusion regarding the justification of the extension of the lessor‟s tacit 
hypothec was recently recognised by at least one academic.218 Lubbe is of the view 
that the court in Bloemfontein Municipality v Jacksons Ltd219 reduced the consent 
requirement to a fiction while at the same time importing considerations that would 
be relevant in the application of the estoppel defence, such as negligence on the part 
of the third party.220 The author argues that the application of the doctrine of estoppel 
as an alternative in early case law has been obscured by the tendency in later 
decisions to consolidate the doctrine of estoppel and the consent doctrine into a 
single enquiry.221 Lubbe further argues that the requirement that the lessor must be 
ignorant of the fact that the lessee is not the owner of the goods may be relevant to 
the requirement of inducement for the operation of the doctrine of estoppel.222 
Accordingly, Lubbe‟s view is that a return to a dualistic approach will be conducive to 
clarity in that it will enable the requirements for the operation of the doctrine to be 
restricted to the conceptual basis for the doctrine‟s meaning and relevance.223 
Lubbe‟s view is that both the implied-consent theory and the doctrine of estoppel are 
relevant in explaining the subjection of third parties‟ property to the lessor‟s tacit 
hypothec for arrear rent.224 
Lubbe‟s suggestion to return to a dualistic approach seems plausible, since it 
may assist the courts to decide cases on the basis of either of the theories. The 
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doctrine of estoppel will find application in cases where the third party is in a position 
to protect himself against the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec but fails to do. 
Applied in this sense, it becomes possible to explain Bloemfontein Municipality v 
Jacksons Ltd225 on the basis of the doctrine of estoppel rather than on the basis of 
implied consent. 
My opinion is that the consolidation of the two approaches has also led the 
courts to decide all cases on the basis of implied consent, even those that could 
have been decided on the estoppel approach. It is also arguable that the “implied 
consent” required for the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec is not actually 
similar to the implied consent that could be inferred in the lease agreement between 
the lessor and the lessee, but rather consent that the court may impute (ascribe) to 
the third party considering that certain requirements are met. My view is that the 
argument that a third party had impliedly consented to the lessor‟s tacit hypothec is 
irrelevant, since the lessor‟s tacit hypothec is a real security right created by 
operation of law and not a right deriving from contract. Consequently, a third party‟s 
consent to be subject to the lessor‟s tacit hypothec cannot be implied because there 
is no contract between the lessor and the third party. Hence, I argue that a better 
explanation of consent (usually called “implied consent”) in the extension of the 
lessor‟s tacit hypothec is that the law may impute consent to a third party if the 
requirements set out in Bloemfontein Municipality v Jacksons Ltd226 are met. 
Taking into consideration the explanation of what “consent” means in the 
extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec and Lubbe‟s suggestion, I conclude that both 
implied (imputed) consent and estoppel are justifications of the extension of the 
lessor‟s tacit hypothec and that they should only be applicable in cases where a third 
party‟s knowledge regarding his property being on the leased premises is 
established. Consequently, if the knowledge of a third party concerning his property 
being on the leased premises is not established, neither of the theories should be 
relied on as a justification for the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec. Applied in 
this sense, the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec to third parties‟ property on 
the basis of either the “implied-consent” or estoppel approach is justifiable. 
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3 4 Statutory protection for third parties 
The common law position regarding the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec has 
been amended by the Security by Means of Movable Property Act.227 Section 2(1) of 
the Act provides as follows:  
“Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the common law or in any other law, 
movable property; 
(a)  which, while hypothecated by a notarial bond mentioned in section 1(1), is 
in the possession of a person other than the mortgagee; or  
(b)  to which an instalment agreement as defined in in section 1 of the National 
Credit Act228 relates, shall not be subject to a landlord‟s tacit hypothec.” 
Section 2(1) of the Security by Means of Movable Property Act protects two different 
categories of third parties. The first part, section 2(1)(a), protects third parties who 
have notarial bonds registered against such movable property. Section 2(2) of the 
Act provides that these third parties are only protected in terms of section 2(1) if the 
notarial bond is registered in terms of section 61(1) of the Deeds Registries Act229 
before the lessor‟s tacit hypothec is perfected.230 The implication of section 2(2) is 
founded on the prior in tempore potior in iure rule, which provides that the first real 
security right to be created is always the strongest and enjoys preference on the 
debtor‟s insolvency.231 
The second part, section 2(1)(b), protects third parties (credit providers) who 
sold property in terms of an instalment agreement against the extension of the 
lessor‟s tacit hypothec to their property. The section states that movable property to 
which an instalment agreement, as defined by section 1 of the National Credit Act232 
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relates, shall not be subject to a lessor‟s (landlord‟s) tacit hypothec. Section 1 of the 
National Credit Act defines an instalment agreement to mean a sale of movable 
property in terms of which  
“(a)  all or part of the price is deferred and is to be paid by periodic payments; 
(b) possession and use of the property is transferred to the consumer; 
(c) ownership of the property either 
(i)  passes to the consumer only when the agreement is fully complied 
with; or 
(ii)  passes to the consumer immediately subject to a right of the credit 
provider to re-possess the property if the consumer fails to satisfy all 
of the consumer‟s financial obligations under the agreement; and 
(d)  interest, fees or other charges are payable to the credit provider in respect 
of the agreement, or the amount that has been deferred.”233 
In terms of the principles surrounding instalment agreements,234 ownership of the 
movable property passes to the consumer only when the agreement had been fully 
complied with, particularly as soon as the full purchase price had been paid.235 It is 
also possible that ownership passes to the consumer immediately, subject to a right 
of the credit provider to re-possess the property if the buyer fails to satisfy all the 
consumer‟s financial obligations under the instalment agreement.236 Prior to the 
coming into operation of the Security by Means of Movable Property Act,237 the 
property belonging to a credit provider could be subject to the lessor‟s tacit hypothec 
only if the credit provider failed to give notice to the lessor of the existence of the 
instalment agreement.238 However, section 2(1) of the Act amended this position 
and, as the law now stands, property to which an instalment agreement relates is no 
longer subject to the lessor‟s tacit hypothec. The Security by Means of Movable 
Property Act has therefore added protection for certain third parties whose movables 
might otherwise have been subject to the extension of the landlord‟s tacit hypothec. 
 
                                            
233
 S 1 (sv “instalment agreement”) of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005. 
234
 An instalment sale agreement refers to what used to be known as a hire-purchase agreement. 
235
 S 1(c)(i) of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005. 
236
 S 1(c)(ii) (sv “instalment agreement”) of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005. 
237
 57 of 1993. 
238
 See s 8 of the Credits Agreement Act 75 of 1980. See also TJ Scott & S Scott Wille’s Law of 
mortgage and pledge in South Africa (3
rd
 ed 1987) 102. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
78 
3 5 Conclusion 
The extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec to third parties‟ property as developed in 
seventeenth century Roman-Dutch law was accepted in South African law. The 
South African law position regarding the lessor‟s tacit hypothec is that it may only 
extend to third parties‟ property if the movable property was brought on to the leased 
premises with the knowledge and consent of its owner to remain on the leased 
premises indefinitely for the use by the lessee.239 However, in certain circumstances 
the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec may apply to third parties‟ property even 
though the third party is not aware of the presence of his property on the leased 
premises. 
The extension of the lessor‟s hypothec is founded on either of two theories. The 
first view is based on the third party‟s implied consent. According to this approach a 
third party is assumed to have consented that his goods can serve as security for the 
debt of another. The second approach is based on the doctrine of estoppel. In terms 
of this approach a third party is estopped from instituting the rei vindicatio against the 
lessor if his property had been attached for the arrear rent of the lessee as a result of 
his failure to notify the lessor of his ownership of the property. 
Prior to the Appellate Division‟s decision in Bloemfontein Municipality v 
Jacksons Ltd240 South African courts held that third parties‟ property could be subject 
to the lessor‟s tacit hypothec only if a third party had knowledge that his property was 
on the leased premises. However, the court in Bloemfontein Municipality v Jacksons 
Ltd extended this principle to also apply in cases where a third party had no 
knowledge of his property being on the leased premises. The development of the 
third party‟s knowledge and consent requirement in Bloemfontein Municipality v 
Jacksons Ltd241 has reduced it from being a decisive element to more of a 
consideration. Accordingly, the fact that the third party was not aware that his 
property was on the leased premises does not exempt his property from the 
extension because the court could also inquire whether the third party had done 
anything to protect himself or to find out about the whereabouts of his property, as 
was the case in Bloemfontein Municipality v Jacksons Ltd and Fresh Meat Supply Co 
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v Standard Trading Co.242 Analysis of Bloemfontein Municipality v Jacksons Ltd and 
subsequent case law proves that what is commonly referred to as “implied consent” 
of the third party is in reality imputed consent. Consequently, the courts may impute 
consent to the third party in cases where the third party is unaware of the presence 
of his property on the leased premises, but is in a position to find out where his 
property was stored and fails to protect himself. 
In conclusion, the uncertainty surrounding the justification of the extension of 
the lessor‟s tacit hypothec is the result of the confusion about how the extension of 
the lessor‟s tacit hypothec should apply and when and how each of the theories 
applies. I argue that a return to a dualistic approach may serve a useful purpose in 
the application of the doctrine extension. Further, the meaning of the third party‟s 
consent should not be understood as either actual consent or implied consent in 
contractual terms, but rather consent that may be ascribed or imputed to the third 
party by operation of law. My view is that the solution regarding the justification of the 
extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec to third parties‟ property lies in the correct 
application of both theories. 
Considering the analysis above of what is commonly referred to as implied 
consent (but is in fact imputed consent), it is clear that if this theory is applied 
correctly (without consolidating the inquiry with the estoppel approach), there will 
probably be no cases in which the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec will find 
application in practice based on the implied consent theory. Also, if the estoppel 
approach (inclusive of the fault requirement) is correctly applied, there may only be 
few cases in which estoppel will serve as the basis for attachment, especially since 
the lessor must first prove the third party‟s negligence. 
The aim of this chapter was to describe the foundational common law principle 
that provides for the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec to third parties‟ property. 
More specifically, the goal was to set out the justifications for the existence of this 
common law principle and to describe the protection measures for third parties as 
provided by the common law and legislation. Therefore, this analysis serves as the 
basis for the next chapter, in which the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec to 
third parties‟ property is scrutinised in light of section 25 of the Constitution.243 
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Chapter 4:  
The property clause 
 
4 1 Introduction 
Given the history of conquest and dispossession of property in South Africa, it was 
inevitable that the proposition to include the property clause in the Interim 
Constitution1 would cause great controversy between the proponents and opponents 
of the property clause.2 The adoption of the Interim Constitution, which included a 
property clause,3 brought the debate about the desirability of the property clause to a 
halt and the meaning, content and interpretation of the property clause became the 
commentators‟ main focus.4 The Interim Constitution has been repealed by the final 
Constitution.5 Like section 28 of the Interim Constitution, section 25 of the final 
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3
 S 28 of the Interim Constitution. 
4
 AJ van der Walt Property and constitution (2012) 2-3; AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law 
(3
rd
 ed 2011) 3, 81-82. 
5
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SALJ 258-311 259-260 (citing E Mureinik “A bridge to where? Introducing the interim Bill of Rights” 
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transition “from a culture of authority to a culture of justification”. In other words, the bridge metaphor 
is the expression of the wish to break with the past and to open a new chapter in South African 
history, an expectation of a clean and complete transition from old to new, from bad to good, from a 
culture of authority to a culture of justification. See also P de Vos “A bridge too far? History as context 
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Constitution protects property interests of individuals against arbitrary deprivation by 
the state. Section 25 of the Constitution also extends the idea of a social-obligation 
norm by including an explicit commitment to land reform and social justice.6 
Accordingly, the South African Constitution is regarded as the most “admirable 
Constitution in the history of the world”.7 
The lessor‟s tacit hypothec is a real security right created by operation of law 
and without the cooperation of the parties. The lessor‟s tacit hypothec entails that the 
lessor may have the lessee‟s movable property on the leased premises attached and 
sold in execution in order to satisfy the lessor‟s claim for unpaid arrear rent. In 
certain circumstances the lessor‟s tacit hypothec extends to third parties‟ property. 
This effect, extending the real security right to property belonging to third parties who 
are not parties to the primary debt relationship, is similar to what section 114 of the 
Customs and Excise Act8 provided, which was held to be inconsistent with section 
25(1) of the Constitution in First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v 
Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and Another; First National Bank of 
SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance9 (“FNB”). The FNB decision may therefore 
imply that the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec to a third party‟s property could 
be inconsistent with section 25(1), since it extends the real security right of the lessor 
to third parties‟ property and in so doing constitutes a forced transfer of ownership (a 
deprivation) that might be arbitrary if (as was held in FNB) it is too wide. Accordingly, 
it is necessary to scrutinize the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec in terms of 
the methodology expounded in the FNB judgment in order to determine whether the 
extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec also amounts to arbitrary deprivation. 
In this chapter I examine whether the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec to 
third parties‟ property complies with section 25(1). The second part of the chapter 
explores the structure and application of section 25 of the Constitution. It also 
explains the FNB methodology in general. In the third and fourth parts I apply section 
                                                                                                                                       
in the interpretation of the South African constitution” (2001) 17 SAJHR 1-33 16, who also refers to 
the interim constitution as a bridge. 
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 GS Alexander The global debate over constitutional property: Lessons for American takings 
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25(1) to the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec to third parties‟ property with the 
aim to determine whether it is constitutionally valid. 
 
4 2 Property clause in context 
4 2 1 Structure and purpose of section 25 
Generally, the purpose of section 25 of the Constitution (the property clause) is to 
balance private and public interests in property.10 Section 25 can be divided into two 
main parts,11 section 25(1) to (3), read with section 25(4); and section 25(5) to (9), 
read with section 25(4).12 The purpose of section 25(1) to (3) is to protect existing 
property rights and interests against unconstitutional state interference. The purpose 
of section 25(4) to (9) is to legitimate and promote land and other related reforms.13 
Stated differently, section 25 protects existing property interests against arbitrary 
deprivation and uncompensated expropriation, and simultaneously aims to achieve 
transformation in the shape of land and other reforms.14 Although these two parts of 
the property clause seem to contradict one another, they must be understood as 
striking a proportionate balance between these two functions.15 Accordingly, it is 
possible – as Van der Walt states – to subject individual interests to control, 
regulations, restrictions, levies, deprivations and changes that promote or protect 
legitimate public interests, sometimes with relatively serious negative effects for the 
property owner.16 Nevertheless, this kind of infringement may occur without 
compensation.17 
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 ed 2011) 30, 91, 101. See also PJ Badenhorst, JM 
Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 2006) 521; I Currie & J 
de Waal The Bill of Rights handbook (5
th
 ed 2005) 532. 
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Generally, constitutional property clauses are difficult to interpret and the South 
African property clause is no exception.18 What makes the South African clause 
more difficult to interpret is the built-in tension between protective provisions and 
reform provisions.19 However, it is both necessary and possible to read section 25 as 
a “coherent whole that embodies a creative tension within itself, without being self-
conflicting or contradictory”.20 This means that an understanding of the dual structure 
and purpose of section 25 plays a vital role in the interpretation of the clause.21 
 
4 2 2 Application of section 25 
Section 25(1) provides that no one may be deprived of property except in terms of 
“law of general application”. It further provides that no “law” may permit arbitrary 
deprivation. Section 25 is structured in a way that indicates how it should be applied. 
The law-of-general-application requirement provides a safeguard against deprivation 
that is unauthorised.22 It is therefore important that the courts first enquire whether 
an alleged deprivation is authorised by law of general application that specifically or 
generally provides for and effects control of property rights.23 Consequently, if the 
deprivation is not authorised by law of general application, it is for that reason invalid 
and unconstitutional.24 Although law of general application may authorise a 
deprivation, it may not permit arbitrary deprivation of property.25 Whether or not the 
deprivation is valid depends on the law that authorises the deprivation.26 Since 
section 25(1) focuses on “law of general application” that either regulates the 
property right or authorises the regulatory action that causes the deprivation, it is 
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 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 47. See further 
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rd
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 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 29. 
20
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rd
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21
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 22. 
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 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 237. 
23
 R Brits Mortgage foreclosure under the Constitution: Property, housing and the National Credit Act 
(2012) unpublished LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 297. See also AJ van der Walt 
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rd
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24
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rd
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25
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logical to argue that a litigant must challenge the law that authorises and not the 
action of deprivation as such.27 
In the next section I discuss two questions regarding the application of section 
25, namely whether section 25(1) applies between private parties in a private dispute 
such as a lessor‟s tacit hypothec and whether section 25(1) can apply directly in a 
lessor‟s tacit hypothec dispute. 
The first question is whether section 25(1) applies between private parties in a 
private dispute such as that surrounding a lessor‟s tacit hypothec. Section 8(1) of the 
Constitution provides that the Bill of Rights applies to all law and binds the 
legislature, the executive, the judiciary and all organs of state. All “law” in section 
8(1) includes all forms of legislation, common law and customary law.28 This section 
provides for the direct vertical application of the Bill of Rights. Section 8(2) provides 
for horizontal application of the Bill of rights, that is, between private individuals. 
Horizontal application of the Bill of Rights can be either direct or indirect.29 Direct 
horizontal application involves direct reliance on a constitutional provision for a 
cause of action or defence.30 This means that the third party may argue that the 
common law principle that provides for the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec is 
inconsistent with section 25(1). Van der Walt states that in the case of indirect 
horizontal application the cause of action or defence relies on the Constitution in 
such a way that the private law rules (statutory or common law) that govern the 
dispute are open to amendment or influence from the Constitution, even though a 
state threat against either party is not directly in issue.31 Applied to the extension of 
the lessor‟s tacit hypothec to third parties‟ property dispute, it follows that the third 
party would challenge the common law principles that permit the deprivation of 
property instead of the lessor‟s actions. 
As a result, the Bill of Rights applies either horizontally or vertically.32 Since the 
lessor‟s tacit hypothec dispute is usually between private individuals without direct 
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 R Brits Mortgage foreclosure under the Constitution: Property, housing and the National Credit Act 
(2012) unpublished LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 297-298. 
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 F du Bois “Sources of law: Overview and Constitution” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s Principles of South 
African Law (9
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 ed 2007) 33-45 39. 
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 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 58; I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights 
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th
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 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 59. 
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 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 59. 
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 See I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights handbook (5
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 ed 2005) 43. 
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state involvement, the question of vertical application seems irrelevant. However, 
both the fact that the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec is granted by the 
common law (law of general application) and the fact that the enforcement of the 
lessor‟s tacit hypothec is effected by a state organ, namely the sheriff, indicate that 
the state is indeed involved. Although the state is not a party to a dispute about the 
lessor‟s tacit hypothec, it is indirectly involved to ensure the peaceful enforcement of 
private debts. As a result the state, through the courts and the office of the sheriff, 
uses its powers to force a transfer of property rights from a third party to the lessor in 
fulfilling its obligation to ensure that the debt enforcement procedure takes place in a 
proper manner.33 
In Du Plessis v De Klerk34 it was held that in cases where the common law 
regulates disputes between private individuals, the Bill of Rights entrenched in the 
Interim Constitution can only apply indirectly to the private legal dispute.35 In 
Khumalo v Holomisa36 the court expressed the view that the common law does not in 
all circumstances fall within the direct application of the Constitution.37 In Phoebus 
Apollo Aviation CC v Minister of Safety and Security38 it was held that a direct 
reliance on section 25(1) to protect the appellant‟s property rights against another 
private party was not possible.39 Roux argues that, since one of the objects of the Bill 
of Rights is to protect people against arbitrary deprivation of property, it is 
unnecessary to consider whether section 25 is directly horizontally applicable.40 Van 
der Walt is of the view that the answer to the question whether section 25 allows for 
direct horizontal application in disputes between private parties is to a certain extent 
implicit in section 25 read with section 8(2) of the Constitution.41 
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The significance of the conclusion that section 25 always applies vertically or 
indirectly horizontally to disputes regarding property between private parties is that it 
offers the possibility to develop the common law.42 Development of the common law 
is required by section 39(2):  
“When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or 
customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and 
objects of the Bill of Rights.” 
This means that when the courts apply any common law principle or doctrine that 
authorises deprivation of property, they must apply or develop the common law in a 
way that gives effect to section 25. The above analysis shows that section 25 
impacts private law in an indirect manner. Since any deprivation that might occur 
during the enforcement of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec would be authorised by the 
common law, it is possible that section 25 will impact the common law indirectly.43 
 
4 2 3 The FNB methodology 
The Constitutional Court follows a two-stage approach to constitutional litigation.44 In 
the first stage the applicant needs to show that he is a beneficiary of a right in the Bill 
of Rights, and that the right has been limited or infringed. In the second stage the 
defendant is afforded the opportunity to prove that the limitation can be justified in 
terms of section 36(1) of the Constitution.45 In FNB46 the Constitutional Court has 
specified the two-stage approach‟s application to constitutional property disputes in 
terms of section 25.47 The FNB judgment also terminated a number of uncertainties 
and debates regarding the interpretation of section 25(1) of the Constitution and 
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brought some clarity regarding the approach to be followed.48 The Court explicitly 
stated that section 25 can and should be interpreted purposefully in view of its 
historical context and constitutional purpose.49 Furthermore, the FNB judgment 
introduced a methodology for analysing section 25 disputes, which has significant 
implications for the application of section 25‟s requirements.50 It is therefore 
important to set out the FNB methodology before proceeding to the individual 
requirements. Roux lists the seven stages of the FNB methodology as follows:  
“(a) Does that which is taken away from [the property holder] by the 
operation of [the law in question] amount to property for purpose of s 25? 
(b) Has there been a deprivation of such property by the [organ of state 
concerned]? 
(c) If there has, is such deprivation consistent with the provisions of s 
25(1)? 
(d) If not, is such deprivation justified under s 36 of the Constitution? 
(e) If it is, does it amount to expropriation for purpose of s 25(2)? 
(f) If so, does the [expropriation] comply with the requirements of s 
25(2)(a) and (b)? 
(g) If not, is the expropriation justified under s 36?”51 
According to the FNB methodology, the starting point for all constitutional property 
disputes is section 25(1).52 The subsection provides that “[n]o one may be deprived 
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of property except in terms of law of general application, and no law may permit 
arbitrary deprivation of property”. The first question is whether the affected interest is 
“property” in terms of section 25(1).53 If the first question is answered in the 
affirmative, the second question is whether there has been a deprivation.54 If so, the 
next question is whether such deprivation is consistent with the provisions of section 
25(1).55 If it is consistent, then the inquiry proceeds to the fifth question (step five), 
since there is no constitutional violation that requires justification provided for by the 
fourth question. However, if the deprivation does not comply with section 25(1), the 
next question is whether such deprivation is justified under section 36 of the 
Constitution.56 If not, the matter ends there and the deprivation is invalid and 
unconstitutional. If the deprivation is consistent with section 25(1) or if the limitation 
of section 25(1) is justifiable under section 36, the next question is whether such 
deprivation amounts to expropriation for purposes of section 25(2).57 If so, the next 
question is whether the expropriation complies with the requirements of section 
25(2)(a) and (b).58 If the expropriation does not comply with subsection 25(2), the 
next question is whether such expropriation is justified under section 36(1).59 If not, 
such expropriation is invalid and unconstitutional. 
Roux argues that if the FNB methodology is followed, it is unlikely that a 
constitutional property dispute would proceed through all the stages.60 Roux argues 
that the three threshold questions (whether the applicant is a beneficiary who 
qualifies for the protection of section 25, whether the affected interest is property and 
whether the interest was indeed infringed) are apparently “sucked into” the 
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arbitrariness test.61 According to Roux62 the arbitrariness test tends to dominate the 
section 25 inquiry, and as a result, the general limitation clause (section 36) has 
receded into the background.63 Van der Walt agrees with Roux and states that all 
constitutional property disputes that follow the FNB methodology are likely to get 
stuck in the section 25(1) arbitrariness analysis.64 
According to the FNB methodology, expropriation is a sub-set of deprivation 
and therefore all expropriations are deprivations, while not all deprivations are 
expropriations.65 This categorisation makes it possible to postpone the question of 
expropriation to a later stage until it is established whether a particular interference 
with property rights amounts to deprivation that complies with section 25(1) or, if not, 
whether such a deprivation is justified in terms of section 36(1) of the Constitution.66 
It has been confirmed that the FNB methodology is still the correct approach when 
bringing any challenge regarding the property clause.67 In what follows, I apply the 
FNB methodology to the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec to third parties‟ 
property. 
 
4 3 Attachment of third parties’ invecta et illata 
4 3 1 Is third parties‟ invecta et illata “property”? 
The question whether the third party‟s invecta et illata is “property” as meant by 
section 25(1) is important and should be considered before engaging in an analysis 
of the meaning of arbitrary deprivation.68 The constitutional property clause provides 
that property is not limited to land.69 In Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional 
Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
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199670 the Constitutional Court had to decide whether the formulation of the right to 
property adopted by the Constitutional Assembly in the final Constitution complies 
with the test of “universally accepted fundamental rights”. The Court held that “no 
universally recognised formulation of the right to property exists”, and concluded that 
the term “property” in section 25 is of such a nature that it allows sufficient scope to 
include all rights and interests that have to be protected according to international 
standards.71 
In FNB the Constitutional Court confirmed that ownership of corporeal 
movables and land are at the heart of the constitutional concept of property,72 and 
consequently the Court found it unnecessary to construe a comprehensive definition 
of property for purposes of the property clause.73 The fact that a real security right 
has been created by the operation of law over a third party‟s property does not 
change the fact that the third party is the owner of the movable property, although 
such ownership is limited for security purposes.74 The third party‟s invecta et illata 
are the corporeal movables brought on to the leased premises by the lessee and 
clearly falls within the scope of property for purposes of section 25 of the 
Constitution.75 
 
4 3 2 Is attachment a “deprivation”? 
If the question whether a third party‟s invecta et illata is property for purposes of 
section 25 is answered affirmatively, the next question is whether there was a 
deprivation of the third party‟s property if the lessor‟s tacit hypothec is extended to 
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that property.76 To answer this question it is necessary to establish the definition of 
deprivation. According to the FNB decision, deprivation is the wider category that 
encompasses all species of state interference with property, and expropriation is a 
sub-set of deprivation.77 Although the term deprivation may be confusing in that it 
creates the impression that it refers to dispossession in the sense of taking away 
property,78 the Constitutional Court has made it clear that deprivation does not have 
to involve taking away or dispossession of property.79 Nevertheless, forfeiture and 
confiscation of property are forms of regulatory deprivations that have the effect of 
taking property away.80 The Constitutional Court has also expressly stated that 
“[d]ispossessing an owner of all rights, use and benefit to and of corporeal movable 
goods, is a prime example of deprivation”.81 In FNB deprivation was defined widely 
to mean  
“[a]ny interference with the use, enjoyment or exploitation of private property”.82 
In Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality; Bissett and Others v 
Buffalo City Municipality; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and Others v Member of 
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the Executive Council for Local Government and Housing, Gauteng and Others83 
(“Mkontwana”) the court apparently altered the FNB definition of deprivation by 
requiring  
“[a]t the very least, substantial interference or limitation that goes beyond the 
normal restrictions on property use or enjoyment found in an open and 
democratic society would amount to deprivation”.84 
Van der Walt argues that the definition in Mkontwana was made subject to a 
disclaimer and that one should be prudent about it because it is problematic.85 The 
author contends that the finding in Mkontwana86 that section 25(1)‟s definition of 
deprivation should be limited to regulatory action that exceeds what is normal in an 
open and democratic society is strange and that it is unclear why the definition of 
deprivation should be linked to the notion of what is normal in an open democracy.87 
In Reflect-All 1025 CC and Others v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and 
Works, Gauteng Provincial Government, and Another88 (“Reflect-All”) the court 
quoted – with approval – the minority judgment of O‟Regan J in Mkontwana. The 
Court held that the purpose of section 25(1) is to recognise both the material and 
non-material value of property to owners, and that it would defeat that purpose were 
deprivation to be read narrowly.89 In Reflect-All the court seems to have followed the 
wider FNB definition of deprivation rather than the narrow Mkontwana definition.90 In 
Offit Enterprises (Pty) Ltd and Another v COEGA Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd 
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and Others91 the Constitutional Court referred to the FNB and Reflect-All definitions 
of deprivation, but it approved and applied the narrower definition adopted in 
Mkontwana.92 
In National Credit Regulator v Opperman and Others93 the Constitutional Court 
referred to the FNB definition of deprivation. However, it stated that “interference 
significant enough to have a legally relevant impact on the rights of the affected party 
amounts to deprivation”.94 In Agri South Africa v Minister for Minerals and Energy95 
the Constitutional Court defined deprivation to include taking away or “significant 
interference” with property rights.96 
Van der Walt defines deprivation as uncompensated, regulatory restrictions on 
the use, enjoyment and exploitation of property.97 Deprivation is distinguished from 
expropriation in which the state acquires the property against compensation, 
whereas by deprivation the state only regulates the use, enjoyment and exploitation 
of the property.98 The deterioration of the value of the property holder caused by 
regulatory control differs and in some instances it can be considerable. Although 
regulation may in some cases result in complete destruction of the property, the 
state does not acquire the property for public purpose and as a result such regulation 
does not amount to expropriation.99 The important element of this definition is that 
regulatory deprivation is not aimed at taking away the property but at regulating its 
use. In addition, it always causes a loss of the value to the property holder and can 
sometimes cause significant loss for the property holder.100 Further, notwithstanding 
its extent, deprivation is usually not compensated, since it applies generally and not 
to one owner or user. The importance of deprivation or regulation is that it serves a 
public purpose in protecting public health and safety. Thus it affects every owner 
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equally or benefits them equally. Expropriation is normally compensated because it 
targets the property of one owner for the benefit of the public.101 
The above analysis shows that the Constitutional Court is struggling to provide 
a single definition of deprivation. For present purposes I accept that any 
uncompensated, regulatory restriction of the use, enjoyment or exploitation of 
property should suffice to qualify as a deprivation.102 
The question is whether the attachment and subsequent sale in execution of a 
third party‟s property in terms of an extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec amounts 
to deprivation of property. In fact, the question comprises of two sub-questions. The 
first question is whether the creation of a real security right by the operation of law 
over property belonging to a third party in favour of the lessor qualifies as 
deprivation. The creation of a real security right by the operation of the law does not 
involve the cooperation of a real security right grantor and its holder. Indeed, what it 
does is to create a real security right in favour of the lessor upon application to the 
court for an attachment order against all the movable property found on the leased 
premises, including third parties‟ property. This real security right entails that the 
lessor can keep the property so attached (including the third party‟s property) until 
his rent in arrears is paid by the lessee. The creation of a real security right without 
the cooperation of a third party over his property amounts to interference with the 
use, enjoyment or exploitation of property, since it limits the third party‟s entitlement 
to dispose of his property in any manner he wishes. Such limitation of the right to 
dispose of property must be seen as a deprivation in terms of section 25(1) of the 
Constitution.103 
The second question is whether the subsequent sale in execution of the third 
party‟s property by the sheriff to satisfy the lessor‟s claim for arrear rent amounts to a 
deprivation. If the lessee fails to pay the arrear rent within a certain time, the lessor 
may apply to the court for sale in execution of the attached property in order to 
satisfy his claim for arrear rent. Although the lessor might become aware that some 
of the movable property belongs to the third party after attachment but before sale in 
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execution, such knowledge does not affect his hypothec. As a result, the sheriff can 
sell at auction the attached property (including the third party‟s property) without the 
cooperation of its owner and use the proceeds to satisfy the lessor‟s claim. A sale in 
execution results in what may be called a forced sale and the transfer of 
ownership.104 The consequence of a sale in execution is that a third party losses all 
entitlements of ownership. This amounts to a substantial interference with the third 
party‟s property rights and therefore qualifies as a deprivation in terms of section 
25(1).105 
In light of the preceding description and analysis of the meaning of deprivation 
and its application, I conclude that both the attachment of a third party‟s property and 
the subsequent sales in execution of the third party‟s property are deprivations in 
terms of section 25(1).106 Since the deprivation of the third party‟s property rights 
already occurs the moment a real security right is created in favour of the lessor 
without the third party‟s cooperation, this chapter focuses only on the attachment and 
not the sale in execution.107 
 
4 3 3 Does the deprivation comply with section 25(1)? 
4 3 3 1 Law of general application 
The first part of section 25(1) deals with the requirement of law of general application 
whereas the second part deals with arbitrariness of the deprivation. Section 25(1) of 
the Constitution does not insulate property against deprivation but protects property 
against unauthorised and arbitrary deprivations.108 Therefore, the law-of-general-
application requirement is intended to protect individuals from being deprived of 
property by bills of attainder or other laws that single them out for “discriminatory 
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treatment”, or which limit their property rights without proper legal authorisation.109 
The reference in section 25(1) to “law of general application” instead of “a law of 
general application” serves a significant purpose, namely to indicate that regulatory 
deprivation of property may also be authorised by the rules of common law and 
customary law.110 Consequently, the common law and customary law are also 
subject to the provision that they may not authorise arbitrary deprivation.111 In S v 
Thebus and Another112 it was held that the common law is law of general application 
and must be consistent with the Constitution. The Court further held that if the 
common law limits any of the rights guaranteed in the Constitution, such a limitation 
must be justifiable under the limitation clause.113 Applied to the extension of the 
lessor‟s tacit hypothec, this means that the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec 
must first comply with section 25(1) of the Constitution and if the extension limits the 
right protected in section 25(1), such a limitation must be justifiable under section 
36(1). Consequently, if the common law principle authorises arbitrary deprivation of 
property that is unjustifiable in terms of section 36(1), it will be invalid and 
unconstitutional. 
The consequence of the law-of-general-application requirement is that the 
focus of section 25(1) falls on the law that authorises the deprivation and not on any 
private or state action that causes the deprivation as such.114 Applied to the 
extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec, this implies that the section 25(1) analysis 
should focus on the common law principle that provides for the extension of the 
lessor‟s tacit hypothec and not on the attachment by the sheriff. 
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Apart from the requirements of validity and the general applicability of the law, it 
is further necessary for the court to determine whether the law in question indeed 
authorises the alleged deprivation.115 In other words, if the deprivation is not 
authorised by law of general application the matter ends there because such a 
deprivation is unconstitutional for lack of authority. The common law principles 
regarding the lessor‟s tacit hypothec provide that the lessor may, in terms of section 
32(1) of the Magistrate‟s Courts Act, apply to the court for an order that mandates 
the sheriff to attach all movable property found on the leased premises. When the 
sheriff effects the attachment of movable property, he does so under the authority of 
the law and under instruction from the court acting within the boundaries of the 
law.116 Accordingly, if the attachment by the sheriff amounts to a deprivation, the 
common law should be challenged for non-compliance with section 25(1) and not the 
attachment.117 
In view of the discussion above and the conclusions in the previous chapter it 
may be concluded that, insofar as the common law does allow an extension of the 
lessor‟s tacit hypothec for arrear rent to movables that belong to third parties other 
than the lessee, the deprivation of the third parties‟ property so caused is indeed 
authorised by law of general application. 
 
4 3 3 2 The non-arbitrariness test 
The second requirement of section 25(1) is that the law of general application in 
question may not permit arbitrary deprivation of property.118 In the FNB case, the 
bank (FNB) was owner of certain vehicles that were in the possession of the 
customs debtor. The state (South African Revenue Services) established a statutory 
lien over the same vehicles to enforce payment of a customs debt.119 The 
Constitutional Court had to decide whether the creation and enforcement of the 
state‟s security interest in the property belonging to an “innocent” third party (FNB) 
constituted an arbitrary deprivation of property. The Constitutional Court held that  
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“[a] deprivation of property is arbitrary as meant by section 25 when the „law‟ 
referred to in section 25(1) does not provide sufficient reason for the particular 
deprivation in question or is “procedurally unfair”.120 
In other words, a deprivation is arbitrary if there is insufficient reason for it or if it is 
procedural unfair.121 The Constitutional Court also developed a mechanism that must 
be followed to establish whether or not there is sufficient reason for a deprivation.122 
The court stated that a complexity of relationships has to be considered in order to 
establish sufficient reason.123 The complexity of relationships includes the 
relationship between the means employed (deprivation) and the ends sought to be 
achieved (purpose of deprivation),124 and the relationship between the purpose for 
the deprivation and the person whose property is affected.125 In addition, regard 
must be had to the relationship between the purpose of the deprivation and the 
nature of the property as well as the extent of the deprivation.126 The court adopted 
and applied a substantive proportionality interpretation of the non-arbitrariness 
requirement and concluded that in the absence of a close nexus between the owner 
of the vehicles (FNB) and the customs debt, and between the customs creditor 
(SARS) and the owner of vehicles, there was insufficient reason for section 114 of 
the Customs and Exercise Act to deprive third parties of their property.127 
Accordingly, the court held that the deprivation caused by section 114 of the 
Customs and Exercise Act was arbitrary for purposes of section 25(1).128 
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Prior to the FNB decision it was unclear whether South African courts would 
follow a “thin” rationality or a “thick” proportionality-type interpretation of the non-
arbitrariness requirement.129 The Constitutional Court responded by deciding that the 
test involved will vary between a mere rationality and a full proportionality approach, 
depending on the context of each case.130 Roux argues that the Constitutional Court 
deliberately reserved almost absolute discretion to itself to decide future cases in a 
manner it deems fit.131 He also argues that the non-arbitrariness test will dominate 
the constitutional property inquiry and that as a result it will “suck” all aspects of the 
constitutional property analysis into the non-arbitrariness test.132 According to Roux, 
the level of scrutiny of the non-arbitrariness test will vacillate between rationality 
review at the lower end of the scale, and something just short of a review for 
proportionality at the other end.133 
According to Van der Walt, there are two views with regard to the meaning of 
the non-arbitrariness provision. The first view is that the non-arbitrariness 
requirement is a rationality requirement that is satisfied whenever there is a 
legitimate government reason for the deprivation.134 The second view of the non-
arbitrariness requirement “means that deprivation should not impose an 
unacceptably heavy burden upon or demand an exceptional sacrifice from one 
individual or a small group of individuals for the sake of the public at large”135 and 
“any law that authorises deprivation of property must establish sufficient reason for 
the deprivation in the sense that it is not only rationally linked to a legitimate 
government purpose but also justified”.136 
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In Mkontwana137 the Constitutional Court had to decide the constitutionality of 
section 118(1) of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000, which 
had the effect that a landowner could not transfer his land to a purchaser until unpaid 
consumption charges that had been run up during the previous two years have been 
settled in full.138 The question was whether the limitation on ownership brought about 
by section 118(1) of the Act could include consumption charges for services used by 
a tenant or an unlawful occupier of the land and, if so, whether such a limitation 
amounted to arbitrary deprivation of property. The high court concluded that there 
was no relevant nexus between the debts and the landowner. According to the high 
court, there was insufficient reason for section 118(1) to deprive owners of the right 
to transfer their properties in cases where the landowners were not responsible for 
the charges for services.139 The high court‟s finding that section 118(1) is 
unconstitutional was referred to the Constitutional Court for confirmation. However, 
the Constitutional Court held that there was a close enough connection between the 
deprivation and the consumption charges for services to the extent that the services 
were delivered and consumed on the premises.140 It was held that it is reasonable to 
expect the owner to take steps to prevent illegal occupation of the premises,141 to 
choose a responsible tenant and to ensure payment by the tenant of consumption 
charges.142 The Court stated that the deprivation did affect an important incident of 
ownership but held that the deprivation was slight in that it limited only one incident 
of ownership and that it was temporary. The Court concluded that the deprivation 
was not arbitrary because there was a sufficient nexus between the deprivation and 
the consumption charges for services. 
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Van der Walt states that “on the surface it looks as if the court merely applied 
the test as set out in FNB, but in fact the court‟s subtle rephrasing of the test points 
towards a significant shift.”143 The author argues that the Mkontwana formulation of 
the non-arbitrariness test is much closer to mere rationality than the contextualised, 
proportionality-focused formulation applied in FNB.144 Further, that the Constitutional 
Court in Mkontwana altered the interplay between the various factors set out in the 
FNB test.145 Accordingly, the question whether a deprivation is arbitrary was based 
on the questions whether the purpose of the deprivation is legitimate and compelling, 
and whether it would be unreasonable in the circumstances to place the burden 
where the relevant provision does.146 Van der Walt argues that the purposes of the 
deprivations in FNB and Mkontwana are the same, that the purpose of the 
deprivation in Mkontwana was legitimate but not compelling,147 and therefore that 
there is no clear reason for the difference in the results.148 The Constitutional Court 
in Mkontwana proved that Roux was correct in stating that the court by means of the 
test it developed in the FNB case reserved a wide discretion for itself to vacillate 
between the proportionality-type test and something more closely resembling a mere 
rationality analysis.149 Van der Walt concludes that the Constitutional Court in 
Mkontwana retreated from the FNB proportionality-type test.150 
Section 114 of the Customs and Exercise Act that was at issue in the FNB case 
had the effect of extending the statutory lien to the third party‟s property; the third 
party owner of the affected movables in that case was neither the customs debtor 
nor connected with the customs debt. Also, section 118(1) of the Local Government: 
Municipal Systems Act, which was at issue in Mkontwana, had the effect of 
precluding the landowner from transferring his land to a purchaser until unpaid 
consumption charges that had been run up during the previous two years by a third 
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party (tenant or unlawful occupier) have been fully paid. Similarly, the lessor‟s tacit 
hypothec provides that if the lessee‟s and/or the sub-lessee‟s movable property 
proves insufficient to satisfy the lessor‟s claim for arrear rent against the lessee, the 
lessor‟s tacit hypothec may extend to third parties‟ property found on the leased 
premises. It is clear that both section 114 of the Customs and Exercise Act and the 
extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec involve the extension of real security rights to 
third parties‟ property. 
However, the difference between FNB, Mkontwana and the extension of the 
lessor‟s tacit hypothec is that the statutory provisions in both FNB and Mkontwana 
favoured the state, whereas the common law principle that provides for the extension 
of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec to third parties‟ property favours private creditors. The 
Constitutional Court in FNB held that “[t]o exact payment of a customs debt is a 
legitimate and important legislative purpose, essential for the financial well-being of 
the country and in the interest of all its inhabitants”.151 It has been argued – 
convincingly in my view – that the same is the position with regard to the 
enforcement of private debts.152 Accordingly, my view is that the lessor‟s tacit 
hypothec serves a useful purpose in the enforcement of the lessor‟s claim for arrear 
rent. The question is whether that consideration is sufficient to justify extension of the 
real security right to third parties‟ property. In effect, the Constitutional Court decided 
in FNB that it was not, while holding in Mkontwana that it was. 
In the next section I apply the FNB non-arbitrariness test to the extension of the 
lessor‟s tacit hypothec to third parties‟ property, focusing especially on the interplay 
of factors set out in FNB in order to determine whether there is sufficient reason to 
deprive a third party of his property to ensure payment of the lessee‟s debt. 
The lessor‟s tacit hypothec provides the lessor with a tacit real security right. 
The hypothec entitles the lessor to attach the lessee‟s, the sub-lessee and/or third 
parties‟ movable property until the arrear rent owed by the lessee is paid in full. To 
perfect the hypothec the lessor must apply to the court for an attachment order. The 
lessor‟s tacit hypothec has similar effects to section 114 of the Customs and 
Exercise Act, namely that they both create real security rights that extend to include 
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a third party‟s property. In fact, the lessor‟s tacit hypothec creates a real security right 
over property belonging to three categories of persons, namely the lessee, the sub-
lessee and the third party, whereas section 114 of the Customs and Exercise Act 
created a real security right over property of two categories of persons, namely the 
customs debtor and third parties. 
The only nexus required by section 114 of the Act between the third party‟s 
property and the customs debtor to render the third party‟s property subject to the 
statutory lien was “possession and control” or the presence of the third party‟s 
property on “any premises in the possession or under the control” of the custom 
debtor. Accordingly, the commissioner of the SARS could detain and sell any 
property, including third parties‟ property found on “any premises in the possession 
or under the control” of the customs debtor. The customs debtor need only be in 
“possession or control” of the premises and not of the property itself. In other words, 
the customs debtor could be unaware of the presence of the third party‟s property on 
his premises. 
With regard to the lessor‟s tacit hypothec, attachment of third parties‟ property 
is based on imputed consent and the doctrine of estoppel. According to the implied-
consent theory, a third party is taken to have impliedly consented that his property 
can be utilised as security for the lessee‟s rent in arrears. The lessor bears the onus 
to prove that the property was on the leased premises with the knowledge and 
consent of the third party; that he was unaware that the property belongs to the third 
party; and that the property was on the leased premises permanently and for the 
lessee‟s use. It is worth noting that the last requirement of the implied-consent 
theory, namely that the third party‟s property must be on the leased premises for the 
use of the lessee, creates a nexus between the third party‟s property and the duty to 
pay rent (the purpose of deprivation). It is this requirement that distinguishes the 
nexus in section 114 of the Customs and Exercise Act from the one in the case of 
the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec. Section 114 of the Act required only the 
presence of the third party‟s property on “any premises in the possession or under 
the control” of the customs debtor and not use of the third party‟s property by the 
customs debtor, whereas the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec to third parties‟ 
property requires both possession (presence on the premises) and use of the 
property by the lessee. The extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec also requires 
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permanence of third parties‟ property on the leased premises, which section 114 of 
the Act did not require. Thus, in terms of section 114 of the Act, the property that 
could have been on the customs debtor‟s possession purely by chance and for short 
period could be subject to the statutory lien. 
According to the second justification, namely the doctrine of estoppel, it is 
argued that the third party is estopped (or precluded) from raising the rei vindicatio 
against the lessor because he has negligently induced the lessor to believe that the 
property belongs to the lessee. As is argued in the previous chapter, the doctrine of 
estoppel (with the fault requirement) should also be regarded as a justification for the 
extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec. Accordingly, the correct application of both 
justifications will mean that if the third party is unaware that his property is on the 
leased premises, his property should not be subject to the hypothec. Thus, if the 
third party is not aware of the presence of his property on the lessor‟s premises, he 
should not be held to be negligent. In other words, correct application of the 
extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec implies that the fault requirement of the 
doctrine of estoppel will not be established easily. However, if the estoppel denier 
fails to prove that he was not negligent with the whereabouts of his property, 
attachment of his property might be justified. 
In light of the analysis above, one can argue that although section 114 of the 
Customs and Exercise Act and the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec have 
similar effects (creating real security rights over the property of third parties), they 
also differ in important aspects. Firstly, the lessor‟s tacit hypothec only extends to 
third parties‟ property if the property of the lessee and/or the sub-lessee proves to be 
insufficient to satisfy the lessor‟s claim for rent. Secondly, unlike section 114 of the 
Act, the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec requires that certain requirements 
must be met before third parties‟ property could be subject to the lessor‟s tacit 
hypothec. These requirements serve as protection of third parties, whereas section 
114 of Customs and Exercise Act provided no protection since it required only the 
presence of third parties‟ property on the premises in the possession or under the 
control of the customs debtor. My view is that if correctly applied and successfully 
proven, the requirements for the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec establishes 
the necessary connection between the third party‟s property and the purpose of 
deprivation that would prevent the extension from being an arbitrary deprivation. 
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Accordingly, I conclude that the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec to third 
parties‟ property does not amount to arbitrary deprivation of third parties‟ property as 
meant by section 25(1) of the Constitution. 
 
4 3 5 Does the deprivation amount to expropriation for purposes of section 25(2) 
of the Constitution? 
In the FNB decision the Constitutional Court accepted that deprivation is a wider 
category that includes expropriation.153 Expropriation does not refer to all 
interference with the property but only to a specific subset of interference. The main 
difference between the effects of deprivation and expropriation is that the state is 
required to pay compensation for expropriation whereas deprivation occurs without 
payment of compensation.154 
According to the FNB methodology, if the deprivation authorised by law of 
general application complies with section 25(1) or is arbitrary but justifiable under 
section 36(1), the next question is whether the deprivation in question amounts to an 
expropriation, and therefore whether it complies with section 25(2) and (3) of the 
Constitution.155 Section 25(2) of the Constitution prohibits expropriation of property 
except in terms of “law of general application” and specifies that property may only 
be expropriated for a public purpose or in the public interest and subject to payment 
of compensation that is just and equitable according to section 25(3).156 At this stage 
it is clear that the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec to third parties‟ property is 
authorised by common law (law of general application). Further, it has been argued 
that expropriation should be authorised by legislation and not the common law,157 
with the result that it is impossible that principles of common law can be a source of 
expropriation, although it qualifies as law of general application.158 It is therefore 
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unnecessary to consider whether a deprivation caused by the common law amounts 
to expropriation. 
 
4 5 Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to examine whether the extension of the lessor‟s 
tacit hypothec to the property of third parties complies with section 25(1). The 
chapter established that the common law that provides for the extension of the 
lessor‟s tacit hypothec is law of general application as meant by section 25(1) of the 
Constitution. 
I applied the FNB methodology in order to determine whether the extension of 
the lessor‟s tacit hypothec to a third party‟s property complies with section 25. The 
chapter argues that the principles of the common law that provide for the extension 
of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec authorise deprivation of third parties‟ property, since 
they authorise the creation of a real security right over and attachment of the third 
party‟s property to secure payment of the lessee‟s arrear rent. I also applied the FNB 
arbitrariness test in order to determine whether the extension of the lessor‟s tacit 
hypothec provides sufficient reasons for the attachment of the third party‟s property 
and came to the conclusion that it does, since the extension of the lessor‟s tacit 
hypothec requires that certain requirements must be met before third parties‟ 
property could be subject to the lessor‟s tacit hypothec and that these requirements 
serve as protection of third parties. It was concluded that the extension of the 
lessor‟s tacit hypothec to the property of a third party is consistent with section 25(1). 
Further, the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec does not amount to expropriation 
as meant by section 25(2). Consequently, one can conclude that the extension of the 
lessor‟s tacit hypothec to third parties‟ property is consistent with section 25 of the 
Constitution, and therefore constitutionally valid. 
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Chapter 5:  
Conclusion 
 
5 1 Introduction 
The lessor‟s tacit hypothec developed in Roman law and Roman-Dutch law, and was 
adopted in South African law. The lessor‟s tacit hypothec is a real security right that 
is created by operation of law. The hypothec accrues as soon as the lessee is in 
arrears with rent. It operates against the movable property of the lessee found on the 
leased premises when rent is due and not paid. If the lessee‟s property proves to be 
insufficient, a sub-lessee‟s property found on the leased may also be attached to 
satisfy the lessor‟s claim against the lessee. However, the sub-lessee‟s property is 
only subject to the hypothec to the extent that the sub-lessee‟s owes rent. In cases 
where the lessee and the sub-lessee‟s property proves insufficient to satisfy the 
lessor‟s claim, property belonging to a third party may also be subject to the lessor‟s 
tacit hypothec. The rationale for the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec to third 
parties‟ property was set out in Bloemfontein Municipality v Jacksons Ltd.1 However, 
recent discourse has shown that there are uncertainties surrounding the justification 
of this extension of the hypothec. It is the purpose of this thesis to examine whether 
and how the existing common law principles that provide for extension of the lessor‟s 
tacit hypothec to property belonging to third parties are affected by the Constitution 
and more specifically to determine whether the common law principles need to 
develop in a different direction under the influence of the Constitution. 
The second chapter analyses the general principles that provide for the lessor‟s 
tacit hypothec. In light of the general principles regarding the lessor‟s tacit hypothec 
set out in Chapter two, Chapter three scrutinises the justifications for the extension of 
the lessor‟s tacit hypothec to property belonging to third parties. It further explores 
the statutory protection of third parties against the lessor‟s tacit hypothec. Chapter 
four examines the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec in view of section 25 of the 
Constitution. 
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5 2 General principles 
Chapter two describes and analyses the principles that regulate the lessor‟s tacit 
hypothec. The chapter starts by examining the meaning of real security. The analysis 
of the historical background of real security is intended to enable an understanding 
of the need for and significance of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec. The chapter‟s main 
focus is on the operation of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec in South African law. 
Similar to other real security rights, the lessor‟s tacit hypothec secures payment 
of the principal obligation (payment of rent).2 In other words, where the lessee is 
unwilling or unable to pay arrear rent the lessor may apply to the court to have 
movable property belonging to the lessee attached and sold in execution. The 
lessor‟s tacit hypothec gives a lessor a right of first preference over the proceeds of 
sale in execution of the attached movable property (security object).3 However, upon 
the lessee‟s insolvency the lessor automatically acquires the right of first preference. 
Unlike other real security rights that are created by agreement between the parties, 
the lessor‟s tacit hypothec is created by operation of law. In contrast to the lessor‟s 
tacit hypothec in Roman and Roman-Dutch law, the South African lessor‟s hypothec 
only secures the lessor‟s claim for arrear rent. It only relates to movable property 
found on the leased premises when the rent is due and not paid. The lessor‟s tacit 
hypothec does not attach to incorporeal property or the proceeds of a sale of 
property by the lessee.4 
In principle, the lessor‟s tacit hypothec applies to movable property belonging to 
the lessee found on the leased premises when rent is in arrear and not paid. 
However, if the lessee‟s movable property proves insufficient to satisfy the lessor‟s 
arrear rent, movable property of a sub-lessee may also be subject to the lessor‟s 
tacit hypothec to the extent that the sub-lessee owes rent. The most striking feature 
of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec is that it may also extend to a third party‟s property. 
However, this may only occur where the lessee‟s and/or the sub-lessee‟s property 
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proves insufficient to satisfy the lessor‟s claim for arrear rent and also subject to the 
conditions set out in Bloemfontein Municipality v Jacksons Ltd.5 
The lessor‟s tacit hypothec accrues as soon as the rent is in arrears.6 Since 
accrual of the hypothec does not afford the lessor with a real security right, in order 
to obtain a real security right the lessor has to apply to the court for an attachment 
order or an interim interdict.7 Although the analysis of case law and academic 
literature shows that there are some doubts as to whether attachment of the movable 
property is essential to create a real security right, relying on legislation, case law 
and authoritative academic views I argue that attachment is necessary, since it 
provides unambiguous compliance with the publicity principle and also ensures legal 
certainty. However, it is accepted that upon the lessee‟s insolvency attachment is not 
necessary because on the lessee‟s insolvency the lessor automatically obtains 
preference over the proceeds of the sale in execution of the security object. It is 
accepted that the preference that the lessor acquires on the lessee‟s insolvency is 
less than what he acquires when the lessee is unwilling to pay the arrear rent. The 
amount claimable on the lessee‟s insolvency is provided for in section 85(2) of the 
Insolvency Act 24 of 1936. The effect of section 85(2) of the Act is that the lessor 
becomes a concurrent creditor for the balance of free residue in the lessee‟s 
insolvent estate.8 
Although the question as to whether the lessor‟s tacit hypothec or the 
instalment agreement hypothec should prevail upon the lessee‟s insolvency has not 
yet been decided by South African courts, relying on section 2(1)(b) of the Security 
by Means of Movable Property Act 57 of 1993, I conclude that the instalment 
agreement hypothec trumps the lessor‟s tacit hypothec. However, the academic 
literature seems to favour the view that the lessor‟s tacit hypothec prevails over the 
instalment agreement hypothec.9 
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 See chapter 2 section 2 4 2. 
6
 See chapter 2 section 2 5 1. 
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 See chapter 2 section 2 5 1 for a discussion of attachment. 
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 See chapter 2 section 2 5 2. 
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5 3 Extension of the tacit hypothec to third parties’ property 
In light of the general principles regulating the lessor‟s tacit hypothec discussed in 
the second chapter, the common law principle that provides for extension of the 
lessor‟s tacit hypothec to property belonging to third parties is discussed in Chapter 
three. More specifically, the chapter focuses on setting out the justifications for the 
extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec as well as the statutory protective measures 
developed under the common law and recently enacted statutory protection. 
The study of case law and literature shows that the extension of the lessor‟s 
tacit hypothec to third parties‟ property is justified on the basis of either of two 
theories, namely implied consent and the doctrine of estoppel.10 According to the 
implied consent theory the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec to third parties‟ 
property is founded on the premise that by allowing his property to be on the leased 
premises, the third party is taken to have impliedly consented that it may be utilised 
as security for the payment of the lessee‟s arrear rent.11 Case law analysis 
demonstrates that even though the requirements that the lessor must prove in order 
to succeed with the tacit hypothec against third parties‟ property developed in 
seventeenth-century Roman-Dutch law, a pivotal development took place in 
Bloemfontein Municipality v Jacksons Ltd.12 At this point it suffices to state that prior 
to the Appellate Division‟s decision in Bloemfontein Municipality v Jacksons Ltd a 
third party‟s property could only be subject to the lessor‟s tacit hypothec if it was 
brought on to the leased premises with the knowledge and consent of its owner, for 
the lessee‟s use and to remain on the leased premises permanently. The analysis of 
Bloemfontein Municipality v Jacksons Ltd has shown that the court extended the 
knowledge and consent requirement. As a result, third parties‟ property may be 
subject to the lessor‟s tacit hypothec even if the third party has no knowledge that his 
property is on the leased premises. This development had the effect of strengthening 
the lessor‟s rights on the one hand and weakening the protection of third parties on 
the other. It is also apparent from the analysis of the implied consent theory that the 
third party‟s knowledge and consent play a significant role in the application of the 
extension principle.13 The case law also shows that a further development regarding 
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the lessor‟s knowledge of the ownership of the property occurred in Paradise Lost 
Properties (Pty) Ltd v Standard Bank of SA (Pty) Ltd.14 The analysis of Paradise Lost 
Properties (Pty) Ltd v Standard Bank of SA (Pty) Ltd and academic comments on it 
shows that as a result of this judgment the lessor‟s knowledge requirement has been 
reduced from being a decisive requirement to a mere factor, and consequently the 
lessor‟s rights had been weakened.15 This means that where the lessor is in a 
position to find out the true ownership of the movable property but fails to do so, he 
will be held to have known of the true ownership of the property (thus his knowledge 
may be inferred from his conduct) and consequently, his hypothec cannot apply 
against such a third party‟s property. The chapter argues that the correct application 
of the requirements for the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec provides 
protection to third parties who might be affected by extension of the hypothec. 
The second theory for the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec relies on the 
doctrine of estoppel. Unlike the implied consent theory that developed in Roman-
Dutch law, the doctrine of estoppel is of English law origin. The application of the 
doctrine of estoppel to the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec implies that the 
third party‟s rei vindicatio against the lessor may be limited if certain requirements 
are met. The case law and academic literature show that even though South African 
courts have in several cases referred to the doctrine of estoppel as justification for 
the extension principle, none of the cases has been decided on it; instead, the cases 
were in fact decided on the basis of implied consent even when they refer to 
estoppel. 
Although the case law and academic literature demonstrate that these theories 
(implied consent and doctrine of estoppel) are relied on to justify the extension of the 
lessor‟s tacit hypothec to third parties‟ property, criticism against these theories is not 
lacking.16 Nevertheless I argue that the correct application of the requirements of the 
extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec may play a significant role in protecting third 
parties‟ property. Furthermore, I argue that what the courts label as the third party‟s 
implied consent is not actual implied consent as meant in contract law, since there is 
no contract between the third party and the lessor. My view is that consent in cases 
of the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec means that the law may ascribe 
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(impute) consent to the third party, provided that certain requirements are met. 
Therefore, my view is that the argument that a third party had impliedly consented to 
the lessor‟s tacit hypothec is irrelevant, since the lessor‟s tacit hypothec is a real 
security right created by operation of law and not a right deriving from contract. 
It was shown that the majority of case law favours the implied consent theory 
as a justification for the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec to third parties‟ 
property and also that in some cases the courts seemed to have accepted the 
doctrine of estoppel as a justification, even though without explicitly applying it. 
Consequently, it is argued that the court in Bloemfontein Municipality v Jacksons Ltd 
failed to develop the doctrine of estoppel, which at that point in time had already 
received judicial recognition as a basis for the extension of the lessor‟s tacit 
hypothec to a third party‟s property. In fact, I argue that the confusion surrounding 
the justifications of the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec to third parties‟ 
property is a result of the consolidation of the doctrine of estoppel and the consent 
doctrine into a single enquiry by the courts. Hence, I argue that a return to a dualistic 
approach will serve a useful purpose. Furthermore, both implied (imputed) consent 
and estoppel are justifications for the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec and as 
such they should only be applicable in cases where a third party‟s knowledge 
regarding his property being on the leased premises is established. Consequently, 
the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec should not apply in cases where the third 
parties had no knowledge of their property being on the leased premises or cases 
where the third parties have done everything to protect themselves against the 
extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec. 
In summary, I argue that the correct application of the requirements for the 
extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec will play a significant role in protecting third 
parties‟ property. Furthermore, since the Security by Means of Movable Property Act 
excludes a large number of potential cases in that it protects third parties who are 
instalment agreement creditors and notarial bond holders against the extension of 
the lessor‟s tacit hypothec, it appears that there will probably be few, if any, cases in 
which the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec will find application in practice 
based on the implied consent theory. Also, if the estoppel approach (inclusive of the 
fault requirement) is correctly applied, there may only be few cases in which estoppel 
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will serve as the basis for attachment, especially since the lessor must first prove the 
third party‟s negligence. 
 
5 4 The property clause 
Chapter 4 considers the question whether the extension of the lessor‟s tacit 
hypothec to property of third parties complies with section 25(1) of the Constitution. 
A further question, namely whether the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec to 
third parties‟ property constitutes an expropriation of property is also considered. The 
structure of the analysis set out in the FNB case is applied to the extension of the 
lessor‟s tacit hypothec to third parties‟ property to determine whether it complies with 
section 25(1) and section 25(2) of the Constitution. 
In the first instance, it has to be determined whether the common law principle 
that provides for the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec to goods belonging to 
third parties affects property as understood by section 25. It is argued that third 
parties‟ property is property as meant by section 25.17 Since the question whether 
third parties‟ movable property is property in terms of section 25 of the Constitution is 
answered in the affirmative, the next question is whether the creation of a real 
security right over and the attachment and sale in execution of third parties‟ property 
constitute a deprivation of the third parties‟ property. It is argued that the creation of 
a real security right by the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec and attachment of 
the third party‟s movable property is a deprivation of property in terms of section 
25(1) since it limits a third party‟s entitlement to dispose of his property as he 
wishes.18 
In the third instance, it has to be determined whether the deprivation is 
consistent with the provisions of section 25(1) of the Constitution. Section 25(1) 
provides that no one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general 
application and that no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property. It is argued 
that the common law principles that provide for extension of the lessor‟s tacit 
hypothec to third parties‟ property constitute law of general application that must 
comply with section 25(1). It is further argued that the common law principles that 
provide for extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec to property belonging to third 
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parties authorise deprivation of the third party‟s property.19 A deprivation is arbitrary if 
there is insufficient reason for it or if it is procedurally unfair. The purpose of the 
extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec to property belonging to third parties is to 
ensure payment of the arrear rent owed by the lessee to the lessor. It is argued that 
the enforcement of private debts such as this is a legitimate purpose. 
In line with the FNB decision I argue that section 114 of the Customs and 
Exercise Act and the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec have similar effects 
(creating real security rights over the property of third parties). However, they differ in 
that the lessor‟s tacit hypothec only extends to third parties‟ property if the property 
of the lessee and/or the sub-lessee proves to be insufficient to satisfy the lessor‟s 
claim for rent and unlike section 114 of Customs and Exercise Act, the extension of 
the lessor‟s tacit hypothec requires that certain requirements must be met before 
third parties‟ property could be subject to the lessor‟s tacit hypothec. My view is that 
these requirements serve as protection for third parties, whereas section 114 of 
Customs and Exercise Act provided no protection since it required only the presence 
of third parties‟ property on the premises in the possession or under the control of 
the customs debtor. My view is that if correctly applied and successfully proven, the 
requirements for the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec establish the necessary 
connection between the third party‟s property and the purpose of deprivation that 
would prevent the extension from being an arbitrary deprivation. Accordingly, I argue 
that the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec to third parties‟ property does not 
amount to arbitrary deprivation of third parties‟ property as meant by section 25(1) of 
the Constitution. 
Since I argue that that the common law principle that provides for the extension 
of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec to property belonging to third parties does not constitute 
an arbitrary deprivation of property, the next step of the FNB analysis is to determine 
whether the deprivation constitutes an expropriation for purposes of section 25(2). I 
argue that since expropriation cannot be authorised by common law, the common 
law principles that provide for the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec do not 
constitute expropriation. Accordingly, the chapter concludes that the extension of the 
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lessor‟s tacit hypothec to the property of a third party is consistent with section 25(1) 
of the Constitution, and therefore constitutionally valid.20 
 
5 5 Concluding remarks 
This thesis starts by considering the general principles regulating the lessor‟s tacit 
hypothec, with the aim to enable understanding of how the lessor‟s tacit hypothec 
developed and how it operates in practice. The thesis‟ main focus is on the extension 
of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec to property belonging to third parties. It is shown in 
Chapter three that the traditional justifications for the extension of the lessor‟s tacit 
hypothec are controversial, but that the correct application of the common law 
principles as well as the statutory protection that has been introduced to exclude a 
large number of cases from the reach of the extension nevertheless adequately 
protect third parties against the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec. In Chapter 
four, the extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec to property belonging to third parties 
is scrutinised in view of section 25 of the Constitution. It is concluded that the 
extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec to the property of a third party does not 
constitute an arbitrary deprivation as meant by section 25, and it is therefore 
constitutionally valid. 
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